Commitment savings products: theory and evidence by Hofmann, Anett
THE LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS AND POLITICAL SCIENCE
Commitment Savings Products
Theory and Evidence
Anett Hofmann
A thesis submitted to the Department of Economics of the London School of
Economics and Political Science for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.
London, July 2014.
Für meine Eltern Anke und Frank, deren Liebe und Unterstützung bis heute das
Bedingungsloseste ist, das ich in meinem Leben kennenlernen durfte.
2
Declaration
I certify that the thesis I have presented for examination for the PhD degree of the
London School of Economics and Political Science is solely my own work other
than where I have clearly indicated that it is the work of others. No chapters are
co-authored.
The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. Quotation from it is permitted,
provided that full acknowledgement is made. This thesis may not be reproduced
without my prior written consent. I warrant that this authorisation does not, to the
best of my belief, infringe the rights of any third party.
I declare that my thesis consists of 39,430 words.
Statement of Inclusion of Previous Work
I confirm that Chapter 1 is an excerpt from a previous study for the Master of Re-
search (MRes) degree in Economics at the LSE, awarded in July 2010. It was pub-
lished as an Economic Organisation and Public Policy Discussion Paper, No. 51, in
March 2014.
London, 31 July 2014
Anett Hofmann
3
Abstract
Recent literature promotes commitment products as a new remedy for overcoming
self-control problems and savings constraints. This thesis argues that the effects
of commitment may be very heterogeneous, and highlights the mechanisms under
which commitment may reduce welfare, rather than increase it. It also examines
a new type of commitment contract: A formal commitment savings account with
fixed regular instalments, introduced in a developing-country context.
Chapter 1 proposes that the popularity of costly or inflexible savings mecha-
nisms as well as of high-interest consumption loans may represent a demand for
commitment to fixed instalments. Using a newly collected dataset from Bangladesh,
it shows that the introduction of a regular-instalment commitment savings product
was associated with a large increase in average savings contributions.
The theoretical framework in Chapter 2 highlights the potential heterogeneity
behind such positive average effects: Commitment improves welfare when agents
have full knowledge of their preferences, including biases and inconsistencies. If
agents are imperfectly informed about their preferences, they may choose ill-suited
commitment contracts. I formally show that commitment contracts can reduce
welfare if the commitment is not strong enough to discipline the agent, result-
ing in costly default. I further show that such insufficient commitment contracts
are likely to be selected by time-inconsistent agents with ‘partially sophisticated’
preferences: Agents who are neither completely unaware nor fully aware of their
time-inconsistency, but anywhere in between those two extremes.
Chapter 3 describes a randomised experiment in the Philippines: I designed
and introduced a regular-instalment commitment savings product, intended to im-
prove on pure withdrawal-restriction products by mimicking the fixed-instalment
nature of loan repayment contracts. Individuals from a general low-income pop-
ulation were randomly offered to take up the product, and were asked to choose
the stakes of the contract (in the form of a default penalty) themselves. The result
is that a majority appears to choose a harmful contract: While the intent-to-treat
effect on bank savings for individuals assigned to the treatment group is four times
that of a withdrawal-restriction product (offered as a control treatment), 55 percent
of clients default on their savings contract. The explanation most strongly sup-
ported by the data is that the chosen stakes were too low (the commitment was too
weak) to overcome clients’ self-control problems. Moreover, both take-up and de-
fault are negatively predicted by measures of sophisticated hyperbolic discounting,
suggesting that those who are fully aware of their bias realise the commitment is
too weak for them, and avoid the product. The study suggests that research on new
commitment products should carefully consider the risk of adverse welfare effects,
particularly for naïve and partially sophisticated hyperbolic discounters.
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INTRODUCTION
Introduction
Commitment is popular. Contrary to predictions of the standard neoclassical model,
the last decade has seen a surge of evidence documenting a demand for (self-)
commitment contracts - roughly understood as a voluntary restriction of one’s fu-
ture choice set, in order to overcome intrapersonal conflicts.1 Applications are as
broad as the scope of human ambition, and range from gym memberships, diet
clubs and pension savings to self-imposed binding deadlines for academic papers.2
More informal arrangements include taking only a fixed amount of cash (and no
credit cards) when going shopping, not keeping alcohol or chocolate in the house,
and putting one’s alarm clock at the other side of the room.3 In the context of de-
veloping countries, documented demand for commitment devices goes back to the
literature on rotating savings and credit organisations (ROSCAs),4 the wandering
deposit collectors of South Asia and Africa,5 and more recent studies on newly
introduced commitment savings products.6
Why do people self-commit? Commitment entails the voluntary imposition of
constraints on future choices, thereby putting a cost on flexibility, which is weakly
welfare-reducing from a neoclassical perspective. Three types of models are fre-
quently cited to rationalise the observed demand for commitment: Models of quasi-
hyperbolic discounting (Strotz (1955), Laibson (1997) and O’Donoghue and Rabin
(1999)), models of temptation and self-control (Gul and Pesendorfer (2001), Gul
and Pesendorfer (2004), Banerjee and Mullainathan (2010)), and dual-self models
suggesting the existence of a long-run planning self and a short-run doing self (Fu-
denberg and Levine (2006)). All of these models generate preferences that are in-
consistent over time, and generally suggest that agents are more impatient over
current trade-offs (now vs. tomorrow) than over future trade-offs (one year vs. one
year plus one day). As a result, they procrastinate activities that involve immediate
1This paper focuses purely on self-commitment. It does not address commitment contracts
adopted with strategic motives with respect to others. Furthermore, the paper abstracts from com-
mitments entered into for convenience or other immediate benefits. As an example, the purchase of
Christmas gifts in October qualifies as self-commitment if the agent fears not having enough money
left in December, but not if the agent’s motivation is purely to avoid the Christmas rush.
2See DellaVigna and Malmendier (2006) for gym memberships as a commitment device, Benartzi
and Thaler (2004) for 401(k) pension savings, and Ariely and Wertenbroch (2002) for academic as-
signments.
3For an overview of commitment devices, see Bryan et al. (2010). For a humorous illustration, see
popular articles and Internet videos on the ‘money-shredding alarm clock ’.
4See Besley et al. (1993), Anderson and Baland (2002), Ambec and Treich (2007) or Gugerty (2007).
5See e.g. Besley (1995) on West Africa’s susu collectors.
6See Ashraf et al. (2006b), Brune et al. (2011) and Dupas and Robinson (2013) for the use of
withdrawal-restriction savings accounts, discussed further in Chapter 1. Also see Duflo et al. (2011)
for commitment to fertilizer use via advance purchase.
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costs and later rewards (saving for a new TV, going to the gym), and do too much
of activities that involve immediate gratification but later costs (using high-interest
credit cards, buying temptation goods). If individuals with such preferences realise
their own time-inconsistency, they will have a positive willingness to pay for com-
mitment devices which eliminate tempting options from their future choice sets (or
make them more expensive), thus allowing them to follow through with their plans
(to save, to eat healthily, to exercise). In theory, this will increase their welfare from
an ex-ante (or long-run) perspective.
Is commitment a good idea? Especially in the development literature, the an-
swer seems to be yes. Recent years have seen a multitude of papers promoting com-
mitment savings in particular as a remedy for behavioural savings constraints, and
thus as a possible way out of (credit-constraint based) poverty traps. Commitment
savings have been hailed as increasing savings levels (Ashraf et al. (2006b)), agri-
cultural input use (Brune et al. (2011)), pension contributions (Benartzi and Thaler
(2004)), microenterprise investment (Dupas and Robinson (2013)), and chances of
successful smoking cessation (Giné et al. (2010)).
The first chapter of this dissertation is concerned with the optimal design of
such commitment savings products. Drawing on evidence from Bangladesh, the
chapter proposes that the popularity of inflexible ROSCAs, costly deposit collec-
tors and (partly) of microcredit and informal borrowing may simply represent a
demand for a commitment savings product with fixed periodic contributions (here-
after: ‘regular saver product’), as it is commonly offered by banks in rich countries.
It presents observational evidence from a microfinance institution (MFI) in Dhaka,
where the introduction of a commitment savings product with fixed regular in-
stalments was associated with a 180 percent increase in average savings contribu-
tions after five months (estimated using a Difference-in-Difference methodology).
The product design mimics the fixed instalment structure found in loan repayment
contracts, thus providing an incentive to make regular future deposits and smooth
consumption. The study is motivated by empirical evidence suggesting that mi-
croloans and informal loans are often taken out for consumption purposes, or for
recurring business expenditures - rather than as a one-off investment.7 With loans
that are not directly required for income generation, the question arises why in-
dividuals are willing to pay substantial loan interest charges rather than choosing
to save. Especially for those who borrow in frequent cycles, the long-term differ-
ence between expensive loan cycles and equivalent savings cycles reduces to (i)
one initial loan disbursement and (ii) a binding fixed-instalment structure that is
7See e.g., Ananth et al. (2007).
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rarely available in savings products.8 The idea that time-inconsistent agents bene-
fit from commitment to fixed regular instalments has previously been discussed in
the context of loans (Fischer and Ghatak (2010), Bauer et al. (2012)). In contrast, the
existing literature on formal commitment savings products has largely focused on
withdrawal restrictions (see the discussion in Section 1.1).
Shifting the focus from the design to the strength (or the ‘stakes’) of a commit-
ment contract, the remainder of the dissertation asks: Are people good at choosing
the ‘right’ commitment contract? And if not, can commitment be harmful? By con-
struction, correctly choosing a welfare-improving contract requires some knowl-
edge about one’s preferences, including possible biases and inconsistencies: To de-
termine whether a contract will enable an agent to follow through with a plan,
the agent needs to anticipate how his future selves will behave under the contract.
Consequently, if the agent is overconfident, or imperfectly informed about his own
future preferences, the contract may result in undesirable behaviour, and the agent
may be hurt, rather than helped. Given that the very nature of most commitment
contracts is to impose penalties (usually of a monetary or social nature) for undesir-
able behaviour, adopting a commitment device that is ill-suited to one’s preferences
may ‘backfire’ and become a threat to welfare.9
The second and third chapter of this dissertation argue that commitment can
be harmful if agents select into the wrong commitment contract - and that they
frequently do. In Chapter 2, I develop a model of commitment under partial so-
phistication and stochastic income. The model shows that a savings product with
fixed regular instalments can benefit agents by increasing achievable savings lev-
els and smoothing savings contributions, as long as the ‘stakes’ of the contract (the
penalty upon default) are sufficiently high to enforce compliance. Given a full set
of contracts, ‘fully sophisticated’ agents (i.e., those with perfect knowledge of their
time preferences) always choose contracts which are ex-ante welfare-improving. In
contrast, commitment contracts can reduce welfare if the commitment is not strong
enough to discipline the agent, resulting in costly default. I show that such insuf-
ficient commitment contracts are likely to be selected by time-inconsistent agents
8Informal arrangements like ROSCAs may constitute an exception, but they are inflexible to an
individual member’s needs. Also, ROSCAs were not widely available in the study region. Deposit
collectors (see Ashraf et al. (2006a)), if available, provide another alternative - but a deposit collection
service does not commit the individual to deposit any particular amount, and the individual may be
tempted to deposit the minimum necessary to avoid social sanctions.
9Consider any type of commitment contract with front-loaded fees, such as retirement savings
products with acquisition or management costs. Fees are generally subtracted from the contributions
during the first few years of the contract, generating a ’J curve’ in the asset value. Canceling or
defaulting on the contract during early years generates high negative returns. A similar argument
can be made for front-loaded gym membership costs.
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with ‘partially sophisticated’ preferences: Agents who are neither completely un-
aware nor fully aware of their time-inconsistency, but anywhere in between those
two extremes. This effect is discontinuous at full sophistication, and may lead to
substantial welfare losses from commitment even when the discrepancy between
believed and actual degree of time-inconsistency is small.
In Chapter 3, I conduct a randomised field experiment with 913 individuals in
the Philippines. Individuals could sign up for a new commitment savings account
with fixed regular instalments, and were given the chance to choose the stakes of
the contract (in form of a default penalty) themselves. I find that the average ef-
fect on bank savings is large and significant: The Intent-to-Treat (ITT) effect on
bank savings is roughly four times that of a conventional withdrawal-restriction
product that was offered as a control treatment. However, a striking feature of the
results is that the median client appears to choose a ‘harmful’ contract: 55 percent of
clients default on their savings contract, and incur the associated penalty. The mag-
nitude and timing of defaults is difficult to reconcile with rational expectations and
idiosyncratic shocks (a ’bad luck’ scenario). Instead, it is suggestive of individuals
making ‘mistakes’ in contract choice. The explanation most strongly supported by
the data is that the chosen stakes were too low (the commitment was too weak) to
overcome clients’ self-control problems. In addition, both take-up and default are
negatively predicted by measures of sophisticated hyperbolic discounting, consis-
tent with the notion that those who are fully aware of their bias realise the commit-
ment is too weak for them, and stay away. The results from a subsequent repeat
marketing stage with the offer of ‘pre-ordering’ the product for a second round
support the impression that a significant share of clients took up the commitment
contract by mistake. Alternative explanations for default that find some support in
the data are income overoptimism and household conflict. A pure stochastic shock
explanation appears unlikely.
This dissertation builds and expands on the literature in three ways. First, it
provides the first causal evidence on the effect of a formal regular-instalment com-
mitment savings product:10 Chapter 1 uses the introduction of a regular-instalment
product in Bangladesh as a natural experiment to assess whether such products can
help individuals in overcoming savings constraints. Motivated by the encourag-
ing results of this case study (a large increase in savings contributions on average),
Chapter 3 introduces a regular-instalment product in a randomised setting. If it is
true that a significant share of the demand for microcredit and informal borrowing
is just a demand for commitment to fixed instalments, then we should expect to
10Previous literature has studied ROSCAs (see Besley et al. (1993) and the discussion in Section
1.1), but these are informal in nature, and inflexible to an individual member’s needs.
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see that the introduction of a fixed-instalment microsavings product will result in
(i) substantial increases in saving and (ii) a reduction in the demand for loans. I
find strong support for an increase in savings, and a large but statistically insignif-
icant reduction of loan demand. Furthermore, the dissertation provides the first
direct comparison of a regular-instalment savings product with a pure withdrawal-
restriction product.11 I estimate an average effect on bank savings that is about four
times the effect of the withdrawal restriction product. This is consistent with the
theoretical work of Amador et al. (2006), who show that when individuals value
both commitment and flexibility, the optimal contract involves a minimum (per-
period) savings requirement.
Second, to the author’s knowledge, it is the first study to explicitly discuss het-
erogeneous effects (and possible welfare risks) of commitment contracts, and link
these to measures of (partially) sophisticated time-inconsistency. This makes it clos-
est in spirit to DellaVigna and Malmendier (2006), who show that U.S. consumers
choose gym contracts which are cost-inefficient given their attendance frequency.
It also relates to the theoretical work of DellaVigna and Malmendier (2004). In the
realm of commitment savings, the literature has largely focused on positive aver-
age effects, highlighting the promising role that commitment savings could play in
overcoming behavioural savings constraints. However, welfare inference critically
depends on the distribution of effects in the population. I establish that these ef-
fects may be very heterogeneous, including the possibility of a majority being hurt
by the product. The results of this study complement previous findings: Ashraf et
al. (2006b) find that a withdrawal-restriction product increased savings by 81 per-
cent on average after 12 months, but 50 percent of the 202 clients made no further
deposits after the opening balance of 100 pesos. Out of 62 clients who selected an
amount goal, only six reached this goal within a year, suggesting that the remainder
may have their initial savings tied up indefinitely.12 Similarly, Dupas and Robinson
(2013) document that offering Kenyan women savings accounts with withdrawal
restrictions led to a 45 percent increase in daily business investment on average,
but 43 percent of women made no further deposits after opening the account. Fi-
11The withdrawal-restriction product tested in this study (Gihandom) directly corresponds to the
SEED product in Ashraf et al. (2006b): Terms and Conditions are identical, and the study locations
are 70km (2h by local bus) apart. The magnitude of estimated effects is comparable, considering that
Ashraf et al. (2006b) estimate an ITT of 411 pesos after 12 months in a sample of previous savings
account holders, whereas I estimate an ITT of 148 pesos after 4.5 months (on average) in a general
low-income population.
12Neither Ashraf et al.’s SEED product, nor the Gihandom product used in this study are fool-
proof, in the sense that clients could have borrowed the goal amount for five minutes from a friend,
deposited it at the bank, and received their savings back. Neither study finds any evidence that this
happened.
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nally, Giné et al. (2010) offered smokers in the Philippines a commitment contract
for smoking cessation, in which smokers would deposit savings into a withdrawal-
restriction account, and forfeit their savings to charity if they failed a nicotine test
after 6 months. The authors point out that offering the commitment contract in-
creased the likelihood of smoking cessation by 3 percentage points. Looking at het-
erogeneity, 66 percent of smokers who took up the product failed the nicotine test,
forfeiting an average of 277 pesos in savings. Interestingly, those who defaulted on
their contract had chosen much lower stakes relative to those who succeeded (suc-
cessful quitters saved 1,080 pesos on average). While the direction of causality is
unclear, this is consistent with the idea that individuals tend to choose commitment
products which are too weak to overcome their self-control problems. In summary,
a closer look at the heterogeneity behind average treatment effects in the literature
reveals that adverse effects of commitment products may be widespread.
Third, Chapter 3 proposes a novel measure of sophistication for time-inconsistent
agents. Previous literature has often assumed a one-to-one mapping from the
take-up of a commitment product to the presence of (fully) sophisticated time-
inconsistency (with the notable exception of Tarozzi and Mahajan (2011), who fol-
low a structural approach). Such a one-to-one mapping does not allow for the pos-
sibility that individuals may take up commitment products by mistake. I propose
a survey-based measure of sophistication, which relies on the interaction between
observed time-inconsistency (as measured by conventional time discounting ques-
tions), and measures of self-perceived temptation.
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Chapter 1
Regular Saver Products: Evidence
from Bangladesh
1.1 Motivation and Context
There are many reasons why even individuals with very low incomes have the
need to convert small everyday sums of money into larger lump sums. Among
them are life-cycle needs (such as marriage, childbirth, education or home build-
ing), insurance against emergencies (like sickness, loss of employment, natural dis-
asters) and business opportunities (e.g. buying land or a new machine). To obtain
these lump sums, individuals use a variety of financial services – many of which
are very costly. In particular, observational evidence indicates a popularity of bor-
rowing for consumption purposes, as well as for periodic business expenses (e.g.,
to maintain stock).1 In both cases, obtaining a loan is not essential to generating
the income that will repay it (as opposed to one-off investments, say, purchasing
a piece of land): Many business clients go through a loan cycle every month for
years, paying back in small instalments every week. A savings cycle with frequent
contributions differs from this in one initial loan disbursement, which pales in size
compared to annualized interest rates between 100 and 500 percent.2 Given such
interest rates, the decision to borrow rather than to save seems puzzling.
A similar puzzle is the popularity of costly or inflexible savings mechanisms:
Consider the wandering deposit collectors found in South Asia and Africa.3 Ruther-
ford (1999) illustrates their work with the example of a woman in India who collects
a fixed amount of 5 or 10 Rupees per day from a client. She returns their savings
1See e.g., Collins et al. (2009), the Indian vegetable vendors studied in Ananth et al. (2007), or
Rutherford (1999).
2See e.g., Rutherford (1999) or Ananth et al. (2007).
3See e.g. Besley (1995) on West Africa’s susu collectors.
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after 220 days, charging a fee of 20 days’ deposits for her service. This is equivalent
to an annualized interest rate of minus 30 percent. Demand for such services is high
– but there are few individuals who have built up the trust and reputation needed
to provide this service, severely limiting supply.
Finally, a savings mechanism that has been prominently featured in the litera-
ture (e.g. Besley et al. (1993), Gugerty (2007)) and is prevalent all across the devel-
oping world are rotating savings and credit organizations (ROSCAs). A ROSCA is
a group of people who meet regularly to each put a fixed amount of money into
a ‘pot’. The content of the pot is given to a different member of the group at each
meeting. While ROSCAs are costless, they are inflexible to an individual member’s
needs.
The obvious question to ask is: Why do people not just save at home, instead
of relying on such costly devices? An answer suggested in the existing literature
are hyperbolic (or quasi-hyperbolic) preferences,4 described in the introduction as
preferences which generate impatience over current trade-offs and (relative) pa-
tience over future trade-offs. Consequently, hyperbolic agents procrastinate saving.
This leads either to a failure to reach their savings target, or to a failure to smooth
consumption over time by saving too much in the last minute. If hyperbolic indi-
viduals become aware of their time-inconsistency, they will be willing to pay for
commitment savings products which enable them to overcome their present bias
by forcing them to save.
A second factor which receives increasing attention are financial claims from
relatives, neighbours and spouses. Slum communities and rural villages are often
close-knit social networks. If an individual has managed to save money at home,
she may be informally obligated to help out a neighbour who has fallen on hard
times, a relative who needs medical treatment, or simply a husband who claims
the remains of the household budget for personal expenses.5 Awareness of claims
on liquid assets may sharply reduce incentives to save in the first place. As in
the previous case, such individuals may develop a preference for commitment to
‘safeguard’ their savings.
In recent years, a burgeoning literature on commitment savings has confirmed
the empirical link between hyperbolic discounting, intra-household bargaining and
a preference for commitment: Bauer et al. (2012) find that individuals in their sam-
ple who have been identified as hyperbolic keep a lower proportion of their savings
4Most prominently, Laibson (1997) and O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999).
5See the literature on informal insurance and need-based gift exchange, e.g. Morduch (1999).
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at home and are more likely to borrow from microcredit organizations.6 Ashraf et
al. (2006b) find that hyperbolic preferences predict take-up of a commitment sav-
ings product which features withdrawal restrictions. Gugerty (2007) finds ROSCA
participation patterns to be consistent with both time-inconsistent preferences and
low intra-household bargaining power (only husband has formal sector income)
– i.e., individuals value public pressure to save. Finally, Anderson and Baland
(2002) find an inverted U-shaped relationship between women’s autonomy from
their husbands (as proxied by female share of household income) and participa-
tion in ROSCAs: Participation in ROSCAs is high when female autonomy is high
enough to persuade their husband to let them join, but not so high that the protec-
tion which the ROSCA provides is no longer needed.
This case study provides suggestive evidence that the demand for costly or in-
flexible informal savings mechanisms (such as ROSCAs and deposit collectors), as
well as the observed popularity of consumption loans and cyclical business loans,
may (partly) reflect a demand for a commitment savings product with fixed reg-
ular instalments. Using a model of hyperbolic discounting,7 it can be shown that
individuals cannot reach their welfare-maximising level of savings when saving at
home, and that a regular saver product can increase their achievable savings level,
as well as smooth savings contributions over time. Using a novel dataset with ad-
ministrative savings data for 2006-2010 from a small MFI in Bangladesh, it is found
that the introduction of a regular saver product is indeed associated with a large
increase in individual’s average savings contributions. The intuition is straightfor-
ward: If individuals are present-biased, the ability to tie themselves to a particular
savings schedule which they would not be able to stick to otherwise improves their
welfare by enabling them to afford lump-sum expenditures (such as school tuition
or a house repair). It may further improve their welfare by smoothing savings (and
consumption) over time. Regarding relatives or spouses’ claims, a regular saver
product will help by restricting withdrawals on past savings. For present savings,
if the penalties associated with default are high enough, the individual may be able
to argue that this money is ‘accounted for’ and cannot be used for a different pur-
pose.
While this view is neither new nor surprising, the existing literature on formal
commitment savings has focused almost exclusively on savings products featuring
6They also attribute the preference of present-biased women for microcredit over other sources of
borrowing to the structure and support that microcredit provides. However, the central feature of
fixed regular repayments is shared by virtually all other common forms of borrowing.
7The model originally developed for this case study is omitted here, as it is nested in the theo-
retical framework in Chapter 2. It corresponds to the special case of full sophistication (β˜ = β) and
deterministic income (λ = 0). The original model is available in Hofmann (2014).
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withdrawal restrictions, but without an obligation to deposit in the first place. No-
table examples include Ashraf et al. (2006b), who find a positive effect on savings
levels using a withdrawal-restriction product in the Philippines. Dupas and Robin-
son (2013) study a similar (though not as strict) withdrawal-restriction product in
Kenya and find increased investment in clients’ small businesses. Brune et al. (2011)
randomly offered withdrawal-restriction accounts to smallholder cash crop farm-
ers, and found a positive effect on agricultural input use, as well as on subsequent
crop sales and household expenditures. Other notable savings interventions in-
cluded text message reminders (Karlan et al. (2010)) and deposit collectors (Ashraf
et al. (2006a), Giné et al. (2010)).8 However, to the author’s knowledge, none of
the formal commitment savings accounts which have been studied so far commit
clients to make future deposits.
For a hyperbolic discounter, simply giving him the opportunity to restrict his
withdrawals will not do - he will be prevented from touching past savings, but
will have no added incentive to contribute further. Similarly, someone constrained
by relatives’ claims can protect past savings, but not current income (before vis-
iting the bank). Benartzi and Thaler (2004)’s ‘SMarT’ program in the U.S. allows
individuals to commit to allocating their future salary increases towards their re-
tirement savings. This comes closest to the objective of this study, in the sense that
the program imposes fixed (or even increasing) savings contributions. However,
the context of defined-contribution pension plans in the U.S. is very different from
the Bangladeshi slum context studied here.
This study takes advantage of a ‘natural experiment’ following the introduc-
tion of a commitment savings product with fixed regular contributions by the MFI
SafeSave in a slum community in Dhaka, Bangladesh, in June 2009. Using adminis-
trative savings data obtained from the MFI for the period 2006-2010, the case study
presents suggestive evidence on the effect of the regular saver product on individu-
als’ savings contributions. In a classical differences-in-differences estimation, I find
that savings contributions during a five-months period increase by 523Tk (about
U.S. $7) more relative to past year savings than those of a ‘control group’ formed
by later adopters of the product. This represents a 180 percent increase compared to
average previous year savings. Allowing for multiple ‘treatment groups’ depend-
ing on month of entry into the product further shows a significant effect for four or
more months of treatment.
8Also see Beshears et al. (2011) for a comparison of different withdrawal restrictions, Dupas and
Robinson (2011) for the effect of informal savings technologies on health investment, and Bryan et al.
(2010) for a review of commitment devices beyond savings.
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The estimates are to be taken with a pinch of salt: The data comes from a field
experiment, where selection into ‘treatment’ with the product is not randomly as-
signed, but self-selected. The resulting endogeneity is kept to a minimum by using
early adopters of the product as a treatment group and late adopters (who had the
product for only part of the period of observation) as a control group. The pa-
per takes the remaining endogeneity of adoption timing seriously and rules out as
many differences between early and late adopters as the data permits. I find that
the estimated treatment effect is robust and even increases when various controls
as well as pre-existing time trends for the treatment groups are included. Unfortu-
nately, it is impossible to control for all differences between early and late adopters.
Hence, this analysis of the effect of a commitment savings product with fixed reg-
ular contributions is best interpreted as a starting point for further research, and as
a motivation to improve on the estimates presented here using randomized control
methodologies (this is done in Chapter 3).
While it would ultimately be interesting to compare the performance of a sav-
ings product with restricted withdrawals to a savings product with fixed regular
contributions (also done in Chapter 3), this case study focuses on the question
whether regular saver products can increase savings levels (by overcoming sav-
ings constraints) relative to autarky. Severe data limitations mean that the analy-
sis is largely focused on average effects: While the dataset is novel and stretches
over four years, it is of administrative nature, and individual characteristics are
largely unobserved. When discussing time-inconsistency, the case study further
abstracts from the issue of sophistication, which will be crucial for the later parts of
this dissertation. Both the heterogeneity of treatment effects and the consequences
of (partially) sophisticated time-inconsistency will be addressed in the theoretical
framework in Chapter 2 as well as the experimental setting in Chapter 3.
1.2 The Data
The previous section suggested that individuals subject to short-term consump-
tion temptations and financial claims from relatives may benefit from a savings
product which enables them to commit to fixed contributions every period. The
remainder of Chapter 1 studies one such product: The Long Term Savings (LTS)
product offered by SafeSave, an MFI located in Dhaka, Bangladesh. SafeSave, which
was founded by microfinance researcher Stuart Rutherford in 1996, aims to pro-
vide day-to-day money management services such as basic savings and loan in-
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struments to the poor.9 In June 2009, SafeSave introduced the LTS product, enabling
clients to save either 50Tk or a multiple of 100Tk (about U.S. $1.3) each month for
a chosen contract length of 3, 5, 7 or 10 years. A particular feature of SafeSave is
branchless banking: ‘Field officers’ visit each client’s house every working day to
collect general savings, and once a month LTS savings. The only time clients need
to visit a bank branch is to open an account (general or LTS), or to take withdrawals
or loans in excess of 500Tk. These field officers informed clients about the new LTS
product in June 2009.
The analysis focuses on the 333 clients who opened an LTS account at a par-
ticular SafeSave branch (Bauniaband branch, the first to offer LTS) between June
2009 and February 2010, conditional on having had a general savings account since
August 2008 or longer.10 The variable of interest is the increase in clients’ savings
contributions after LTS adoption: Do clients save more when they use LTS? Data is
available on clients’ general savings level plus LTS savings as of 31 August and 31
January each year, between August 2006 and January 2010. This makes it possible
to compare savings contributions made during the five-month period from August
to January, for the years 2006 to 2009.11 During the last of these four periods, from
August 2009 to January 2010, LTS was available. This paper explores the variation
contained in the timing of LTS adoption: Those who adopted LTS soon after its
introduction in June 2009 were ‘treated’ with the product for the full five month
period of interest. Those clients who adopted LTS later in 2009 received ‘partial
treatment’ in the sense that they used LTS for only a fraction of the period from
August 2009 to January 2010. The analysis then compares whether the savings con-
tributions of ‘fully treated’ individuals increased more relative to previous years’
contributions than the savings of ‘partially treated’ or untreated individuals did.
The obvious difficulty with approaching LTS as a treatment is that assignment into
the treatment group does not occur randomly, as individuals select into the treat-
ment group by adopting early. The effects that can arise from such endogeneity of
treatment are discussed in Section 1.3.2 and Appendix A.
Two features of the LTS product design are worth noting for their divergence
from the later theory framework: First, interest rates are not perfectly identical
across commitment and non-commitment accounts. Interest rates for LTS are 7, 8,
9, and 10 percent for a 3, 5, 7, and 10 year contract, respectively, where the aver-
9For more details on SafeSave, see Rutherford (1999) and www.safesave.org.
10Of originally 334 clients, one was excluded as an outlier, as her savings in 2009 deviated from the
average in 2009 by -19.6 standard deviations, or -32,709Tk.
11Note that contributions made during January to August periods are not considered, as they span
seven months and may contain seasonal effects.
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age chosen contract length is 5.3 years. With inflation ranging around 9 percent in
2008 and 2009, the real interest rate on LTS is negative or roughly zero. It seems
unlikely that clients adopted LTS to increase the size of the pie, rather than for its
commitment features. However, it cannot be ruled out that individuals chose LTS
to evade inflation, not because they wanted or needed commitment. In compari-
son, the (non-commitment) general savings account pays 6 percent interest with-
out any commitment.12 Given the uncertainty of most slum dwellers’ incomes and
consumption needs, it seems doubtful whether a client who does not desire com-
mitment would sign a 5-year contract for an additional 2 percent of interest.
Secondly, the penalty upon canceling the LTS contract is complex: If a client
runs three months or less behind on payments, a small nominal ‘service fee’ needs
to be paid to catch up on any past missed payments. If he is more than three months
behind, the LTS contract is canceled, and the penalty imposed is that he loses all
LTS interest payments above the general account interest rate, with retrospective
effect since he opened his LTS. For simplicity, the three-month grace period may be
thought of as one period within a theoretical framework. The penalty for canceling
LTS is more ‘lost bonus’ than actual penalty, in the sense that agents receive the
same returns which they would have received, had they never joined LTS. If agents
are rational, this will reduce the efficacy of the product. For behavioural agents
who exhibit reference dependence and loss aversion, the penalty would still be
effective: While holding an LTS, individuals are likely to adjust their reference point
to the higher interest payments they believe to accumulate over time, and will be
reluctant to give them up. This ambiguity in the design of the commitment product
will be corrected in the experimental setting in Chapter 3.
1.3 Estimation
1.3.1 The Differences-in-Differences Approach
An obvious first step to estimate the effect that LTS has on client’s savings is to look
at how much early adopters saved between August 2009 and January 2010, i.e.,
while using LTS, and compare this to their savings during previous years’ August
to January periods. To isolate time effects, this change in savings contributions
can be compared to the change in savings of a control group during the same time
period. The resulting differences-in-differences (DD) estimate can be interpreted as
a causal treatment effect only under the strong assumption that the treatment group
12This interest rate of 6 percent requires a savings balance of at least 1000Tk – a criterion that 285
of 333 clients in our sample satisfied as of August 2009.
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would have evolved identically to the control group, had they not been treated
(i.e., had they not used LTS). The plausibility of this assumption will be discussed
in Section 1.3.2. The first part of the analysis considers all clients who adopted
LTS between June 2009 and September 2009 (‘early adopters’) as ‘treated’, while
those who adopted LTS between October 2009 and February 2010 (‘late adopters’)
are used as a control group. Note that LTS deposits must be made on the 20th
of each month, and ‘adopting LTS in September’ means that clients chose to first
contribute to LTS on 20th of September. Hence, clients adopting LTS in September
can be considered as ‘fully treated’ in the sense that they contributed on all LTS
payment dates between 31 August 2009 and 31 January 2010.
Table 1.1 presents descriptive statistics of clients’ characteristics (as far as avail-
able), the LTS contract options they chose, and their average savings contributions
by group. Column (1) of Table 1.2 presents the regression estimates of a DD ap-
proach generalized to multiple time periods, which at this point should be inter-
preted as correlations only. The regression equation is
Sit = α+ γTi + λt + βDit + eit
where Sit are an individual’s savings contributions (general plus LTS savings) in
period t, i.e. the difference between their savings balances in January of year t + 1
and August of year t. Ti is a dummy that switches on for individuals who adopted
LTS in or before September 2009, λt is a vector of year dummies for 2006-2009, and
Dit is a treatment dummy that switches on for observations of treated individuals
in 2009. The estimated βˆ shows that, on average, early adopters increased their
savings contributions by 523 Tk (about $7) more relative to past year savings than
late adopters did during the treatment period. At average contributions of 290Tk in
the previous year, this implies an increase in savings of 180 percent. The treatment
group coefficient γˆ is not significant: Early adopters did not appear to save more
(in contribution levels) than late adopters before LTS was introduced.
TABLE 1.1: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Early Adopters Late Adopters All
Age 30.6 32.9 31.4
Female 89.7 89 89.5
Occupation (percent)
Housewife 66.5 52.3 61.9
Small Business 6.7 15.6 9.6
continued on next page
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Early Adopters Late Adopters All
Private Service 11.6 9.1 10.8
Handicrafts 6.7 12.8 8.7
Student 8.5 10.2 9.0
LTS Entry Month (percent)
June 2009 27.9
July 2009 17.7
August 2009 11.4
September 2009 10.2
October 2009 7.2
November 2009 4.5
December 2009 3.0
January 2010 11.7
February 2010 6.3
LTS Contract Details
Contract Length (years) 5.1 5.76 5.3
Monthly Deposit (Taka) 210 235 218
Purpose of LTS Contract
Education 56 51.4 54.6
Ornaments 1.4 1.8 1.5
Land Purchase 5.8 9.2 6.9
House Construction 1.3 0.9 1.2
Medical Treatment 4.9 0.9 3.6
Marriage 10.7 12.8 11.4
Business 19.9 23 20.8
Mean Savings Contributions
Aug 2006 - Jan 2007 318 197 277
Aug 2007 - Jan 2008 323 301 316
Aug 2008 - Jan 2009 292 285 290
Aug 2009 - Jan 2010 1064 499 879
Observations 224 109 333
Notes: “Early Adopters” are all clients who adopted an LTS contract at Bauniaband branch between
June and September 2009. “Late adopters” are all clients who adopted an LTS contract at
Bauniaband branch between October 2009 and February 2010. While income data was not available
on client level, bank staff estimate average monthly household income between 5000 and 6000 Tk.
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TABLE 1.2: IMPACT OF A REGULAR SAVER PRODUCT
Dependent Variable: Change in Total Savings from August (t) to January (t+1)
(1) (2) (3)
Treatment group*2009 523.1*** 654.6*** 750.9***
(195) (209) (264)
Treatment group 42.45 39.90 148.3
(58.3) (61.9) (240)
Treatment group trend -51.16
(106)
Female 4.513 4.570
(174) (134)
Age 24.70* 24.70*
(13.0) (14.6)
Age² -0.308** -0.307*
(0.15) (0.18)
Interaction Area*2009 NO YES YES
Time effects YES YES YES
Occupation FE NO YES YES
Robust SEs YES YES NO
R-squared 0.06 0.08 0.08
Observations 1185 1185 1185
*significant at 10 percent; **significant at 5 percent; *** significant at 1 percent. Exchange rate is
about 100Tk for US $1.3.
The cut-off between early and late adopters may seem arbitrary, given that joining
LTS was possible every month. Alternatively, the concept of treatment and con-
trol group can be generalized to allow for separate treatment groups depending on
month of LTS entry. This allows us to test whether savings increase in the number
of months that a client used LTS – in other words, whether the coefficient on treat-
ment in the savings equation increases in the number of months that a client was
‘treated’ with LTS.13 The regression equation becomes
Sit = α+ γmTi + λt + βmDit + eit
13This is similar in concept (but much simpler in implementation) to the approach of Duflo (2001),
who showed that a higher degree of exposure to a school construction program in Indonesia had
increased effects on wages and education.
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where m indexes months of treatment. The equation contains a vector of treatment
group effects γm (dummy Ti is one if individual i was “treated” m months), a vector
of time effects λt, and a vector of treatment effects βm, where Dit is a vector of dum-
mies that switches on for observations in 2009 for individuals treated for m months.
Treatment varies at the individual level, and the analysis explicitly assumes that ob-
servations are independent at the individual level, i.e., there is no group structure
to the time-individual specific errors eit (see Section 1.3.3 for concerns regarding
the error structure).
Column (1) of Table 1.3 reports the regression estimates of a DD with five treat-
ment groups, ranging from two to six months of treatment. One and zero months
of treatment (January and February adopters) have been combined as a control
group. The six months group (June-August adopters) has been added to account
for possible differences between those who already held an LTS when the period of
observation started on 31 August, and those who only joined LTS on the first rele-
vant payment day on 20th September. The regression in column (1) shows an even
stronger correlation of savings with treatment than before: While the effects for six,
five and four months are highly significant, the coefficient on treatment peaks at
1177Tk ($15) for five months treatment, i.e., September adopters, and then roughly
decreases in level and significance as duration of treatment drops. It is interesting
to observe that all group and time effects are insignificant – suggesting that levels
of savings contributions were roughly the same across groups before treatment.
1.3.2 Endogeneity Concerns
The previous section pointed out that ‘treatment’ in the form of early LTS adoption
is highly correlated with higher savings, but has refrained from making any state-
ments of causal nature. A necessary requirement to make causal statements in an
OLS regression is that the coefficient of interest can be estimated consistently, which
in turn requires that regressors are uncorrelated with the error term. In our case,
this requirement asks that treatment is orthogonal to anything that determines sav-
ings. This may not be plausible considering that treatment is self-selected, i.e., there
may be omitted variables in the error term which cause individuals to both adopt
the product early, and to save more. Much of the appeal of DD estimation comes
from the fact that it avoids many of the endogeneity problems commonly associ-
ated with comparisons between heterogeneous individuals: In particular, omitted
variables that are either time-invariant or group-invariant will not affect the va-
lidity of a DD estimation, even if they are correlated with treatment or take-up.
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TABLE 1.3: IMPACT OF A REGULAR SAVER PRODUCT - MULTIPLE TREATMENT GROUPS
Dependent Variable: Change in Total Savings from August (t) to January (t+1)
(1) (2) (3)
Treatment Effects
Six months treatment 759.2*** 863.9*** 816.3**
(262) (275) (331)
Five months treatment 1177*** 1265*** 1094**
(404) (410) (474)
Four months treatment 963.6*** 885.9*** -0.476
(334) (319) (533)
Three months treatment 306.3 263.4 210.2
(416) (422) (632)
Two months treatment 518.7 529.7 851.0
(435) (445) (755)
Group Effects
Six months 51.44 46.14 -5.095
(61.0) (67.4) (298)
Five months -54.91 -77.43 -269.6
(152) (159) (443)
Four months -58.76 -96.10 -1125**
(128) (134) (507)
Three months 127.3 113.5 53.23
(109) (111) (577)
Two months -154.0 -103.9 286.6
(147) (160) (735)
Group specific trends
Trend (6 months) 24.75
(132)
Trend (5 months) 90.97
(195)
Trend (4 months) 478.5**
(222)
Trend (3 months) 27.98
(257)
Trend (2 months) -177.2
(318)
Female -6.061 -6.042
(174) (135)
Age 23.42* 24.00
(13.8) (15.1)
Age² -0.292* -0.299
(0.16) (0.19)
Interaction Area*2009 NO YES YES
Time effects YES YES YES
Occupation FE NO YES YES
Observations 1185 1185 1185
R-squared 0.07 0.09 0.10
Robust SEs YES YES NO
*significant at 10 percent; **significant at 5 percent; *** significant at 1 percent.
Note: Exchange rate is about 100Tk for US $1.3.
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Starting from the equation
Sit = αi + λt + βDit + γzi + eit
where zi is unobserved, the classic two-period DD estimator βˆ = ∆S¯Tt − ∆S¯Ct dif-
ferences out any effects that are constant either across time or across individuals.
As an illustration, suppose that higher income causes early take-up, and higher
income also causes higher savings levels, but it does not cause different savings
time trends. Then the effect of income is time-invariant, and thus income will not
bias the DD estimator. The real problem for the DD approach adopted are unob-
servables which cause both early adoption and a change in the savings time trend.
The following decomposition for the two-period case illustrates this: The treatment
effect that we are ultimately interested in is
E[STit − SNTit | T]
where E[SNTit | T] are the expected savings of a treatment group individual in ab-
sence of treatment. The DD coefficient that we estimate converges to
E[STit − SNTi, t−1 | T]− E[SNTit − SNTi, t−1 | NT]
which can be decomposed into
E[STit − SNTit | T]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Treatment E f f ect
+ E[SNTit − SNTi, t−1 | T]− E[SNTit − SNTi, t−1 | NT]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Selection Bias
.
In other words, the identifying assumption is that
E[SNTit − SNTi, t−1 | T] = E[SNTit − SNTi, t−1 | NT].
The estimator is biased if the (counterfactual) change in savings for the treatment
group absent treatment is different from the change in savings for the control group.14
Given the lack of a suitable instrumental variable, this case study will not be able
to fully solve the endogeneity problem. Instead, the remainder of this section will
take a closer look at the selection bias by suggesting possible differences between
early and late adopters, controlling for them where possible, and discussing their
implications for savings behaviour.
14See Besley and Case (2000) for a clear discussion of endogenous treatment and possible remedies
in the case of policy choice.
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Shedding Light on LTS Adoption
The most obvious step in analysing take-up is to test whether observable char-
acteristics can predict the timing of LTS adoption. Table 1.4 presents the results of
regressing LTS entry month on age, occupation, gender and area of residence. Like-
wise, it may be interesting to look at correlations of contract choices, i.e., whether
early adopters chose higher monthly contributions. Table 1.5 presents a regression
of entry month on other choices – which is purely to illustrate correlations and
should be interpreted as such.
Table 1.5 suggests that early adopters were more likely to choose shorter con-
tracts, but committed to roughly similar monthly contributions. They also opened
their general bank accounts at the same time. Table 1.4 reveals that while age, gen-
der and occupation are not associated with adoption timing, the area where clients
live strongly predicts when they took up the LTS product. The importance of area
may seem striking, considering that SafeSave only operates within a one kilometre
radius of a bank branch (in this case, Bauniaband branch), so the areas considered
are relatively small and close together. The addition of a deposit-collection service
means that transaction costs are independent of area. At first sight, this may look
like an omitted variable bias: For instance, area may be correlated with income,
which may influence take-up. While individual income data is not available, ob-
servational evidence from field officers who visit each client every day suggests
that all areas are comparatively poor. Second, insights such as those from Bertrand
et al. (2004b) suggest that situational factors such as walking distance to the branch
(to sign an LTS contract) may be important for take-up. Walking distances are Block
A (5min), Block B (10min), Block C (16min), Block D (12min), Block E (12min), Kur-
mitola and Mirpur (5-15min). With Block C being the farthest from the branch and
at the same time the earliest to adopt LTS, the distance explanation does not seem
plausible.
There are various other explanations for a ‘patchwork pattern’ of adoption, such
as herding behaviour and other mechanisms of technology adoption.15 Appendix
A discusses these explanations in detail and shows that, in particular with herd-
ing behaviour, random factors may lead to a profitable innovation spreading very
quickly in one area, and not at all or with considerable delay in another area, even
if individuals are completely homogeneous in their savings preferences (implying
zero selection bias). Factors which may determine adoption timing independent of
area include different degrees of risk aversion and the amount of benefit which in-
dividuals derive from the product: Suppose information about the manageability
15Compare Besley and Case (1994) and Foster and Rosenzweig (1995).
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TABLE 1.4 TABLE 1.5
PREDICTING LTS ADOPTION TIMING LTS CONTRACT CHOICES
Dependent Variable:
LTS Entry Month (1=June 2009)
Dependent Variable:
LTS Entry Month (1=June 2009)
Female -0.0859 Quarter of bank
entry
-0.00972
(0.55) (1=2000Q1) (0.016)
Age -0.00975 Contract length (yrs) 0.161**
(0.061) (0.070)
Age² 0.000243 Monthly deposit (Tk) 0.0000952
(0.00077) (0.00088)
Occupation FE Purpose of LTS contract
Housewife 0.151 Marriage -0.573
(0.65) (0.54)
Handicrafts 0.972 Education -0.710*
(0.77) (0.38)
Small Business 0.462 Ornaments 0.172
(0.80) (1.37)
Private Service 0.0203 Land Purchase 0.0270
(0.75) (0.67)
Area of Residence House Construction -0.194
Bauniaband Block B -1.302*** (1.38)
(0.43) Medical Treatment -1.413*
Bauniaband Block C -1.396*** (0.85)
(0.42) Constant 3.558***
Bauniaband Block D -0.587 (0.63)
(0.49) Observations 333
Bauniaband Block E -0.574 R-squared 0.04
(0.48) *significant at 10 percent;
Kurmitola 2.374*** **significant at 5 percent;
(0.90) ***significant at 1 percent.
Mirpur 1.617* Notes: The omitted category for
(0.92) purpose is Business.
Constant 4.228***
(0.97)
Observations 333
R-squared 0.12
*significant at 10 percent; **significant at 5
percent; *** significant at 1 percent.
Notes: The omitted category for occupation
is student. The omitted category for area is
Bauniaband Block A.
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of LTS is a public good. Early adopters will be those who derive the largest poten-
tial benefit from the product, and thus have the highest stake in learning about it -
for instance, because their time-inconsistency prevents them from achieving a de-
sired savings goal (commonly a lump-sum expenditure) without commitment, but
a commitment product with fixed instalments does make their savings goal achiev-
able (anticipating the theoretical framework in Chapter 2, this corresponds to the
range β ∈ [βˆB, βˆ)). Individuals who could have reached their savings goal without
commitment, but who benefit from commitment through smoother savings contri-
butions (in theory terms, β ≥ βˆ), may still adopt LTS, but wait for others to adopt
first. Appendix A elaborates on this argument and shows that the implications for
a possible selection bias are ambiguous, instead pointing towards heterogeneous
treatment effects.
Unfortunately, the data do not allow a further disentanglement of which factors
were at work in adoption timing. Most plausibly, it was a mixture of the above plus
some factors which have not been discussed – like shocks that occurred simultane-
ously with treatment. Ultimately, what matters for the estimated treatment effect
is whether the factors which determined adoption also determined savings trends
absent treatment. The following subsection will attempt to control for two sources
of selection bias.
1.3.3 Adjusting the Estimation Strategy
How can we eliminate or at least reduce a possible selection bias in order to isolate
the treatment effect? First, the effect of area can be controlled for by interacting
the treatment period (2009) with the area dummies. Suppose time-individual spe-
cific effects were such that clients in areas who adopted early (like Block C) would
have increased their savings even without treatment. Early adoption leads to dis-
proportional representation of these clients in the treatment group and biases the
estimated treatment effect. Including 2009*area as a control will capture this effect.
Column (2) of Tables 1.2 and 1.3 show that including these area interactions further
increases the treatment effect, and suggests that early adoption blocks B, D and E
would have decreased their savings absent treatment.
A second source of selection bias that can be controlled for are pre-existing
trends. In other words, if early adopters are different from late adopters in a way
that causes them to follow different savings time trends before treatment, this can
be controlled for by including a time trend specifically for the treatment group. Col-
umn (3) of Tables 1.2 and 1.3 show that the estimated treatment effects are largely
robust to including treatment-specific time trends. Time trends are mostly insignif-
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icant, suggesting that savings patterns of the treatment and the control group were
comparable before treatment. Clients treated for four months (October entrants)
constitute a special case, as their treatment effect is fully absorbed by a large neg-
ative group effect and a large positive time trend. This is almost certainly due to
the fact that the regressors explain only four periods of data, and would disappear
with a longer time series.
An important source of bias remains in time-individual specific shocks which
occurred simultaneous with LTS introduction: For instance, if there was a change
in circumstance for a particular group of people which caused them to both adopt
early and increase their savings (absent treatment), then the estimate of the treat-
ment effect is biased upwards. Unless these shocks target specific age, occupation
or area groups, the scarce nature of the data prevents attempts to control for the re-
sulting bias. As a consequence, the treatment regressor is plausibly still correlated
with the time-individual specific error. The logical next step is an instrumental
variable analysis – but lacking a suitable instrument, this step has to be postponed
until more comprehensive data is available.
Concerns about Standard Errors
After discussing at length a possible bias of the treatment effect estimator, it is
worth taking a closer look at the accuracy of the standard errors. Bertrand et al.
(2004a) point out that serial correlation in the dependent variable severely biases
standard errors in many DD analyses: If the dependent variable is positively cor-
related, OLS overstates the amount of information contained in the data and thus
understates standard errors. This bias is particularly severe if the treatment vari-
able is of a ‘switch-on’ nature and thus itself serially correlated. The bias increases
in the length of the time series. Applying these factors to the present analysis,
serial correlation can likely be ruled out as a significant source of bias: The depen-
dent variable, savings contributions, is the first difference obtained from savings
balances. Unless savings balance is an explosive time series, savings contributions
will not exhibit positive serial correlation. If savings balance does not have a unit
root but exhibits autocorrelation of 0 < ρ < 1, savings contributions will be nega-
tively correlated, leading to an overstatement of standard errors. However, the time
span of the data is short (4 periods) and ends after the treatment period, preventing
autocorrelation of treatment. Therefore, it seems unlikely that serial correlation of
any sign had a significant effect on standard errors.
Another frequent concern in the DD literature is the clustering of the error
terms. Grouped error terms are a concern when the outcome of interest varies at
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the individual level while treatment varies only at the group level.16 This is not the
case here, as both savings and treatment vary for each individual.
A final concern addressed here is heteroscedasticity of regression residuals,
which may result from heteroscedastic errors in the true model, or simply from a
nonlinear conditional expectation function E[Sit | Dit, Xit]. While robust standard
errors improve on conventional ones asymptotically, Angrist and Pischke (2009)
show that when heteroscedasticity is modest, robust standard errors are more bi-
ased than OLS errors. They propose a rule-of-thumb to use the maximum of con-
ventional and robust standard errors, which has been applied throughout the anal-
ysis: For every regression column in Tables 1.2 and 1.3, the maximum of conven-
tional and robust standard errors was reported, with the choice of errors indicated
in the last row of the table.
1.4 Conclusion and Outlook
This case study has presented some first empirical evidence on the effect of a com-
mitment savings product with fixed periodic contributions in a slum in Dhaka,
Bangladesh. The analysis indicates that clients who used the product during the
entire observation period increased their savings significantly relative to clients
who only used the product for a part of the observation period. I also find that
the effect of the product is significant for four or more months of treatment.
In attempting to understand the nature of the endogeneity, the study finds a
significant effect of area on adoption timing, but no correlation of adoption timing
with other savings choices, such as monthly contribution or bank entry timing. I
also estimate that early and late adopters follow the same savings trends before
treatment. A story of herding behaviour or other technology adoption mechanisms
would be consistent with this evidence, explaining differences in adoption timing
without necessarily implying a selection bias. However, the endogeneity problem
cannot be fully resolved due to possible unobservable time-individual specific ef-
fects. A related issue is the potential heterogeneity of treatment effects: While the
benefit of the product may consist in reaching a previously unattainable savings
goal for some individuals, it may simply consist in smoothing savings contribu-
tions for others (this can be motivated theoretically, see Chapter 2).
The objective of the study is to provide a motivation for further research into
regular saver products, and to tackle the plethora of questions it does not answer:
First, a randomized controlled experiment would help to account for unobserved
16See Angrist and Pischke (2009), Chapter 8.2.
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determinants of participation by giving the product only to a fraction of those who
want it, and using the others as a control group. Second, the present analysis lacks
data on individuals’ time preferences. Surveys and lab experiments are needed to
identify individuals’ time preferences as well as the strength of the social claims on
their savings, in order to link hyperbolic discounting and relatives claims’ to a de-
mand for regular saver products. Third, it is desirable to more explicitly compare
the performance of different types of commitment savings products – e.g., high
frequency versus low frequency deposit products, versus the pure withdrawal-
restriction products which have been a subject of academic interest in recent years.
The randomized field experiment in Chapter 3 attempts to answer some of these
questions.
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Chapter 2
Theoretical Framework:
Commitment under Partial
Sophistication
The following chapter develops a formal understanding of the interaction between
commitment and partial sophistication. Focusing specifically on a regular-instal-
ment savings product, it sheds light on (i) why sophisticated hyperbolic discoun-
ters can benefit from commitment to fixed instalments, (ii) why commitment re-
duces welfare if it is too weak to be effective, (iii) why partially sophisticated hy-
perbolic discounters are likely to select into such weak commitment contracts, and
(iv) why those with high perceived degrees of time-inconsistency may avoid com-
mitment. The autarky setting (Section 2.2) is based on the autarky savings frame-
work in Basu (2014), generalised to allow for partial sophistication and stochastic
income (creating a need for flexibility). Using this setting as a benchmark, I then in-
troduce a commitment savings product with regular instalments (Section 2.3). The
commitment design differs from previous models of commitment products by a de-
fault penalty that is conditional on per-period contributions, and the simultaneous
absence of any withdrawal restrictions. A version of the regular-instalment de-
sign with full sophistication and deterministic income was developed in Hofmann
(2014) (it is nested in the current model).
Consider an agent who chooses whether to save for a nondivisible good which
costs the lump-sum 2 < p < 3 and yields a benefit b > 3. The agent lives for 3
periods and receives a per period income of 1 (barring shocks), which he can either
consume or save. He cannot borrow. His instantaneous utility is twice differen-
tiable and strictly concave, with u′(c) > 0, u”(c) < 0, and u′(0) = ∞. Throughout,
assume the interest rate is R = 1 and δ = 1 for simplicity. Define st as the amount
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of savings that he sends from period t to t + 1, so that ct = yt + st−1 − st ≥ 0.
Lifetime utility as evaluated in each period is given by the discounted sum of the
instantaneous utilities:
Ut = u(ct) + β
3
∑
k=t+1
u(ck)
For β < 1, the agent is present-biased: He exhibits a lower rate of discount over
current trade-offs (t vs. t + 1) than over future trade-offs (t + s vs. t + s + 1, s >
0). Following O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999), the agent’s degree of sophistication
about his present bias is captured in the parameter β˜ ∈ [β, 1], which he believes he
will use in all future periods. In particular, the agent believes in period t that his
utility function in period t + s will be
Ut+s = u(ct+s) + β˜
3
∑
k=t+s+1
u(ck).
For a fully sophisticated agent, β˜ = β. A fully naive agent believes he will behave
time-consistently in the future, captured in β˜ = 1.
A need for flexibility is introduced through stochastic income shocks: With a
per-period probability of λ, the agent loses his income in that period. This shock
has a variety of interpretations: It can be interpreted directly as a loss of income,
e.g., from redundancy, bad business, or illness of an income-earning household
member. With a minor modification, it can be interpreted as a reduced-form taste
shock: Suppose the sudden illness of a family member changes preferences such
that utility stays unchanged if a hospital visit (at cost 1) is consumed and paid for,
and drops to u(c) = −∞ without a hospital visit. The implication of a shock is
that the agent’s lifetime income drops to (at most) 2, which means the nondivisible
good can no longer be purchased. When a shock hits, any plans to save for the
nondivisible are abandoned, and existing savings are optimally spread over the
remaining periods for consumption. This results in a third interpretation: More
generally, the shock λ corresponds to the probability that, for any time-consistent
reason, the agent no longer finds it optimal to save for the nondivisible.1
While there is much ambiguity over the definition of welfare for time-inconsistent
agents, the paper will follow the convention proposed by O’Donoghue and Rabin
(1999): An agent’s welfare is evaluated from an ex-ante perspective, and corre-
sponds to the lifetime utility of the period 0 agent:
1Another time-consistent explanation why an agent may no longer wish to purchase the nondivis-
ible are state-dependent preferences. In contrast to income shocks, this would not necessarily result
in a precautionary savings motive.
37
2.1. FIRST BEST
W = E[u(c1) + u(c2) + u(c3)].
The advantage of this convention is that no particular period is favoured (since no
consumption takes place in period 0).
2.1 First Best
I assume throughout that b, p are such that it is optimal for a time-consistent agent
to save for the nondivisible. For λ = 0, consumption smoothing implies that the
agent optimally distributes the required savings burden of p− 1 evenly over peri-
ods 1 and 2, and uses his period 3 income plus accumulated savings to purchase
the good. Denote the implied savings profile as s1 =
p−1
2 ≡ s¯, s2 = p− 1 = 2s¯. For
λ > 0, there is a precautionary savings motive, even if the agent does not intend to
save for the nondivisible good. Denote such precautionary savings sNot . It can be
shown that the optimal savings path is slightly increasing, i.e., s1 < s¯.2 Since the
present analysis focuses on regular-instalment products, I assume that desirability
of the nondivisible still holds for fixed equal instalments s¯ ≡ p−12 :
(1− λ)2[2u(1− s¯) + (1− λ)u(b) + λu(p− 1)]
+ (1− λ)λ[u(1− s¯) + u(s¯− sNo2 ) + E(u(y3 + sNo2 ))]
+ λ[u(0) + E(u(y2 − sNo2 ) + u(y3 + sNo2 ))]
≥ E[u(y1 − sNo1 ) + u(y2 + sNo1 − sNo2 ) + u(y3 + sNo2 )] (2.1)
where sNot is chosen to optimally spread available current assets over the remaining
future periods, conditional on not buying the nondivisible (i.e. sNot = f (yt, st−1, λ)).
Inequality 2.1 reflects the ‘survival probabilities’ of the savings plan: With probabil-
ity (1− λ)2, no shock occurs in period 1 and 2, thus c1 = c2 = 1− s¯, and the period
2 self successfully transfers 2s¯ = p− 1 to period 3. If no shock hits in period 3, the
agent buys the nondivisible and consumes c3 = b. If a shock does hit, he is unable
to buy the good, and consumes c3 = p − 1 instead. The second and third line of
inquality 2.1 account for the case that saving fails because of a shock realization in
period 2 (probability (1− λ)λ) or period 1 (probability λ), respectively.
2The probability of remaining shock-free (and thus obtaining the nondivisible) increases over time,
from (1 − λ)3 ex-ante to (1 − λ) once period 2 has been reached without a shock. This makes it
optimal to slightly skew the savings burden p− 1 towards period 2. To see this formally, note that
expected utility decreases in s1 when evaluated at s1 = s¯: dU/ds1 = (1− λ)2[−u′(1− s1) + u′(2 +
s1 − p)] + (1− λ)λ[−u′(1− s1) + u′(s1 − sNo2 )] < 0 for s1 = p−12 > 0.5. By the envelope condition,
dU/ds1 = δUδs1 +
δU
δs2 ·
δs2
δs1 =
δU
δs1 .
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2.2 Autarky Equilibrium
The results in this section generalise the no-banking equilibrium from Basu (2014)
to allow for partial sophistication and stochastic income.
The analysis proceeds by assuming that no shock has hit up to period t. If a
shock does hit (i.e., if yt = 0), the agent immediately gives up any plans to save
for the nondivisible, and instead spreads available savings st−1 optimally over the
remaining periods. Denote such savings as sNot . For β = β˜ = 1, the agent will
always buy the nondivisible given the above condition (and absent shocks). The
savings path will be perfectly smooth (s1 = s¯, s2 = 2s¯) if λ = 0, and slightly
increasing (s1 < s¯, s2 = 2s¯) if λ > 0. If β ≤ β˜ ≤ 1 (with at least one inequality
strict), the three period selves engage in strategic interaction. Savings behaviour
can be analysed by backward induction, taking into account the agent’s belief about
his future preferences.
Period 3
The agent will buy the nondivisible whenever he can afford it, i.e., whenever there
is no shock, and s2 ≥ p− 1. Additional savings s2 > p− 1 are simply consumed,
as are savings that are not sufficient to buy the good. Since there are no future
choices, the sophistication level does not influence behaviour at this stage. The
consumption profile is
c3 =
y3 + s2 − p + b i f y3 + s2 ≥ py3 + s2 i f y3 + s2 < p
Period 2
The period 2 self knows the good will be bought if and only if he sends s2 ≥ p− 1,
and absent shocks. He decides whether to send s2 = p− 1, in which case the good
is bought, or less. Due to consumption smoothing motives, it is never optimal
to send s2 > p − 1 > 1, which exceeds the magnitude of a shock. If the agent
prefers not to save for the good, he will want to smooth s1 over periods 2 and 3:
sNo2 (s1) = argmax(u(y2 + s1 − s2) + βE[u(y3 + s2)] subject to 0 ≤ s2 < p− 1 (note
E[u(y3 + s2)] = λu(s2) + (1− λ)u(1+ s2)). This equation also describes his savings
behaviour in case of a shock, where y2 = 0, imposing an additional restriction
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0 ≤ s2 < s1. He is willing to save s2 = p− 1 if s1 is such that
u(1+ s1− (p− 1))+ β[(1−λ)u(b)+λu(p− 1)] ≥ u(1+ s1− sNo2 )+ βE[u(y3+ sNo2 )].
(2.2)
Lemma 1. (a) The period 2 agent is willing to save for the nondivisible and transfer
s2 = p − 1 if s1 is bigger than some threshold value, s1 ≥ smin. (b) smin is strictly de-
creasing in the time-inconsistency parameterβ. (c) The effect of the shock frequency λ on
smin is ambiguous.
(All proofs are in Appendix B.)
As in period 3, the level of sophistication does not affect the analysis: The period 2
self knows his true current β, but may mistakenly think that his period 3 self will
apply β˜ ≥ β to future decisions. As there are no future decisions once period 3 has
been reached, this is of no consequence. Also note that the period 2 self conditions
his behaviour on the s1 received from period 1, regardless of the beliefs held by the
period 1 self.
Period 1
Analogue to the minimum s1 threshold for period 2, it is useful to identify the maxi-
mum s1 that period 1 is willing to save, conditional on purchase of the nondivisible.
If this maximum is bigger than the minimum required, the agent is theoretically
able to purchase the good (whether saving is successful in equilibrium depends on
the coordination between the selves, which is discussed in the equilibrium subsec-
tion below). In period 1, sophistication first comes into effect: Period 1 anticipates
period 2’s decisions, but is overconfident that his future self will be more patient
than he is, i.e., he believes his future self uses β˜ ≥ β. This belief affects not only
his perception of smin, but also directly enters his own optimality considerations via
s˜No2 ≡ sNo2 (β˜), his perception of sNo2 . It is easy to show that s˜No2 increases in β˜, and
that β˜ ≥ β implies s˜No2 ≥ sNo2 . The special case of full sophistication is obtained by
setting s˜No2 = s
No
2 . Conditional on the nondivisible not being purchased (i.e., period
2 is believed to save s˜No2 < p− 1), period 1 saves only for precautionary purposes:
sNo1 = argmax(u(y1 − s1) + βE[u(y2 + s1 − s˜No2 ) + u(y3 + s˜No2 )]) for sNo1 ≥ 0 and
yt = {0, 1}. The occurrence of a shock implies y1 = 0 and thus sNo1 = 0.
Assume no shock has hit up to period 1. The expected utility from saving for
the nondivisible is then captured in the left-hand side of inequality 2.3, conditional
on period 2 saving s2 = p − 1. If no shock hits in any future period (probabil-
ity (1− λ)2), the nondivisible is consumed in period 3. However, the agent also
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takes into account that saving may fail because of shocks in period 3 (probability
(1− λ)λ) or period 2 (probability λ). The maximum that period 1 is willing to pay
for the expected purchase of the nondivisible, denoted smax, is the maximum value
of s1 which satisfies
u(1− s1) + β(1− λ)²(u(1+ s1 − (p− 1)) + u(b))
+ β(1− λ)λ(u(1+ s1 − (p− 1) + u(p− 1))
+ βλ(u(s1 − s˜No2 ) + E[u(y3 + s˜No2 )])
≥ u(1− sNo1 ) + βE[u(y2 + sNo1 − s˜No2 ) + u(y3 + s˜No2 )]. (2.3)
If there is no such value, let smax = 0.
Lemma 2. (a) The maximum that period 1 would be willing to save, denoted smax, is
strictly increasing in the time-inconsistency parameter β. (b) smax weakly decreases in the
amount of naiveté, β˜− β.
By assuming desirability of the nondivisible for a time-consistent agent (in-
equality 2.1), it follows that smax(β = β˜ = 1) ≥ p−12 . We further know that
smax(0) = 0. In addition to the maximum which period 1 is willing to save in
order to purchase the good, consider the optimal way in which period 1 would like
to allocate the savings burden of p− 1 across periods 1 and 2.
Lemma 3. (a) The optimal allocation of savings from period 1’s perspective, denoted
s1 = sopt, is characterized by
u′(1− sopt) = β[(1− λ)u′(2+ sopt − p) + λu′(sopt − s˜No2 )(1+ δs˜
No
2
δs1
· 1−β˜
β˜
)].
(b) sopt is strictly increasing in β, and always smaller than smax.
The term involving δs˜No2 /δs1 is a result of the time-inconsistency (for a time-
consistent agent, the envelope condition applies): s˜No2 is chosen optimally given
period 2’s preferences (more specifically, period 1’s belief thereof), which makes it
suboptimal from period 1’s perspective for β˜ < 1. As a result, s1 has a first-order
positive effect on s˜No2 .
Unfortunately, the effect of sophistication on sopt is ambiguous. Holding β con-
stant and increasing β˜ (sophistication falls), period 1 is more confident about period
2 following his interests in the future - in particular with respect to precautionary
savings for period 3. As β˜ increases, it becomes more attractive to send savings to
period 2, as the period 2 self is believed to spread them more equally across periods
2 and 3. On the other hand, period 1 no longer has to overcompensate for period 2’s
bias, sending excessive savings just to ensure some of them are passed on to period
3. It depends on the specific values of λ, u”(c), β˜ and β which effect is stronger.
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Autarky Equilibrium with Full Sophistication
Given a decreasing smin(β) and an increasing smax(β)- function, there is a threshold
level βˆ such that smin(β) ≤ smax(β) for any β ≥ βˆ. The fact that βˆ is in the relevant
interval (0, 1] follows from smin(0) > smax(0) and smin(1) ≤ smax(1): The former
follows from smin(0) > 1, smax(0) = 0. The latter is a consequence of desirability
(inequality 2.1), by which a time-consistent agent always purchases the good. Since
the different period selves are perfectly able to anticipate each other’s behaviour,
the nondivisible will be purchased (absent shocks) for all β ∈ [βˆ, 1]. Absent shocks,
equilibrium savings are
s1 =
max(smin, sopt) i f β ∈ [βˆ, 1]sNo1 i f β ∈ [0, βˆ) , s2 =
p− 1 i f β ∈ [βˆ, 1]sNo2 i f β ∈ [0, βˆ)
If a shock occurs in any period, the individual gives up any plans to save for the
nondivisible, and merely smoothes available assets yt + st−1 over future periods,
saving sNot ≥ 0 for all t after the shock.
Importantly, it is ambiguous whether autarky savings will be above or below
s¯ ≡ p−12 . This will complicate the later analysis of the regular saver product (e.g.,
compare Figures 2.2 and 2.3). Considering that a time-consistent agent saves s¯ (for
λ = 0) or slightly below s¯ (for λ > 0), this question corresponds to O’Donoghue
and Rabin’s (1999) pre-emptive overcontrol: A sophisticated hyperbolic discounter
may both save more or less than a time-consistent agent, depending on the numer-
ical values used for (b− p) and u”(c). In the following, scenarios with smin(βˆ) =
smax(βˆ) < s¯ will be referred to as “low autarky savings”, and scenarios with smin(βˆ) =
smax(βˆ) > s¯ will be referred to as “high autarky savings”.
Autarky Equilibrium with Partial Sophistication
Allowing for partial sophistication, the period 1 agent overestimates the patience
of his future self, β˜ > β. As discussed previously, this affects the smax- and sopt-
function used by period 1 via precautionary savings. However, the main effect of
partial sophistication is to cause period 1 to underestimate the amount of savings s1
required to convince period 2 to save s2 = p− 1 (and thus facilitate the purchase of
the nondivisible). For ease of graphical illustration, assume β˜ = β+ γ. Denote the
resulting perceived smin-function as s˜min(β˜) = s˜min(β+ γ) = s˜min(β) < smin(β): For
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Figure 2.1: Autarky Equilibrium with Partial Sophistication
a constant sophistication level γ, perceived minimum savings s˜min can be expressed
as a function of β.3 This allows me to define thresholds in terms of β only:
Define βˇ such that s˜min(β) ≤ smax(β) for any β ≥ βˇ. For β ∈ [βˇ, 1], the period
1 agent will believe that he is able to save for the nondivisible. Note s˜min(β) <
smin(β) implies that βˇ < βˆ. Furthermore, define βmax such that smin(β) ≤ sopt(β)
for any β ≥ βmax. For β ∈ [βmax, 1], the optimal savings choice from period 1’s
perspective is more than required given period 2’s true preferences. It follows that
βˇ ≤ βˆ ≤ βmax. Absent shocks in period 1 and 2, the autarky savings outcome is
s1 =
max{s˜min, sopt} i f β ∈ [βˇ, 1]sNo1 (β) i f β ∈ [0, βˇ) , s2 =
p− 1 i f β ∈ [βmax, 1]sNo2 (β) i f β ∈ [0, βmax)
The savings path is illustrated by the red dashed line in Figure 2.1. The most re-
markable feature of this savings function is that period 2 “eats” period 1’s savings
for β ∈ [βˇ, βmax).4 For β ∈ [βˇ, βˆ), the agent believes he can save for the nondivisi-
ble, but is not genuinely able to do so given his true preferences. This is the region
3While a constant sophistication level γ is convenient for the purposes of graphical illustration,
the model’s results do not depend on assumptions about the functional relationship between β˜ and
β, other than β˜ ≥ β.
4This is comparable to the theoretical result in Duflo et al. (2011) for farmers’ decision to save for
fertilizer.
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where s˜min(β) ≤ smax(β) < smin(β). Period 1 sends s1 = s˜min(β), anticipating that
this will be enough to incentivise period 2 to save p − 1. Period 2 responds by
consuming the savings, transferring only sNo2 < p− 1 to period 3.
Even more paradoxically, for β ∈ [βˆ, βmax), the agent fails to obtain the non-
divisible because of a coordination failure between his different selves: s˜min(β) <
smin(β) ≤ smax(β), so the nondivisible could be bought if period 1 saved s1 ≥
smin(β). Instead, incorrect beliefs about this future preferences lead him to save
s1 = max{s˜min, sopt} < smin(β), and again period 2 consumes period 1’s savings.
It is only for β ∈ [βmax, 1] that the savings sent by period 1 are sufficient for pur-
chasing the nondivisible: As β rises, period 1 becomes sufficiently patient to save
more than s˜min voluntarily, eventually reaching the point where sopt(β) becomes
larger than the required true smin(β). Conditional on the absence of shocks, the
nondivisible is purchased for the region β ∈ [βmax, 1].
2.3 Equilibrium with a Regular Saver Commitment Product
The following section investigates the effect of offering agents a commitment to
fixed regular contributions - as commonly found in loan contracts, pension savings,
and other forms of regular saving. As pointed out by Fischer and Ghatak (2010) for
the case of microloans, small frequent instalments may mediate time-inconsistency
problems of hyperbolic discounters. In a savings setting, commitment to fixed in-
stalments may help agents to reach savings goals, and smooth savings contribu-
tions.5
The Regular Saver product is defined as follows: Consider an agent who can
commit in period 0 to deposit a fixed amount s¯ = p−12 in a bank account in both pe-
riod 1 and 2. He also chooses a default penalty D, subject only to a limited liability
constraint which prevents negative consumption. Once the agent fails to deposit s¯
in a period, he is charged the default penalty D, but immediately receives back any
accumulated savings. In addition, he is free to save at home independently of his
bank contributions. His total cumulative savings (in the bank plus at home) which
are transferred from period t to t + 1 can then be captured as st. The penalty D is
imposed in period 1 if s1 < s¯, and in period 2 if s1 ≥ s¯, s2 < 2s¯. The contract is
successfully completed with s1 ≥ s¯, s2 ≥ p− 1. The assumption that the contract is
5Section 2.1 argues that the first-best savings schedule is s1 = s¯ for λ = 0, and slightly increasing
for λ > 0, i.e., s1 < s¯. For small λ, this effect is likely to be small. Commitment products with increas-
ing savings schedules are possible, but may pose serious challenges to institutional implementation:
The first-best schedule will depend on individual values of λ, u”(c), p and b. The present analysis
focuses on fixed-instalment products due to their empirical popularity and ease of administration.
44
2.3. EQUILIBRIUM WITH A REGULAR SAVER COMMITMENT PRODUCT
signed in period 0 simplifies things greatly, as the agent is not subject to temptation
in this period.6 As before, the savings outcome can be derived using backwards
induction, with a contract-signing period 0 discussed at the end.
Period 3
Period 3 behaviour is identical to that in autarky. The agent will buy the nondivis-
ible whenever he can afford it, i.e., whenever s2 ≥ p− 1 holds, and absent shocks.
Period 2
Suppose the contract is still active in period 2. In other words, period 1 has not
been hit by a shock, and has transferred s1 ≥ s¯. Suppose a shock hits in period 2:
At an asset level of s1 < 1 and contractual savings of s2 = 2s¯ = p− 1, default is
unavoidable. The resulting consumption level is c2 = s1 − D− sNo2 ≥ 0, implying
that a penalty of D ≤ s1 can be enforced. Absent shocks, period 2 is faced with the
decision of whether to send s2 = 2s¯ = p− 1 (it is never optimal to send s2 > p− 1).
He is willing to do so if he receives an s1 that satisfies
u(2+ s1− p)+ β[(1−λ)u(b)+λu(p− 1)] ≥ u(1+ s1−D− sNo2 )+ βE[u(y3 + sNo2 )]
(2.4)
Since the inequality differs from the autarky case only in the penalty D, the same
proof can be used to show that the nondivisible is bought for any s1 ≥ sBmin. The
threshold sBmin(β) will be strictly lower than smin(β) in the autarky case: The right-
hand side of the inequality decreases when D is introduced, while the left-hand
side stays unchanged. The effect of the penalty disappears for s1 < s¯: Period 1 has
already defaulted on the contract and paid the penalty, so the contract is no longer
active in period 2. As a result, sBmin(β) = smin(β) for s1 < s¯. The two sections of the
sBmin(β)-function combine with a horizontal line at s
B
min(β) = s¯ =
p−1
2 . In this region,
the smin required by period 2 is lower than s¯ if he faces the penalty, and higher than
s¯ if he does not. To keep the contract active and ensure that period 2 faces the
penalty, the period 1 agent needs to save s1 ≥ s¯. Therefore, the minimum s1 needed
to incentivise period 2 to save is s¯. Finally, in the region where sBmin(β) > s¯, the
period 2 agent is not willing to save for the nondivisible unless period 1 makes
additional savings at home.
6This assumes that the bank can enforce the penalty, even in the case that the agent defaults before
depositing any savings. See Section 2 and footnote 16 on how I dealt with this issue in the study.
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Period 1
Consider the maximum s1 that period 1 is willing to save, once subjected to a
penalty for s1 < s¯. Denote this as sBmax. Absent shocks in period 1, sBmax is given
by the maximum value of s1 which satisfies
u(1− s1) + β(1− λ)²(u(1+ s1 − (p− 1)) + u(b))
+ β(1− λ)λ(u(1+ s1 − (p− 1)) + u(p− 1))
+ βλ(u(s1 − D− s˜No2 ) + E[u(y3 + s˜No2 )])
≥ u(1− D− sNo1 ) + βE[u(y2 + sNo1 − s˜No2 ) + u(y3 + s˜No2 )]. (2.5)
If there is no such value, let sBmax = 0. The intuition for inequality 2.5 is analogue to
that of inequality 2.3: The agent considers the expected utility from saving for the
nondivisible, conditional on period 2 saving s2 = p− 1. He takes into account that
the savings plan may fail to survive until the purchase of the nondivisible, due to
shocks in future periods. As described in Section 2.2, partial sophistication implies
that the agent uses s˜No2 ≡ sNo2 (β˜) to assess period 2’s behaviour.
In contrast to the inequality for sBmin, both sides of the s
B
max- inequality are af-
fected by the penalty: Even for a devoted saver, the penalty is unavoidable if a
shock hits in period 2, causing the left-hand side to decrease in D (discounted by
βλ). On the right-hand side, the penalty is the consequence of a deliberate deci-
sion to default in period 1. Note that, due to limited liability, the penalty cannot
be enforced if there is a shock in period 1: With no income or previous savings,
c1 = s1 = 0.
Proposition 1. For small shock frequencies λ, and in the region where savings are skewed
towards period 1, s1 ≥ s¯ ≡ p−12 , adopting a regular-instalment product increases the
maximum the agent is willing to save, i.e., sBmax > smax. A sufficient constraint on the
shock frequency is λ < u
′(1)
u′(0.5) . In the region s1 < s¯, adopting the regular-instalment
product unambiguously decreases smax, i.e., sBmax < smax.
Note that inequality 2.5 is specific to the region s1 ≥ s¯: The penalty is not
charged in period 1 if the agent saves for the nondivisible. Consider the case where
necessary savings are s1 < s¯, i.e., period 1 could ensure the good is bought even if
he does not contribute s¯. In this case, he faces a penalty whether or not he saves
for the good. The penalty D enters in period 1 on both sides of the inequality (later
periods are unaffected by D, as the contract is no longer active). The resulting
threshold sBmax(β) is strictly lower than the original threshold smax(β).
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Figure 2.2 shows that the two sections of the sBmax(β)-curve combine with a ver-
tical line. To see why, extend the lower section of sBmax(β) to the s¯-line. For any β
in this range, smax is below s¯ if the agent is charged the penalty even if he saves
for the nondivisible, and smax is above s¯ if he is not charged. Since the penalty
does not apply for s1 ≥ s¯, the maximum that he is willing to pay is given by the
upper part of the sBmax(β)-curve. Even a high sBmax ≥ s¯ does not rule out that the
period 1 agent may optimally save s1 < s¯ for the nondivisible, deliberately in-
curring the penalty as a “premium” for procrastinating the savings burden onto
period 2. Consider sBopt(β), the optimal way in which period 1 would like to split
the savings burden p− 1 across periods 1 and 2, when subjected to the penalty. In
autarky, sopt = s¯ > 0.5 holds only for a time-consistent agent, and given λ = 0.
In the presence of time-inconsistency and a positive shock frequency λ > 0, sopt
is strictly below s¯. In consequence, the introduction of a penalty reduces optimal
savings further, as the agent needs to pay both s1 and the penalty D, as a premium
for procrastinating savings. Algebraically, sBopt < sopt follows from Lemma 3, after
allowing for the fact that period 1’s consumption is now c1 = 1− sopt − D.
Alternatively, period 1 may prefer to jump to s1 = s¯, rather than paying the
penalty. The vertical part of sBmax illustrates that it is never optimal to choose savings
in the region sˆ(β) < s1 < s¯, where sˆ(β) denotes the savings level which makes
period 1 indifferent between saving sˆ plus paying the penalty D, and saving s1 = s¯,
thus avoiding the penalty.7 Intuitively, if the necessary savings s1 are such that
s1 + D > s¯, then period 1 is trivially better off to save s¯. Furthermore, the threshold
sˆ is strictly lower than s¯ − D for β > 0: At equal instantaneous cost s1 + D = s¯,
it is strictly preferable to save s¯, for the sake of the additional consumption D in
the next period. Finally, willingness to jump to s1 = s¯ requires that sBmax ≥ s¯. As a
result, sˆ(β) is only defined for the range of β such that sBmax(β) ≥ s¯ (see Figure 2.2).
Lemma 4. The threshold sˆ(β) weakly decreases in β. Equivalently, as β increases, a larger
range s1 ∈ (sˆ(β), s¯) is strictly dominated by s¯.
Equilibrium and Contract Choice: Full Sophistication
With full sophistication, the nondivisible good is purchased whenever sBmax(β) ≥
sBmin(β), which occurs for any β ∈ [βˆB, 1]. Equilibrium savings (absent shocks) are
7Formally, sˆ is the lowest value of s1 which satisfies
u(1− sˆ− D) + β(1− λ)(u(2+ sˆ− p)) + βλ(u(sˆ− s˜No2 (sˆ)) + E[u(y3 + s˜No2 (sˆ))])
≤ u(1− s¯) + β(1− λ)(u(2+ s¯− p)) + βλ(u(s¯− D− s˜No2 (s¯)) + E[u(y3 + s˜No2 (s¯))]).
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Figure 2.2: Regular Saver Equilibrium (high autarky savings)
Figure 2.3: Regular Saver Equilibrium (low autarky savings)
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analogue to those for autarky, except for a lower savings threshold βˆB < βˆ, and a
dominated region s1 ∈ (sˆ(β), s¯):
s1 =

max(sBmin, s
B
opt) i f β ∈ [βˆB, 1] and max(sBmin, sBopt) /∈ [sˆ, s¯)
s¯ i f β ∈ [βˆB, 1] and max(sBmin, sBopt) ∈ [sˆ, s¯)
sNo1 i f β ∈ [0, βˆB)
s2 =
p− 1 i f β ∈ [βˆB, 1]sNo2 i f β ∈ [0, βˆB).
Figures 2.2 and 2.3 illustrate the Regular Saver equilibrium with full sophistication.
Figure 2.2 shows the savings path starting from high autarky savings, while Figure
2.3 starts from low autarky savings. It is critical for the welfare implications of the
regular saver product whether βˆB ≤ βˆ. In other words, is the nondivisible achiev-
able for a larger range of preferences when the regular saver product is used? The
answer is yes, given a sufficiently large penalty. Since the period 0 agent chooses
the penalty himself, βˆB ≤ βˆ is guaranteed to hold under full sophistication.8 As
a result, for β ∈ [βˆB, βˆ), the nondivisible is achievable with the regular-instalment
product, but not without it. The threshold βˆB decreases in the size of the chosen
penalty D (a corollary of Proposition 2). Furthermore, for the region β ∈ [βˆ, 1),
the Regular Saver product weakly smoothes savings contributions (and thus con-
sumption) towards s¯.
Period 0 Adoption Decision and Penalty Choice In principal, any agent with
β ∈ [0, 1) can benefit from commitment. Given a sufficiently large penalty, it makes
the nondivisible achievable and smoothes savings: Absent shocks, the contract is
trivially enforceable in period 1 if D > s¯, and in period 2 if D > 2s¯. Even with
β = 0, it is cheaper for the agent to make the contracted-upon savings contribution
than to pay the penalty. As a result, the threshold βˆB can be moved to an arbitrarily
low β. The downside of commitment is the risk of “rational default” due to shock
frequency λ: The penalty not only acts to discipline the agent when income is avail-
able, it also needs to be paid when the agent no longer finds it welfare-maximising
(or feasible) to save for the nondivisible. Limited liability implies that this risk is
limited to shocks in period 2: If a shock hits in period 1, the agent has no assets or
8Formally, βˆB ≤ βˆ holds regardless of penalty size if starting from a high-savings autarky scenario
with smin(βˆ) = smax(βˆ) ≥ s¯. For scenarios with low autarky savings smin(βˆ) = smax(βˆ) < s¯, the
penalty D needs to be large enough to make an agent with β = βˆ willing to jump to sBmax(βˆ) ≥ s¯ to
ensure βˆB ≤ βˆ.
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income, thus the penalty cannot be enforced. In period 3, the contract is no longer
active. In contrast, if a shock hits in period 2, the agent’s savings of s1 ≥ s¯ may
be lost to the penalty D, leaving the agent worse off than if he had not adopted
commitment.
The resulting decision is a two-step problem: The period 0 agent first decides
which penalty D offers the optimal trade-off between commitment and flexibility.
He then makes a binary choice between adopting the regular saver product with
the optimal penalty, or not adopting the product. Unfortunately, the choice of the
optimal penalty is non-monotonic in β, and sensitive to the autarky scenario, due to
the consumption smoothing motive: Consider starting from a low β < βˆ in Figure
2.2 (high autarky savings). Increasing D will first shift the upper part of the sBmin-
and sBmax-curve to the left, until sBmax(β) = sBmin(β) holds for the agent’s β (in other
words, until βˆB = β). The nondivisible is now achievable, but at a skewed savings
schedule s1 = sBmin(βˆB) > s¯. The agent may choose to increase D further, in order to
decrease sBmin and smooth savings towards s¯. However, the benefit associated with
smoother savings contributions is a discrete drop from the benefit associated with
achieving the nondivisible, and the agent may not deem it worthwhile to increase
D further in the face of shock frequency λ. To see why the optimal penalty is non-
monotonic in β, consider starting from a high β ≥ βˆ in Figure 2.3 (a scenario with
low autarky savings). In autarky, the nondivisible is achievable, and the agent
saves s1 = max(smin, sopt)  s¯. While the Regular Saver product is not needed to
achieve the nondivisible, it can help to smooth consumption: As D increases, sˆ(β)
falls, and the dominated region s1 ∈ (sˆ(β), s¯) becomes larger, until it eventually
includes max(sBmin, s
B
opt).
9 The period 0 agent would like to choose the penalty at
the minimum level which will make him jump to s1 = s¯.10 Thus, he will choose D
such that sˆ(β) = max(sBmin, s
B
opt) holds exactly. As max(s
B
min, s
B
opt) first decreases in
β along with sBmin, and then increases in β along with s
B
opt, the penalty required to
make sˆ(β) = max(sBmin, s
B
opt) first increases and then decreases in β. Depending on
u”(c) and λ, the take-up decision for β ∈ [βˆ, 1) (where the Regular Saver product
is exclusively used for consumption smoothing) may be similarly non-monotonic.
9Note that the sBmin-curve is unaffected by D in the region s1 < s¯, as the contract is no longer active
in period 2. Meanwhile,sBopt decreases in D, as it factors in the default on the contract. Therefore, the
only possibility to smooth consumption via penalty D is through its effect on the dominated region
(sˆ(β), s¯).
10This is a simplification: The first-best is to save slightly below s¯, which is not feasible with a
regular-saver product. However, for small λ, this difference is small, and the agent is better off with
a smooth savings schedule s¯, compared to leaving the savings decision entirely at the discretion of
period 1.
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For the sake of simplicity, I will abstract from the consumption smoothing mo-
tive, and focus on the range of β ∈ [0, βˆ). For this range of β, the nondivisible is not
achievable in autarky, and obtaining it constitutes the primary benefit of the Reg-
ular Saver product. This focus is empirically meaningful: It restricts the analysis
to the part of the population who are not able to save for lump-sum consumption
expenditures by themselves, i.e., without the use of commitment. This is consistent
with data from my sample population.11 Define De f f (β) to be the minimum effec-
tive penalty which achieves sBmax(β) ≥ sBmin(β). Given full sophistication, a Regular
Saver contract with a penalty De f f will enable the agent to save for the nondivisible
(absent shocks). By construction, De f f = 0 for β ≥ βˆ.
Proposition 2. For a given shock frequency λ, the minimum effective penalty De f f that
will enforce saving weakly decreases in the time-inconsistency parameter β.
Proposition 3. The optimal Regular Saver contract for a fully sophisticated agent with
β < βˆ depends on the effect of the minimum effective penalty, D = De f f : Where De f f
results in sBmin(β) ≤ sBmax(β) ≤ s¯ (illustrated in Figure 2.3), equilibrium savings contri-
butions are perfectly smooth, i.e., s1 = s¯ ≡ p−12 and s2 = 2s¯ = p− 1. Consequently, the
optimal contract is to choose De f f . Where De f f results in sBmax(β) ≥ sBmin(β) > s¯ (illus-
trated in Figure 2.2), the optimal contract involves D ≥ De f f , with equilibrium savings
weakly skewed towards period 1 (s1 ≥ s¯).
For plausible ranges of the parameters, the case where De f f guarantees perfect
consumption smoothing s1 = s¯ (and thus eliminates the need to choose a higher
penalty) coincides with the “low autarky savings” scenario.12 The specific param-
eter restrictions needed are the subject of current research.
Having determined the optimal penalty for the Regular Saver product, the pe-
riod 0 agent then faces the binary decision of whether or not to take up the product.
1135 percent of the study population reported zero savings of any form, the median level of liq-
uid assets (bank and home savings) was 500 pesos (U.S.$ 12), and the most common way to afford
lump-sum expenditures was through high-interest borrowing (which includes a commitment to fixed
instalments).
12As discussed in the autarky section, “low autarky savings” refers to a situation where smin(βˆ) =
smax(βˆ) < s¯. It does not refer to the specific savings made by the agent in autarky.
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The following inequality is sufficient for take-up to be optimal:
(1− λ)3[u(1− s1) + u(2+ s1 − p) + u(b)]
+ (1− λ)2λ[u(1− s1) + (u(2+ s1 − p) + u(p− 1)]
+ (1− λ)λ[u(1− s1) + u(s1 − De f f − sNo2 ) + E(u(y3 + sNo2 ))]
+ λ[u(0) + E(u(y2 − sNo2 ) + u(y3 + sNo2 ))]
≥ E[u(y1 − sNo1 ) + u(y2 + sNo1 − sNo2 ) + u(y3 + sNo2 )] (2.6)
where s1 = max{s¯, sBmin(βˆB)} and yt = {0, 1} depending on the realisation of
shocks. The rows of inequality 2.6 describe the different cases of shock occurrence:
The savings plan could be undisturbed by shocks until the end of the agent’s life
(first row), it could fail in period 3 (second row: period 3 lacks the income to buy
the nondivisible), a shock in period 2 could lead to costly default (third row), or a
shock in period 1 could prevent saving for the nondivisible altogether (fourth row).
This leads to the following results for period 0’s adoption decision: Whether the
agent adopts commitment will critically depend on shock frequency λ, nondivisi-
ble benefit b, price p, and required penalty De f f (β). However, ceteris paribus, those
with the lowest values of β will require the highest penalties De f f . Consequently,
those with the lowest values of β are the least likely to adopt the product. To see
this, realise that the benefit of an effective commitment contract (obtaining the non-
divisible with a smooth schedule s1 = s¯) is independent of β: The period 0 agent
bases his adoption decision on the welfare function W = E[u(c1) + u(c2) + u(c3)],
which does not directly depend on β. Put simply, the time-inconsistency param-
eter β determines how difficult it is for the agent to save for the nondivisible, but
not how much he benefits from achieving it.13 As a result, agents with low β (and
therefore a high required penalty De f f ) will find that commitment harms them in
expectation, and will not adopt it.
The result on welfare is straightforward: Given full sophistication, everyone
who adopts the commitment product is made better off in expectation. Agents per-
fectly anticipate their own behaviour, and assess the required degree of commit-
ment (De f f ) correctly. The only reason for contract defaults are shocks: A fraction
13Strictly speaking, the benefit from commitment is only independent of β for λ = 0. With λ > 0,
the period 0 agent has to rely on his future selves to make precautionary savings. The lower is β,
the larger is the disagreement between the selves over how much should be saved for shocks. The
commitment contract insures the agent against shocks at least in period 3 (no savings are available
if a shock hits in period 1, and a shock in period 2 would leave the agent with s1 − D ≥ 0). Since
precautionary savings decrease in β, the insurance effect of commitment is slightly more valuable for
lower β. However, this effect is unlikely to quantitatively dominate the offputting effect of a higher
required penalty De f f .
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Figure 2.4: The Regular Saver Equilibrium with Partial Sophistication
λ of adopters defaults each period. In summary, commitment through a regular-
instalment product will be weakly welfare-increasing for sophisticated hyperbolic
discounters.
Equilibrium and Contract Choice: Partial Sophistication
The derivations for penalty choice and adoption decision for partially sophisticated
agents are analogous to those for full sophistication – except that the period 0 agent
systematically applies an incorrect belief β˜ > β. This results in a biased perception
not only of s˜min < smin (as for period 1), but also of s˜max(β) ≡ smax(β˜) > smax(β),
as period 0 is overconfident about the patience he will have in period 1. Since the
same belief β˜ is used to assess s˜min and s˜max, the partial sophistication bias in period
0 graphically corresponds to a shift in the entire schedule by a constant β˜− β ≡ γ
(see Figure 2.4).
The analysis will focus on those agents with β < β˜ < βˆ: The part of the popula-
tion who is not only unable to save without commitment, but who is also aware of
this fact (for instance, because they have not observed themselves save in the past).
Given a large benefit b of the nondivisible good, the primary motivation of such
agents for adopting the regular-instalment commitment savings product will be to
achieve the nondivisible. The minimum penalty which is perceived to be effective
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in making the nondivisible achievable (in other words, the penalty which results in
s˜Bmin = s˜
B
max) is then De f f (β˜), denoted D˜e f f . By construction, D˜e f f = 0 for β˜ ≥ βˆ.
The optimal penalty choice for partially sophisticated agents is a corollary of
Proposition 3: An agent who believes to have β˜ < βˆ will unambiguously choose
the perceived minimum effective penalty, D = D˜e f f , whenever he anticipates that
this will result in perfect consumption smoothing, i.e., when s˜Bmin(β) ≤ s˜Bmax(β) ≤ s¯
at D˜e f f . This is likely to happen under low autarky savings scenarios. Where D˜e f f
results in s˜Bmax(β) ≥ s˜Bmin(β) > s¯ (typically in high autarky savings scenarios), the
agent chooses D ≥ D˜e f f , and anticipates equilibrium savings s1 = s˜Bmin ≥ s¯. By
Proposition 2, De f f decreases in β. Therefore, β˜ > β implies D˜e f f < De f f .
The take-up decision is determined in the same way as for fully sophisticated
agents, and captured in inequality 2.6. The inequality does not (directly) depend on
β, but it depends on the (perceived) effective penalty De f f . Partially sophisticated
agents differ from fully sophisticated agents precisely in the fact that they perceive
a lower D˜e f f < De f f to be sufficient. As a response, for the range of β < β˜ < βˆ,
the regular-instalment product is more attractive to partially sophisticated agents
than to fully sophisticated agents: Conditioning on β, and holding λ, p, b and u”(c)
constant, those with higher sophistication gaps γ have a lower D˜e f f , and are thus
more likely to adopt the product.
The savings outcome is a function of the chosen penalty. In addition, it may
critically depend on the degree of learning which the agent undergoes during his
life: In period 0, he believes he will use the parameter β˜ in all future periods. In
period 1, he realises his true current β. In a static model where the agent does
not update his beliefs after he observes his behaviour, period 1 will continue to
believe that he will use β˜ in the future (much like a dieter who observes himself
eating chocolate, but repeatedly plans to be more disciplined tomorrow). The other
extreme is full updating: As period 1 learns his true current β, he updates his belief
to β˜ = β for all future periods. Ali (2011) characterizes conditions under which
agents’ beliefs converge to full sophistication, presuming Bayesian updating. This
paper discusses the two extreme assumptions: The case without updating, and the
case of full updating.
Suppose the minimum effective penalty is perceived sufficient to guarantee per-
fect consumption smoothing, i.e., s˜Bmin(β) ≤ s˜Bmax(β) ≤ s¯ at D˜e f f . The period 0 agent
chooses D˜e f f and expects s1 = s¯. In period 1, the agent learns his true current β, and
thus sBmax < s˜Bmax. Without updating, period 1 still believes in s˜Bmin. With full updat-
ing to β˜ = β, the agent also learns the true sBmin > s˜
B
min. In this scenario, updating is
of no consequence for the savings outcome: D˜e f f is constructed to make s˜Bmin = s˜
B
max
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hold exactly. The realisation that sBmax < s˜Bmax is sufficient to inform the agent that
saving is not feasible: Whether he believes in s˜Bmin or s
B
min only determines the size
of the gap sBmax < s˜Bmin < s
B
min which keeps him from saving (see Figure 2.4). As
a response, he abandons his savings plan in period 1, pays the penalty, and saves
sNo1 .
Starting from a situation where D˜e f f provides incomplete consumption smooth-
ing, i.e., s˜Bmax(β) ≥ s˜Bmin(β) > s¯, will generally produce the same result: Agents
choose their penalty at D˜e f f or slightly above. For most parameter specifications,
period 1’s realisation that sBmax < s˜Bmax will result in sBmax < s˜Bmin < s
B
min, which leads
to immediate contract default irrespective of learning behaviour. For illustration,
consider an agent with β = βˇB in Figure 2.4, who believes that his future selves
will use β˜ = βˆB. The agent’s β and β˜ are at the banking thresholds βˇB and βˆB by
construction of the penalty D˜e f f and the assumed function β˜ = β+ γ.
However, the result may differ in cases where the agent has a particularly strong
motive for consumption smoothing: The agent may voluntarily increase the penalty
beyond D˜e f f in order to reduce s˜Bmin ≥ s¯ and get closer to s¯. The success of this
endeavour depends on the size of the penalty, and on learning: The agent may
increase D until s˜Bmin = s¯ holds exactly (higher penalties cannot be optimal, since
their only effect is to increase the cost of default in case of a shock). In period 1,
the agent realises sBmax < s˜Bmax. Without updating, if s˜min = s¯ < smax, the agent still
believes he is able to save, and transfers s1 = s˜min = s¯ to period 2 (this follows
from s1 = max(s˜Bmin, s
B
opt) and s
B
opt < s¯). However, in reality, s
B
min > s˜
B
min = s¯. The
penalty that is sufficient to reduce s˜Bmin to s¯ is not sufficient to reduce s
B
min to s¯. Com-
parable to the coordination failure in autarky, once period 2 arrives, the agent eats
his savings, and fails to save for the nondivisible. The situation is welfare-reducing
relative to autarky, as the effect of an uneven consumption path is exacerbated by
the loss of the penalty D. Instead, consider the case with full updating: In period
1, he learns that sBmin > s˜
B
min = s¯. If the chosen penalty is large enough to guarantee
sBmax ≥ sBmin for his true preferences, the agent is willing to save s1 = sBmin > s¯. While
the agent fails to achieve consumption smoothing, updating his beliefs enables him
to avoid contract default, and obtain the nondivisible. When do such cases occur?
The motive for consumption smoothing must be large, and the sophistication gap
low. Therefore, successful saving under partial sophistication is most likely to occur
for high autarky savings, small sophistication gaps γ, small shock frequency λ (so
the agent is less averse to big penalties), and large nondivisible prices p (increasing
the benefits to consumption smoothing).
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The resulting welfare implications are discouraging: For β < β˜ < βˆ, and with-
out updating of beliefs, all partially sophisticated adopters default. Agents are
particularly likely to adopt the contract if they have a high β˜, as is the case for
those with large sophistication gaps γ. Default always occurs in period 1 when
choosing D = D˜e f f . Welfare is unambiguously reduced: It decreases from WA =
E[u(y1 − sNo1 ) + u(y2 + sNo1 − sNo2 ) + u(y3 + sNo2 )] in autarky to WRS = E[u(y1 −
sNo1 − D) + u(y2 + sNo1 − sNo2 ) + u(y3 + sNo2 )] with the commitment product. When
choosing D > D˜e f f , default in period 2 is possible under some parameter speci-
fications. Finally, with full updating of beliefs, the agent may be able to fulfill the
contract and obtain the nondivisible under parameter specifications which strongly
encourage consumption smoothing.
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Chapter 3
When Commitment Fails: A
Randomized Experiment in the
Philippines
3.1 Overview
The field experiment was designed to test the efficacy of regular-instalment sav-
ings products in a randomised setting. I partnered with 1st Valley Bank, a rural
bank based in Mindanao (Philippines). The sample population of 913 individuals
was obtained by conducting a door-to-door baseline survey in low-income areas in
proximity to two selected bank branches. The baseline survey elicited time prefer-
ences, with a random half of individuals receiving real monetary rewards. Further
elicited measures included perceived time-inconsistency, risk aversion, financial
claims from others, cognitive ability, financial literacy, intrahousehold bargaining
power, household demographics, and measures of saving, borrowing, and house-
hold expenditures. After the baseline survey, all individuals were provided with
a marketing treatment, which included a personalised savings plan for an upcom-
ing expenditure and a free non-commitment savings account with 100 pesos (U.S.
$2.50) opening balance.1 Personal savings plans featured a self-chosen goal date,
goal amount, and a weekly or bi-weekly instalment plan (see Figure C.5 for a sam-
ple). The idea was to encourage individuals to save for their lump-sum expenses
(such as school fees, business capital, or house repairs), rather than following the
common practice of borrowing at high informal moneylender rates. At the end of
the marketing visit, a randomly chosen 50 percent (the ‘Regular Saver’ group) were
1At the time of marketing (October 2012), the exchange rate was 42 Philippine pesos per U.S.
dollar.
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offered a new commitment product called ‘Achiever’s Savings Account’ (ASA).
ASA committed clients to make fixed regular deposits and pay a penalty upon de-
fault, which effectively made all features of the personal savings plan binding. The
default penalty was chosen by the client upon contract signing, and framed as a
charity donation.2 There was no compensation for the restrictions, no added help
(such as deposit collectors or text message reminders), and a standard market in-
terest rate.3
As a control treatment, an additional 25 percent of the sample (the ‘Withdrawal
Restriction’ group) were offered the commitment savings account studied in Ashraf
et al. (2006b), Giné et al. (2010), Brune et al. (2011), and Karlan and Zinman (2013):
The ‘Gihandom’ savings account (Visayan for ‘dream’) allowed individuals to com-
mit to either the goal date or the goal amount from their savings plan, by restricting
withdrawals before the goal had been reached. This account did not include any
obligation to make further deposits after the opening balance. The remaining 25
percent of the sample received no further intervention after the marketing treat-
ment, and constitute the control group. For those in the control group (and those
who rejected the commitment accounts), none of the savings plan features were
binding. Since individuals’ expenditures were due at different times, the outcome
variable of interest are individuals’ savings at the time of their goal date. The study
concluded with a comprehensive endline survey, a ‘customer satisfaction survey’
for ASA clients, and a repeat marketing stage where ASA clients could opt to ‘pre-
order’ the product for a second round.4
I find that demand for commitment is high, even in a general low-income pop-
ulation with little previous bank exposure: Take-up rates were 27 percent for ASA
and 42 percent for Gihandom, in spite of the fact that all individuals were given a
free standard savings account (with 100 pesos) immediately prior to the commit-
ment offer.5 Offering ASA was more effective at increasing savings: By the time in-
dividuals reached their goal date (an average of 130 days later), bank savings in the
Regular Saver group had increased by 585 pesos (U.S. $14) relative to the control
group, whereas bank savings in the Withdrawal Restriction group had increased
by 148 pesos (U.S. $3.50, as measured by the Intent-to-Treat effect) relative to the
2The concept is roughly comparable to the Stickk initiative (www.stickk.com), where people are
asked to set their own stakes, but applied to the requirements of a developing country context.
3The bank’s standard interest rate as of September 2012 was 1.5 percent per annum, and decreased
to 1 percent in November 2012. This interest rate was the same across all offered accounts. The
inflation rate for 2012 was 3.1 percent.
4Pre-orders were not legally binding, but involved a cost through substantial paperwork.
5The difference in take-up rates may be partly driven by liquidity concerns: ASA required an
opening balance equal to the first weekly deposit (minimum 150 or 250 pesos), whereas Gihandom
could be opened with 100 pesos.
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control.6 The control group saved an average of 27 pesos. The scale of effects sug-
gests that a commitment product with fixed regular instalments is highly effective
at increasing savings on average. However, this average hides a lot of heterogeneity
in the case of both products: 55 percent of ASA clients defaulted on their savings
contract, incurring penalties (charity donations) between 150 and 300 pesos - the
equivalent of a day’s wage (the stated treatment effect already accounts for these
charges). The penalty for the withdrawal-restriction product Gihandom was less
salient, but existent: 79 percent of Gihandom clients made no further deposits after
the opening balance. For those who had chosen to make their goal amount binding
(45 percent), this meant their initial savings were tied up indefinitely, or until the
bank would exhaust their account with dormancy fees.7
Using conventional measures of actual time-inconsistency and a novel mea-
sure of perceived time-inconsistency (sophistication), the data suggest that present-
biased preferences by themselves do not predict take-up of a commitment product,
but they do predict default. In contrast, sophistication drives both take-up and de-
fault: As an agent’s degree of sophistication rises, he becomes less likely to adopt
commitment, and less likely to default, conditional on take-up. This is consistent
with the interpretation that partial sophistication about time-inconsistency leads
agents to adopt weak commitment contracts, and subsequently default. Highly so-
phisticated agents are more cautious about adopting commitment, but have higher
chances of success when they do choose to commit. The notion of ‘weak com-
mitment’ is supported by the observation that 80 percent of ASA clients chose the
minimum admissible default penalty (150 or 250 pesos, depending on the savings
goal). Finally, the data is strongly bi-modal, in the sense that almost all clients ei-
ther (i) stop depositing immediately after the opening balance or (ii) complete their
savings plan in full. The timing of defaults is inconsistent with idiosyncratic shock
patterns, where individuals rationally default following large random shocks to
their income or expenditures.
The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 describes the experimental design
employed in more detail. Section 3.3 explains the survey instrument, with partic-
ular view to the measurement of time-inconsistency and sophisticated hyperbolic
discounting. Section 3.4 outlines the empirical strategy. Section 3.5 presents empir-
ical results. Section 3.6 discusses other explanations. Section 3.7 concludes.
6The Intent-to-Treat (ITT) effect measures the effect of being offered the product. An increase of 585
pesos (148 pesos) corresponds to 27 percent (7 percent) of median weekly household income in our
sample.
7Dormancy fees are very common with Philippine banks, and commonly start after two years of
inactivity.
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3.2 Experimental Design
I designed and implemented the commitment savings product ASA in cooperation
with 1st Valley Bank, based in Mindanao, Philippines. 1st Valley Bank is a small
rural bank that offers microcredit, agricultural insurance, salary loans, and pension
products to its clients. The bank agreed to offer both the regular-instalment prod-
uct ASA and the withdrawal-restriction product Gihandom in two of their bank
branches: Gingoog and Mambajao. Gingoog is a city of 112,000 people in northern
Mindanao, and Mambajao is a municipality of 36,000 people on Camiguin Island.
For these two bank branches, both ASA and Gihandom constituted new product
additions at the time of the study.8
The sample was obtained through door-to-door visits in all low and middle in-
come areas in proximity to the bank branches. In each household, the survey team
identified the person in charge of managing the household budget (in 94 percent
of the cases, this was the mother of the family), and invited them to take part in
a household survey. The baseline survey was completed with all individuals who
(i) had some form of identification,9 (ii) claimed to have a large upcoming expen-
diture (such as school fees, house repairs, or business expansions) and (iii) agreed
to receive a visit from a financial advisor (to talk about how to manage household
expenses). After the baseline survey, individuals were randomly assigned to three
groups: 50 percent of individuals were assigned to a ’Regular Saver’ (R) group, and
25 percent each were assigned to a ’Withdrawal Restriction’ (W) and a control (C)
group.
Approximately one week after having completed the household survey, indi-
viduals received a visit from a bank marketer. Of 913 surveyed individuals, 852
could be re-located.10 Marketers engaged individuals in a conversation about how
to manage large lump-sum expenses, and talked about the benefits of saving. Fo-
cusing on one particular expenditure, individuals were encouraged to make a for-
mal ’Personal Savings Plan’, which contained a purpose, a goal amount, a goal date,
and a fixed equal instalment plan with due dates (see Figure C.5). Median savings
goals were 2400 pesos across all groups (roughly comparable to a median house-
hold’s weekly income of 2125 pesos), with a median weekly instalment of 150 pe-
8Gihandom had been previously offered at other 1st Valley Bank branches, but not at the two
branches in question.
9A valid form of identification was required by the bank to open a savings account. Accepted
forms of identification included a birth certificate, tax certificate, voter’s ID, barangay clearance, and
several other substitutes.
10A test for equality of means in the probability of being reached by the marketer across treatment
groups yields an F-statistic with a p-value of 0.16. Individuals in group R were as likely to be reached
as individuals in group C, but slightly less likely than individuals in group W.
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sos. Common savings goals were school tuition fees, house repairs, and Christmas
gifts (see Table C.1 for an overview of savings plan characteristics). The duration of
savings plans was limited to 3–6 months, so that the outcome could be observed by
the study. The median duration was 137 days. In addition, everyone was offered
a standard non-commitment savings account (henceforth called ’ordinary savings
account’) as a ’welcome gift’ from the bank, along with an encouragement to use
this account to save for the expenditure. This ordinary savings account contained
a free 100 pesos opening balance, which also constitutes the minimum maintaining
balance.11
At the end of the visit, individuals in group R were asked whether they wanted
to commit to the fixed-instalment structure outlined in their Personal Savings Plan
by taking up the ASA product, and the product features were explained. In con-
trast, individuals in group W were offered the option to restrict withdrawals of
their savings until they reached either the goal amount or the goal date specified in
their Personal Savings Plan, implemented through the use of the Gihandom prod-
uct. It is to be expected that the marketing treatment itself influenced individuals’
savings behaviour, as evidenced in the literature on mental accounting.12 How-
ever, up to the point of offering the commitment products, the marketing script was
identical across all groups, which prevents a bias of the estimated treatment effects.
The effect of marketing as such cannot be identified, as there was no marketing-free
group. However, the fact that the control group saved an average of 27 pesos until
their respective goal dates indicates that, given a non-negativity constraint on bank
savings, the effect of marketing was small.
Out of 852 individuals located for the marketing visit in September and Octo-
ber 2012, 788 accepted the free ordinary savings account, and 748 agreed to make
a savings plan. In group R, 114 clients (out of 423 offered) accepted the ASA prod-
uct.13 In group W, 92 (out of 219 offered) accepted the Gihandom product. Table
C.2 summarizes the take-up results.
The regular-instalment product ASA committed clients to a specific instalment
plan with weekly or bi-weekly due dates. An account was considered in default
from the day the client fell three instalments behind. In case of a default, the ac-
count was closed, an ’Early Termination Fee’ was charged, and any remaining sav-
11Individuals were able to close this account and retrieve funds by visiting the bank, but incurred a
50 peso closing fee. During the period of observation (September 2012 until 15 April 2013), no client
closed their account.
12Most prominently, see Thaler (1985) and Shefrin and Thaler (1988).
13One member of the control group was mistakenly offered the ASA product and accepted, which
means a total of 115 ASA accounts were opened. This constitutes a mild contamination of the control
group, and means that the estimated ASA treatment effect is a lower bound on the true effect.
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ings were returned to the client. A termination fee that is directly linked to the
instalment structure distinguishes the ASA product from withdrawal-restriction or
standard accounts, and represents its key commitment feature. No fee was charged
after successful completion. The amount of the fee was chosen by the client upon
signing the ASA contract: Each client signed a ’Voluntary Donation Form’, which
specified a termination fee that would be donated to charity in case of a default.
Clients were given a choice of three national (but not locally-based) Philippine
charities.14 While the instalment structure may appear rigid at first sight, a variety
of flexibility features were included to allow clients to adapt to changing circum-
stances: First, clients could fall up to two instalments behind at any given time,
making it theoretically possible to miss every other instalment, and pay a dou-
ble instalment in alternate weeks. To encourage timely depositing, a small 10 peso
($0.25) admin fee had to be paid upon making up a missed past instalment, but this
fee did not accumulate over time. Deposits towards future weeks could be made
at any time, as long as they were in increments of the weekly instalment. This was
a practical requirement, as the client’s progress was monitored by making ticks on
a collection card for each successful week (see Figure C.5). The possibility of mak-
ing future deposits early effectively provided a form of insurance against uneven
income streams. Withdrawals during the savings period were only possible by al-
lowing default to occur.
Enforceability of the termination fee was facilitated through the account open-
ing balance: To complete the opening of an ASA, clients had to deposit an opening
balance equal to their first weekly instalment, but at least 150 pesos for savings
goals below 2500 pesos, and at least 250 pesos for savings goals of 2500 pesos and
above. The same threshold applied for the termination fee: Clients could choose a
termination fee as high as they liked, but no lower than a minimum of 150 or 250
pesos, respectively. Consequently, the minimum termination fee could always be
enforced. Higher termination fees could be enforced only if the client continued to
save, or if their opening balance exceeded the minimum. By nature of the contract,
all ASAs were either successfully completed or in default by the goal date,15 and
any remaining savings were transferred to clients’ ordinary savings accounts.
The withdrawal-restriction account Gihandom was simpler in structure: Clients
chose to restrict withdrawals before either their goal date or their goal amount
(specified at contract signing) was reached. Out of 92 Gihandom clients, 39 chose
14Attitudes towards charities were measured in the baseline, and an indicator for previous charita-
ble contributions is available as a control variable. See Appendix C.3 for a description.
15After the goal date, there was a one-week grace period to make any outstanding deposits, but no
client made use of this.
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the amount goal, and 53 chose the date goal. The goal amount can be interpreted
as the stronger restriction, since additional deposits need to be made in order to re-
ceive savings back. Formally, there was no limit on how long individuals could take
to reach the goal amount. However, as is common for Philippine banks, significant
dormancy fees were applied after two years of inactivity. While the marketers en-
couraged individuals to deposit the first weekly instalment from their savings plan
as an opening balance, the formal minimum opening balance for Gihandom was
100 pesos. The difference of 50–150 pesos (depending on the savings goal) in the
mandatory opening balances between ASA and Gihandom is a possible explana-
tory factor in the difference between take-up rates. Finally, two features were com-
mon to both ASA and Gihandom: First, opening balances for both products were
deliberately collected one week after contract signing. The practical motivation be-
hind this was to give individuals time to prepare for the expense. The theoretical
motivation was to free the decisionmaker from temptation in the contract-signing
period – a sophisticated hyperbolic discounter should choose a welfare-maximising
contract when asked in period 0, but not necessarily when asked in period 1.16 Sec-
ond, both products shared the same emergency provisions: In case of a medical
emergency or death in the family, a relocation to an area not served by the bank
branch, or a natural disaster (as declared by the government),17 clients could close
their account and access their savings without any penalties. Within the six months
of observation, no client exercised this option.
In order to identify the treatment effect of a commitment to fixed regular instal-
ments, individuals were left to themselves during the savings period, without any
help from deposit collectors or reminders. After all goal dates had been reached,
a comprehensive endline survey was administered. The endline survey focused
on all types of savings (including at home and in other banks), outstanding loans,
expenditures, changes in income, and various types of shocks experienced since
the baseline survey. In addition, existing ASA clients were offered the option to
sign up for a ’Pre-Order’ of the product: Clients were informed that the bank may
decide to offer ASA for a second round, conditional on sufficient demand. While
the Pre-Order did not involve a financial commitment, it involved the completion
16This approach is similar to that in Benartzi and Thaler (2004), who let employees commit to
allocate future salary increases to their pension plan. It could be argued that the late collection of
opening balances effectively just delayed when individuals entered the commitment contract. In a
purely financial sense, this is true. However, signing the contract was associated with substantial
paperwork, as well as a non-financial commitment to the marketers, who personally collected the
opening balance after one week. Out of 159 individuals who initially signed the ASA contract, 45
failed to deposit an opening balance. The corresponding number for Gihandom is 24 out of 116
initially signed contracts.
17Provided appropriate documentation, i.e. a hospital bill, death certificate, or proof of relocation.
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of a new savings plan, a new ’Voluntary Donation Form’, and a decision on a new
termination fee (to deter cheap talk).
3.3 The Survey Instrument
The household survey administered at the beginning of the study had two objec-
tives: First, to measure factors commonly suspected to influence the demand for
(commitment) savings products. Second, the survey data on savings, loans, in-
come, and expenditures provides the baseline for the estimation of treatment effects
(see Section 3.5.1).
I measured time-inconsistent preferences using the common method of multi-
ple price lists (MPLs): Individuals were asked to choose between a fixed monetary
reward in one period and various larger rewards in a later period. A randomly
chosen half of the sample received real rewards, whereas for the other half, the
questions were hypothetical. After a set of questions using a near time frame (now
versus one month), the same set of questions was repeated for a future time frame
(one month versus two months). The outcome of interest was the size of the later re-
ward necessary to make the individual switch from preferring the (smaller) earlier
reward to the (larger) later reward. For illustration, consider the following sample
questions:
1. Would you prefer to receive P200 guaranteed today, or P250 guaranteed in 1
month?
2. Would you prefer to receive P200 guaranteed in 1 month, or P250 guaranteed
in 2 months?
The earlier reward was kept constant at 200 pesos, while the later reward gradually
increased from 180 to 300 pesos. Individuals whose preferences satisfy standard ex-
ponential discounting will be time-consistent – i.e., the amount necessary to make
them switch from the earlier reward to the later reward will be the same whether
they are asked to choose between now and one month, or between one month and
two months. I identify as hyperbolic discounter those who are impatient in the
present, but patient in the future, i.e., the reward needed to make them wait for one
month is larger in the present than in the future (thus the term ’present biased’).
In the opposite direction, individuals who exhibit more patience now than in the
future are classed as ’future biased’. An individual who always prefers the earlier
reward in all questions (for both near and future time frames) is classified as ’im-
patient’. The two sets of questions were separated by at least 15 minutes of other
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survey questions, in order to prevent individuals from anchoring their responses
to earlier answers. An ad-hoc randomisation based on individuals’ birthdays de-
termined who played the game with real rewards (see Appendix C.3 for details).
For those with real rewards, one of their choices was paid out, selected at random
by drawing a ping pong ball with a question number from a black bag. To pre-
vent uncertainty about whether future payments would be guaranteed (causing an
upward bias of the present-bias measure), both cash and official post-dated bank
cheques were presented during the game.
I find 16.6 percent of individuals to be present-biased, and 18.9 percent of indi-
viduals to be future-biased.18 An additional 36 percent of individuals were classi-
fied as ‘impatient’ (they consistently chose the earlier reward, implying a switching
point outside of the 180–300 pesos survey range, and thus an inconclusive time-
consistency status). These estimates are slightly below comparable estimates in
the literature, but show a similar tendency for future bias to be as common as
present bias (Ashraf et al. (2006b) find 27.5 percent present-biased and 19.8 per-
cent future-biased, Giné et al. (2012) find 28.5 and 25.7 percent, respectively, Dupas
and Robinson (2013) find 22.5 and 22 percent, and both Brune et al. (2011) and Sinn
(2012) find 10 percent present-biased and 30 percent future-biased). Explanations
that have been proposed for future bias include utility from anticipation (Loewen-
stein (1987), Ameriks et al. (2007)), varying degrees of future uncertainty (Takeuchi
(2011), Sayman and Öncüler (2009)), and survey noise.
In addition to a standard measure of preference reversals, it is vital to the anal-
ysis to obtain a measure of sophistication. In particular, this measure should not
in itself be derived from a demand for commitment. The approach pursued in this
paper relies on a simple idea: Multiple price lists provide a measure of actual time-
inconsistency, independent of an individual’s awareness of said inconsistency. If
observed inconsistency could be interacted with a measure of perceived inconsistency,
a measure of sophisticated hyperbolic discounting would result.
Such an awareness measure exists: The self-control measure proposed by Ameriks
et al. (2007), henceforth referred to as ACLT. Using survey questions, the authors
elicit how individuals would optimally like to allocate a fixed resource over time.
They then ask which allocation individuals would be tempted to consume (if not
exercising self-control), and finally, which allocation they expect they would con-
sume in the end. While originally intended to identify the parameters of the Gul
18At 17.9 percent, present bias was more frequent among those with hypothetical rewards, than
among those with real rewards (15.2 percent), but the difference is not significant. This suggests
that a bias from uncertainty is unlikely. A detailed comparison of real and hypothetical incentives is
beyond the scope of this paper, and will be provided in a separate working paper on the elicitation
of time preferences. Appendix C.2 gives a summary.
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and Pesendorfer (2001) model, the questions require the individual to critically
assess future temptations and their (hypothetical) response to them. The result-
ing measure reflects an individual’s perceived (rather than actual) self-control prob-
lems. This makes the ACLT questions, interacted with a measure of observed time-
inconsistency (e.g., through MPLs), a promising candidate to measure sophistica-
tion.
The setup is as follows: Respondents were presented with a hypothetical sce-
nario of winning 10 certificates for “dream restaurant nights”. In this scenario, each
certificate entitled the holder and a companion to an evening at any local restau-
rant of their choice, including the best table, an unlimited budget for food and
drink, and all gratuities. The certificates could be used starting immediately, and
would be valid for two years. Any certificates not used after two years would ex-
pire. I presented the ACLT scenario along with an example list of local middle-class
restaurants which were chosen to be above what respondents could usually afford,
and which were regarded as highly desirable. This was intended to prevent simple
substitution of certificates into everyday consumption (given the low income lev-
els in the sample, respondents were used to eat either at home, or in simple street
eateries, carinderias). In addition, the restaurant framing has the added benefit of
being directly linked to consumption, thus avoiding the common concern with cash
rewards that money is fungible and does not have to be associated with an imme-
diate consumption shock (cf. Frederick et al. (2002)). In line with the ACLT design,
I then asked the following questions:
1. Think about what would be the ideal allocation of these certificates for the
first and the second year. From your current perspective, how many of the
ten certificates would you ideally like to use in year 1 as opposed to year 2?
2. Some people might be tempted to depart from this ideal allocation. For ex-
ample, there might be temptation to use up the certificates sooner, and not
keep enough for the second year. Or you might be tempted to keep too many
for the second year. If you just gave in to your temptation, how many would
you use in the first year?
3. Think about both the ideal and the temptation. Based on your most accurate
forecast of how you would actually behave, how many of the nights would
you end up using in year 1 as opposed to year 2?
The answers to these questions provide two important measures: Perceived self-
control (from (3)− (1), expected− ideal) and perceived temptation (from (2)− (1),
tempted− ideal). However, these measures were designed for the Gul-Pesendorfer
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model, which does not directly translate into the βδ-model of hyperbolic discount-
ing which underlies this analysis. The models are not nested, and there is no direct
equivalent to self-control and temptation in the model of hyperbolic discounting.
From the perspective of the βδ-model (where self-control does not exist), we would
expect the two measures to be the same - namely the difference between the opti-
mal ex-ante allocation, and (the individual’s perception of) the allocation that re-
sults in a subgame perfect equilibrium between the different selves. Following this
logic, both measures are equally suitable to assess an individual’s awareness of
their time-inconsistency.
For the purposes of my empirical analysis, I choose to focus on tempted− ideal
as an awareness measure for time-inconsistency. I then interact awareness of time-
inconsistency with observed time-inconsistency (in MPLs), and obtain a measure
of sophisticated hyperbolic discounting: tempted− ideal ∗ presentbias.19 The reason
for focusing on the temptation measure is as follows: Suppose costly self-control
does exist. An individual who exercises full self-control, and thus realises the (ex-
ante) ideal allocation, might still have a demand for commitment. While a commit-
ment device would not change the de-facto allocation he consumes, it can increase
his utility by removing temptation, and thus the need to exercise costly self-control.
Therefore, a low or zero measure of expected− ideal (i.e., good self-control) might
still be associated with a demand for commitment, while time-consistent prefer-
ences would not. As a result, for the purposes of analyzing demand for a com-
mitment savings product, the temptation measure provides a better indication of
whether individuals feel they could benefit from commitment. In this sense, per-
ceived temptation is closely related to the concept of sophistication.
I observe that 81.6 percent of individuals report strictly positive values of temp-
tation, with a median temptation of two certificates. Given the much lower fre-
quency of observed present bias, the question arises how to interpret temptation
without present bias. This paper remains agnostic about the precise theoretical
connection between models of self-control and those of hyperbolic discounting,
and instead offers a simple intuition: If an individual reports to be tempted, but
behaves in a time-consistent fashion, this may be due to the exercise of self-control.
This hypothesis is supported by the data: Conditional on a given level of temp-
tation, non-present biased individuals report significantly better self-control than
present-biased individuals.
19I censor values of temptation and self-control at zero. I interpret observed negative values as mea-
suring something other than temptation and self-control – e.g., not having time to go to restaurants
as often as individuals would ideally like, or inability to understand the survey question. Negative
values occurred in 4 (42) out of 910 cases for temptation (self-control).
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TABLE 3.1: SUMMARY STATISTICS BY TREATMENT ASSIGNMENT
R-Group W-Group Control F-stat P-value
Age* 43.8337 43.4493 44.25 0.8039
(0.6029) (0.8214) (0.8412)
Female* 0.9409 0.9430 0.9430 0.9912
(0.0110) (0.0154) (0.0154)
Education (yrs) 10.55604 10.39207 10.56388 0.8398
(0.1662) (0.2417) (0.2513)
HH Income 2890.89 2485.78 3194.43 0.0481
(124.26) (165.13) (272.45)
#HH members 5.07221 5.179825 5.429825 0.1081
(0.0909) (0.1399) (0.1398)
Real Rewards* 0.5033 0.5219 0.5263 0.8371
(0.0234) (0.0332) (0.0331)
Financial 0.3934 0.3877 0.3860 0.9867
Claims* (0.0229) (0.0324) (0.0323)
Existing 0.4683 0.4649 0.4254 0.5176
Savings Account (0.0234) (0.0331) (0.0328)
Impatience 0.3217 0.4035 0.3333 0.0959
(0.0219) (0.0326) (0.0313)
Present Bias* 0.1723 0.1614 0.1560 0.8388
(0.0180) (0.0246) (0.0246)
Perceived 2.3838 2.1850 2.4714 0.2249
Temptation (0.0889) (0.1122) (0.1210)
Risk Aversion 4.2254 4.6360 4.1316 0.0104
(0.0932) (0.1219) (0.1289)
Cognitive 2.9365 2.8860 2.9342 0.8870
Ability (0.0592) (0.0889) (0.0955)
Financial 1.8556 1.8377 1.8509 0.9767
Literacy (0.0466) (0.0682) (0.0694)
Donates to 0.3961 0.3860 0.4518 0.2836
Charity (0.0229) (0.0323) (0.0330)
N 457 228 228 913
Note: A starred variable indicates that the randomisation was stratified on this variable.
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In addition to the measures for present bias and sophistication (tempted− ideal ∗
presentbias), the survey obtained measures of financial claims from others, risk
aversion, cognitive ability, financial literacy, bargaining power within one’s house-
hold, distance to the bank branch (via GPS coordinates), attitudes towards charita-
ble giving, and frequency of income or expenditure shocks, as well as an indicator
for having an existing bank account. These measures are discussed in Appendix
C.3.
Table 3.1 presents summary statistics for the main observed covariates from the
survey. Tests for equality of means across treatment groups were conducted to
verify that the randomisation was balanced. Randomisation into treatment groups
occurred shortly after the baseline survey, which means that covariates were avail-
able at the time of randomisation. A star next to a variable in Table 3.1 indicates that
the randomisation was stratified on this variable. In three cases, means were sta-
tistically different across treatment groups: Income, impatience and risk aversion.
Income and impatience have no predictive power in any of the later regressions.
In particular, wealthier individuals are no more likely to take up a commitment
product than poorer individuals. Risk aversion does have predictive power for the
take-up of Gihandom (W-group). Robustness checks are reported in Appendix C.2.
3.4 Empirical Strategy
The primary objective of the study was to analyse the demand for and the effects of
a regular-instalment commitment savings product, and to compare its performance
to traditional withdrawal-restriction commitment products. Given the heterogene-
ity of results, a deduced objective is to document possible risks of commitment
contracts, in particular with respect to partially sophisticated hyperbolic discount-
ing. The main outcomes of econometric interest are a range of treatment effects (on
bank savings, other savings, loan demand, and expenditures), as well as predictors
of take-up, contract outcome (successful or default), and the pre-order decision
(comparable to repeat take-up).
For the estimation of treatment effects, denote by Ri an indicator variable for
assignment to the ‘Regular Saver’ treatment group – all individuals in this group
were offered the ASA product. Denote by Wi an indicator variable for assignment
to the ‘Withdrawal Restriction’ group – all individuals in this group were offered
the Gihandom product. Treatment effects can be estimated using the equation
∆Yi = α0 + αRRi + αWWi + ei (3.1)
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where ∆Yi denotes the change in the outcome variable of interest. In Section 3.5.1,
I focus on bank savings, but also provide estimates for total savings, loan demand,
and expenditures (see Figure C.1). Bank savings refers to the change in savings
held at 1st Valley Bank. For ASA clients, this is the sum of their savings in ASA
plus their savings in the non-commitment savings account provided to them. For
Gihandom clients, it is the sum of their Gihandom savings plus their savings in the
ordinary account. For everyone else (i.e., the control group and those who rejected
the commitment product offered to them), bank savings refer to their ordinary sav-
ings account only (recall that individuals were encouraged to use the ordinary sav-
ings account to follow the personal savings plan provided to them). Summing all
existing savings accounts per individual means that crowd-out between savings
devices at the bank will not impact the analysis. However, individuals could have
substituted away from home savings, or savings at other banks. To observe such
effects, I also analyse a measure of other savings, obtained from survey data, which
includes home savings, money lent out to others or safekept elsewhere, and money
at other banks. The time frame for measuring savings runs from the date of the
baseline survey visit to the individual’s savings goal date – i.e., savings durations
vary at the individual level. This is a consequence of focusing the marketing on
particular expenditures: If savings were measured at the end of the study, even a
successful saver would have a savings balance of zero if he has already paid for the
expenditure.
An OLS estimation of equation 3.1 provides αˆR and αˆW – estimates of the Intent-
to-Treat effects of the regular-instalment product ASA and the withdrawal-restriction
product Gihandom. The ITT measures the mean causal effect of having been offered
the product, which is likely to be an average of the effect of using the product, and
of simply feeling encouraged to save because of the product offer. However, as has
been outlined in Section 3.2, individuals in all groups received an identical mar-
keting treatment. Only after a personal savings plan for an upcoming expenditure
had been made, and an ordinary savings account had been opened, did the mar-
keters offer individuals in groups R and W the possibility to bindingly commit to
selected features in their savings plan. Under the assumption that the mere offer of
commitment has no effect on savings (other than via encouraging people to use the
product), the ITT will be a composite of the Treatment-on-the-Treated effect (TOT)
on those who took up the product offered to them, and a zero effect (relative to
the control) on those who did not take up the product.20 In this case, the TOT can
be estimated by dividing the ITT (αˆR and αˆW) by the fraction of take-ups. Alter-
20See Imbens and Angrist (1994) and Duflo et al. (2007) for a discussion on ITTs and local average
treatment effects.
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natively, equation 3.1 can be estimated using an instrumental variables approach,
with takeup (ASAi and Gihandomi) as the regressors and assignment to treatment
(Ri and Wi) as orthogonal instruments.
Predictors of the take-up, default and pre-order decision can be summarized in
a binary choice equation. I use a probit model to estimate
Choicei = β0 + βXi + ei,
where Choicei can be an individual’s decision to take up ASA (if in group R), to take
up Gihandom (if in group W), to default on an ASA contract, or to pre-order ASA
for a second round. The vector Xi contains demographics (age, gender, marital sta-
tus, income, assets, household size, years of education), as well as all survey-based
measures mentioned in Section 3.3. In addition, all binary choice regressions con-
tain marketer fixed effects. This is to filter any noise from differences in marketer
ability.
3.5 Results
3.5.1 Average Treatment Effects
Effect on Total Bank Savings
This section presents estimates of the effects of the two commitment treatments on
individuals’ total savings held at the partner bank. The outcome variable of interest
is the change in a client’s total savings balance at the partner bank, summed across
ordinary savings accounts and any commitment savings products (ASA or Gihan-
dom). The savings period is specific to each individual, starting with the date of the
baseline survey, and ending with the goal date specified in an individual’s personal
savings plan.21 The cost of this reliance on the goal date is that it diminishes the
sample to those 748 individuals who a) could be located for the marketing visit and
b) were willing to make a savings plan with the marketer. This form of attrition is
orthogonal to assignment to treatment.
Column (1) in Table 3.2 estimates that assignment to the Regular Saver treat-
ment group increased average bank balances by 585 pesos (U.S.$14) relative to the
control group. This estimate already includes any charged termination fees due
21All accounts except for those of existing 1st Valley Bank clients were opened after the marketing
stage, implying the observed change in savings is equal to the savings balance. For those 18 clients
who had previously existing 1st Valley Bank savings accounts, the existing account was monitored
instead of opening a new ordinary savings account. Existing bank clients were still offered commit-
ment savings products, in accordance with their assignment to treatment.
71
3.5. RESULTS
TA
B
L
E
3.
2:
SA
V
IN
G
S
O
U
T
C
O
M
E
S
(O
L
S,
P
R
O
B
IT
)
(1
)C
ha
ng
e
in
Ba
nk
Sa
vi
ng
s
(2
)P
ur
ch
as
ed
Sa
vi
ng
s
G
oa
l
(3
)B
or
ro
w
ed
to
Pu
rc
ha
se
G
oa
l
(g
iv
en
pu
rc
ha
se
)
(4
)C
ha
ng
e
in
O
th
er
Sa
vi
ng
s
(s
ur
ve
y-
ba
se
d)
R
eg
ul
ar
Sa
ve
r
58
5.
46
52
**
*
0.
11
56
**
0.
05
09
42
6.
81
12
Tr
ea
tm
en
t(
A
SA
)
(1
29
.2
51
0)
(0
.0
48
6)
(0
.0
62
1)
(6
71
.8
44
2)
W
it
hd
ra
w
al
R
es
tr
.
14
8.
24
29
**
*
0.
13
22
**
0.
21
09
**
*
-3
28
.1
58
5
Tr
ea
tm
en
t
(G
ih
an
do
m
)
(4
0.
92
69
)
(0
.0
54
5)
(0
.0
80
8)
(7
05
.4
60
7)
C
on
st
an
t
27
.1
60
0*
**
63
.4
51
3
(9
.3
98
7)
(5
31
.0
27
9)
M
ea
n
D
ep
.V
ar
ia
bl
e
0.
49
92
0.
19
22
R
²
0.
02
0.
00
O
bs
er
va
ti
on
s
74
8
61
5
30
7
60
3
R
ob
us
ts
ta
nd
ar
d
er
ro
rs
in
pa
re
nt
he
se
s,
**
*
p<
0.
01
,*
*
p<
0.
05
,*
p<
0.
1.
En
tr
ie
s
in
co
lu
m
ns
(1
)a
nd
(4
)r
ep
re
se
nt
O
LS
co
ef
fic
ie
nt
s.
En
tr
ie
s
in
co
lu
m
ns
(2
)a
nd
(3
)r
ep
re
se
nt
m
ar
gi
na
lc
oe
ffi
ci
en
ts
of
th
e
co
rr
es
po
nd
in
g
pr
ob
it
re
gr
es
si
on
s.
72
3.5. RESULTS
to default. In contrast, individuals assigned to the Withdrawal-Restriction group
saved on average 148 pesos more than the control group. Noting that the aver-
age duration of savings periods was 130 days (about 4.5 months), this estimate is
roughly comparable to the effect estimated in Ashraf et al. (2006b): In a sample of
previous savings account holders, the authors find that their withdrawal-restriction
product SEED increased average savings by 411 pesos after 12 months. Given that
the product design of SEED and Gihandom was identical, the Gihandom estimates
presented here also serve to replicate and confirm the results of Ashraf et al. (2006b).
Furthermore, the estimates confirm a small but significant increase of 27 pesos in
savings for the control group. Two interpretations are possible: First, the market-
ing treatment could have led to higher savings even in the absence of commitment
products. Second, the savings increase could be a result of the monetary rewards
received in the baseline survey. Randomisation into treatment groups was stratified
on whether individuals had received real rewards, which ensures that the result-
ing income shock is exogenous to treatment. Note that savings increases are net
of the 100 peso opening balance contained in the free ordinary savings account –
this amount constituted the minimum account maintaining balance, and no client
closed their ordinary savings account during the period of observation.
In addition to the ITT effects reported in Table 3.2, an instrumental variables
regression of the change in bank savings on an indicator for take-up of the commit-
ment products (using assignment to groups R and W as orthogonal instruments)
provides an estimate of the Treatment-on-the-Treated (TOT) effect (discussed in
Section 3.4). The TOT regression suggests that taking up the regular-instalment
product ASA increased savings by 1928 pesos, while taking up the withdrawal-
restriction product Gihandom increased savings by 324 pesos. Both estimates are
conditional on the assumption that being offered a commitment product has no
effect on savings, other than through use of the product (equivalently, those who
rejected the commitment products on average saved the same as clients in the con-
trol group). This assumption is supported by the fact that the marketing treatment
was identical across all groups. The increased gap in the TOT effects of ASA and
Gihandom relative to their ITT effects is a result of the higher take-up rate for the
Gihandom product.
The remainder of Table 3.2 presents the results from a probit estimation of
whether individuals purchased the savings goal (see Table C.1) they had been sav-
ing for: At the end of the endline survey, individuals were asked whether they had
purchased the good specified on their personal savings plan.22 This is a distinct
22The survey team was informed about this savings purpose, in case individuals had forgotten.
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question from whether individuals achieved a certain amount of money in a bank
account – they could have saved for the good at home, or found a different way to
pay for it. If respondents confirmed having purchased the desired good, they were
further asked how they paid for it, and in particular whether they borrowed (from
any source, including friends or family). Due to attrition in the endline survey, the
sample for this estimation is limited to the 615 individuals who a) had made a sav-
ings plan during the marketing stage and were b) reached by the endline survey.23
Exactly half of the individuals reported to have bought the good, or paid for the
expenditure, that was named on their personal savings plan. These 307 individu-
als constitute the sample for the probit regression in column (3), which estimates
the relationship between treatment and the likelihood of borrowing for the pur-
chase (conditional on purchase). Due to sample selection issues, the coefficients in
column (3) do not have a causal interpretation, and should be interpreted as cor-
relations. Borrowing was not uncommon: Slightly below 20 percent of individuals
chose loans or family borrowing as a means of affording the expenditure.
Column (2) of Table 3.2 confirms that both the Regular Saver treatment and the
Withdrawal Restriction treatment increased an individual’s chances of purchasing
their savings goal. The coefficients for the two treatments are not significantly dif-
ferent from each other. However, column (3) shows that individuals in the With-
drawal Restriction group were significantly more likely to borrow in order to obtain
the good: Considering marginal effects, assignment to group W is associated with
a 19.6 percentage points higher likelihood of borrowing (of 31 rather than 11.4 per-
cent). In comparison, assignment to group R (being offered ASA) increased the
likelihood of obtaining one’s savings goal, but seems unrelated to the probability
of borrowing for the expenditure. This may suggest that the ASA product indeed
helped individuals to purchase a savings goal using their own money, and without
the use of loans.
Figure C.1 (Appendix C) shows the impact of the Regular Saver treatment and
the Withdrawal-Restriction treatment on the cumulative distribution of changes in
bank savings, total savings, outstanding loans, and expenditures.24
Testing for Crowd-Out of Savings
A caveat about the estimation presented above is that it is restricted to savings at
the partner bank. During the baseline survey, 46 percent of the sample reported
23Both ’having a savings plan’ and ’being reached by the endline survey’ are orthogonal to assign-
ment to treatment.
24The observation period ends with the goal date for bank savings and total savings, and with the
date of the endline survey for outstanding loans and expenditures.
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to have an existing savings or checking account. This number is partly driven by
microentrepreneurs, who are required to hold an existing savings account when ob-
taining microloans (the pairwise correlation is 0.18). More than one quarter of bank
account holders reported not to have used their account in the last 12 months, and
dormant accounts were common. The regression in column (4) of Table 3.2 seeks
to establish whether the savings increases observed at the partner bank constituted
new savings, or whether a simple substitution from other sources of savings (at
home, or at other institutions) took place.
The outcome variable in column (4) is the change in an individual’s total sav-
ings balance outside of the partner bank, as measured by survey data: During the
baseline survey, individuals were asked about their savings at home, money lent
out or safekept by others, informal savings, and savings at other institutions. An
incentive of 30 pesos was paid for showing an existing bank passbook. The same
exercise was repeated during the endline survey six months later, except that in-
dividuals were now questioned about the savings they kept around the time of
their goal date. Unfortunately, the survey data is very noisy, and coefficients are
estimated with substantial imprecision.25 The available evidence does not suggest
that a substitution took place between savings increases at the partner bank, and
savings at home or at other institutions. All coefficients are insignificant. More-
over, the coefficient for being assigned to the Regular Saver treatment is positive –
if anything, individuals who were offered ASA may have been encouraged to save
even more in other savings vehicles, in addition to deposits made to their ASA
accounts. In contrast, the coefficient for the Withdrawal Restriction treatment is
negative. While this could easily represent survey noise, it is consistent with the
‘safekeeping’ explanation discussed earlier: Individuals may decide to shift exist-
ing assets into an account where they know other members of their household will
not be able to access them.
3.5.2 Heterogeneity: Descriptive Results
The ASA results were very bi-modal: At the time of their goal date (between De-
cember 2012 and April 2013), 51 ASA clients (45 percent) had reached their savings
goal. They had completed all scheduled instalments with a median of 12 transac-
tions,26 and reached savings goals between 950 and 7150 pesos (U.S.$170). By de-
sign, accounts were closed after completion of the savings plan, and clients could
25To account for some outliers in the stated balances, the savings data has been truncated at 1
percent, reducing the sample from 615 to 603 observations.
26 One transaction can cover several weeks’ instalments.
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withdraw their savings in order to pay for the planned lump-sum expenditure (any
remaining savings were transferred onto clients’ ordinary savings account). Many
of these clients pro-actively enquired at the bank to roll over their account into a
new ASA contract. While rolling over contracts was not an immediate possibility
during the study period, the repeat marketing stage included the option to ‘pre-
order’ the product for a second round, should the bank decide to offer the product
again. The pre-order contract was not financially binding, but included substantial
official paperwork. Two thirds of the successful clients took up this offer (see Ta-
ble 3.4), devised a new savings plan, and chose a new termination fee. The bank
has since decided to offer new ASA contracts to those enquiring about them at the
branch.
The situation looked very different for the remaining 63 ASA clients (55 per-
cent) who defaulted on their savings contract. After falling three deposits behind,
their accounts were closed, and the initially agreed termination fee charged (and
transferred to charity). What happened? Two possibilities emerge:27 (i) Clients had
chosen an ASA contract which was optimal for them in expectation, and then ratio-
nally defaulted upon observing a shock (in other words, a ‘bad luck’ scenario). Or
(ii), clients chose the contract by mistake. If the ‘bad luck’ explanation is true, the
timing of the defaults should depend on the shock distribution: If shocks are inde-
pendently distributed across individuals and time, and hazard rates are small, the
timing of defaults should be roughly uniform over time. In sharp contrast, Figure
3.1 illustrates that clients had a tendency to default either right from the start, or
not at all: Out of 63 defaults, 35 clients stopped depositing immediately after the
opening balance, 10 clients made one more deposit, another 10 made between three
and five deposits, and only 8 clients made more than five deposits (see Figure 3.1).
Approximating transactions with weeks (85 percent of clients chose weekly instal-
ments), Figure 3.1 also illustrates the expected default timing given a hazard rate
of 0.028 per week. This estimate is obtained from the endline survey: The sample
population was questioned about the occurrence of 17 types of common emergen-
cies (sickness, loss of job, bad business, flood damage) including a flexible ‘other’
category. 45% reported at least one shock within 6 months, with an average of 0.72
shocks, equivalent to 0.028 shocks per week. This hazard rate is neither consis-
tent with the overall frequency of defaults (observed 55 percent versus predicted
29 percent based on a 12 week contract), nor with the steep timing of defaults. A
much higher hazard rate of 0.56 shocks per week would be needed to explain that
56 percent of all defaults happened immediately after opening. A hazard rate this
27Strictly speaking, this assumes that an individual would not take up a contract if he knows that
default is certain.
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Figure 3.1: Savings Transactions: Defaulted ASA Clients
high is problematic: It predicts an overall default frequency of 99 percent within 6
weeks, which contradicts both the observed 45 percent ‘success rate’ on contracts
lasting 12-24 weeks, as well as the thick tail of the default distribution (13 percent
of defaults occur more than 6 weeks after opening). The observed default timing is
difficult to reconcile with the exponential pattern that would be generated by any
i.i.d. hazard rate. Unless there was an aggregate shock which affected all defaulting
clients immediately after opening their accounts, a pure shock explanation seems
unlikely. Evidence of aggregate shocks is discussed in Section 3.6.2. Heterogeneous
hazard rates are discussed in Section 3.6.1.
The second possibility requires a deviation from rational expectations: Indi-
viduals could have chosen their contract by mistake. Mistakes (defined as choices
that are not optimal under rational expectations) can happen if individuals have
incorrect beliefs about their future preferences or their income distribution, includ-
ing the probability of shocks to either of the two. Chapter 2 outlines why a time-
inconsistent agent with incorrect beliefs about the degree of his time-inconsistency
is likely to select into a commitment contract that is too “weak” to overcome his
self-control issues, leading to default. Looking at the data, it is notable that 80
percent of individuals chose the minimum permissible termination fee for their
savings goal (P150 for goals below P2500, and P250 for goals of P2500 and above),
roughly equivalent to a day’s wage. The observed combination of minimum penal-
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ties and high default rates raises the question whether individuals underestimated
the amount of commitment it would take to make them save. This is consistent
with the observed tendency to default soon after account opening, as individu-
als start behaving according to their true degree of time-inconsistency upon en-
tering the depositing phase. Could rational expectations about stochastic future
time-inconsistency explain the data? If individuals had correct beliefs on average
about their future preferences, they should realize which contract (and in partic-
ular, which penalty) will be effective for them on average. Moreover, risk-averse
preferences imply that individuals who internalize the risk of default should ei-
ther sign up for stronger commitments (to be on the safe side), or stay away from
commitment. This is inconsistent with the frequency of observed defaults, and the
tendency to choose the minimum penalty.
Figure C.2 (Appendix C) lists the chosen termination fees of the 114 ASA clients,
and contrasts them with how much was charged (‘successful’ indicates that no fee
was charged). Not all chosen fees were enforceable: Whenever clients chose a fee
strictly above the minimum and later defaulted on their contract, the charged fee
was the lesser of chosen fee and savings balance at the time of default. The mini-
mum fee was always enforceable through the opening balance.
Unfortunately, it is safe to conclude that the ASA contract likely reduced the
welfare of a significant share of its adopters. For the 35 clients who defaulted imme-
diately after depositing the opening balance, losing the opening balance (through
the termination fee) was the only economic consequence of the contract, thus leav-
ing them worse off. For those who defaulted later during their savings plan (thus
making a shock explanation more likely), an argument can be made that the con-
tract helped them to achieve savings which they would not otherwise have been
able to achieve, at a negative return of 150 or 250 pesos (which is still less than
common interest payments to local moneylenders). A cautious estimate of the fre-
quency of ‘mistakes’ is provided by the pre-order results: 55 percent of all ASA
clients (71 percent of defaulting clients and 35 percent of successful clients) chose
not to order the product again (see Table 3.4).
For the Gihandom accounts, both benefits and risks were less pronounced: Out
of 92 accounts, only five reached the goal amount specified in their savings plan
(three were date-based, two were amount-based). The 53 clients who had opted for
a binding date goal received their savings back after the savings period completed.
Their median savings were 100 pesos (average 286 pesos), which is equivalent to
the minimum opening balance. Out of 39 clients who had opted for binding goal
amounts, 35 were still open at the end of the six-month observation period (average
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TABLE 3.3: ACCOUNT USAGE
Average # of Deposits
(includes opening balance)
Mean Median #accounts
ASA (all) 6.76 5 114
______(successful) 11.98 12 51
______(default) 2.52 1 63
Gihandom Account (all) 1.68 1 92
______(date-based) 1.68 1 53
______(amount-based) 1.69 1 39
Control Savings Account 0.43 0 788
TABLE 3.4: ASA PRE-ORDER
Yes No
Successful 33 18 51
Default 18 43 63
51 63 114
savings 141 pesos).28 85 percent of all amount-based Gihandom accounts (and 79
percent of Gihandom accounts overall) had no further deposits after the opening
balance. This creates a parallel between Gihandom and ASA defaults: Similarly to
the ASA clients who made no further deposits, amount-based Gihandom accounts
effectively lose their opening balance if they do not continue to deposit. A differ-
ence between the two commitment products is that the penalty for discontinuing to
save on an amount-based Gihandom account increases with every deposit, while
the default penalty for ASA is fixed.
Finally, 582 clients opened exclusively an ordinary savings account – either be-
cause they were assigned to the control group, or because they rejected the commit-
ment product offered to them. Out of these clients, one reached the goal amount
specified within their savings plan. Summary statistics for transactions in all ac-
counts can be found in Table 3.3.
3.5.3 Heterogeneity: Regressions
In an attempt to resolve the puzzles presented in the previous section, this section
analyses empirical predictors of take-up for the two commitment products, as well
as default and pre-order decisions.
28Two accounts were closed after reaching the goal amount, and another two were closed after the
bank mistakenly treated them as date-based accounts.
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3.5.3.1 Predicting Take-Up of the Commitment Savings Products
Columns (1) to (3) in Table 3.5 present the results of a probit regression of the ASA
take-up decision on a number of potential determinants, limiting the sample to the
Regular Saver group (R), where ASA was offered.29 The first notable fact is that
not a single demographic factor seems to correlate with the take-up decision. Age,
gender, income, assets, marital status, education and household size all appear to
be insubstantial for the decision to take up the regular-instalment product.
The main factors which do predict ASA take-up are the proposed measure of
sophisticated hyperbolic discounting (see Section 3.3) and a measure of cognitive
ability (see Figure C.4 for a sample question from the cognitive ability test). The
positive predictive power of cognitive ability is reassuring: The ASA product is
more complex in its rules than traditional savings accounts (but no more complex
than a loan contract). The significance of cognitive skills suggests that those clients
who were more likely to understand the rules were also more likely to take up the
product. This may also be interpreted as evidence against possible manipulation
by the bank marketers.
Present bias on its own is not a predictor of take-up, consistent with the intuition
that perceived time-inconsistency, rather than actual time-inconsistency, determines
demand for a commitment product. Perhaps more surprisingly, the association of
commitment take-up and sophisticated hyperbolic discounting is significant and
negative. Recall from Section 3.3 that sophistication is measured as the interaction
of present bias (from multiple price list questions) and self-reported temptation.
In other words, those who exhibit hyperbolic preference reversals, but at the same
time report low levels of temptation, are more likely to take up the product. In con-
trast, those who report being strongly tempted tend to stay away from the prod-
uct. To interpret interaction coefficients, note that present bias is a binary variable,
whereas temptation is in the interval [0, 10]. A possible explanation for this link
comes from theory: Partially sophisticated agents (i.e. those with time-inconsistent
preferences and positive but low self-perceived temptation) have a positive de-
mand for commitment. They take up the product and choose a low default penalty,
which they anticipate will be sufficient to make them save. In contrast, agents who
perceive themselves as strongly tempted have two choices: Either they take up the
product with a penalty that is sufficiently large to make them save, or they stay
away from the product completely. The latter choice may be optimal if the required
29The sample for the regression is restricted to those clients who could be located for the marketing
visit. Inability to locate individuals for marketing is orthogonal to treatment group assignment.
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TABLE 3.5: PREDICTING DEMAND FOR COMMITMENT (PROBIT)
Commitment
Take-Up
ASA
(1)
ASA
(2)
ASA
(3)
Gihandom
(1)
Gihandom
(2)
Gihandom
(3)
Age -0.0015 -0.0004 -0.0003 0.0017 0.0009 0.0011
(0.0019) (0.0020) (0.0020) (0.0029) (0.0028) (0.0028)
Female 0.0328 0.0592 0.0536 0.2418 0.2347 0.2300
(0.0914) (0.0936) (0.0868) (0.1687) (0.1501) (0.1516)
Married 0.0076 0.0095 0.0165 -0.0932 -0.0848 -0.0952
(0.0650) (0.0640) (0.0630) (0.0939) (0.0872) (0.0887)
HH Income 0.0018 0.0013 -0.0028 0.0003 -0.0054 -0.0052
(0.0081) (0.0080) (0.0079) (0.0118) (0.0108) (0.0109)
Assets 0.0007 -0.0048 -0.0084 0.0220 0.0253 0.0258
(0.0145) (0.0143) (0.0143) (0.0224) (0.0213) (0.0216)
HH Members 0.0125 0.0105 0.0130 0.0229 0.0202 0.0217
(0.0100) (0.0097) (0.0095) (0.0157) (0.0154) (0.0158)
Education (yrs) -0.0055 -0.0075 -0.0094 0.0276*** 0.0316*** 0.0315***
(0.0066) (0.0064) (0.0064) (0.0094) (0.0093) (0.0093)
Present Bias 0.0757 0.0636 0.0827 0.0809 0.1020 0.1046
(0.0866) (0.0870) (0.0864) (0.1260) (0.1256) (0.1301)
Soph. Present Bias -0.0622** -0.0579** -0.0631** -0.0363 -0.0524 -0.0530
(Pres.Bias*Temptation) (0.0291) (0.0290) (0.0292) (0.0491) (0.0510) (0.0532)
Perceived Temptation -0.0114 -0.0067 -0.0046 -0.0058 0.0005 0.0006
(0.0123) (0.0124) (0.0125) (0.0212) (0.0205) (0.0209)
Impatience -0.0047 0.0053 -0.0008 -0.0124 -0.0224 -0.0219
(0.0476) (0.0467) (0.0464) (0.0717) (0.0684) (0.0688)
Financial Claims -0.0022 -0.0076 -0.0038 0.1079 0.1166* 0.1185*
(0.0426) (0.0418) (0.0414) (0.0663) (0.0638) (0.0646)
Risk Aversion -0.0049 -0.0059 0.0497*** 0.0500***
(0.0106) (0.0105) (0.0167) (0.0168)
Cognitive Ability 0.0353* 0.0363* 0.0157 0.0174
(0.0188) (0.0187) (0.0236) (0.0239)
Financial Literacy 0.0425* 0.0328 -0.0115 -0.0120
(0.0246) (0.0250) (0.0322) (0.0321)
HH Bargaining Power 0.0063 0.0053 0.0444*** 0.0456***
(0.0113) (0.0113) (0.0164) (0.0167)
Distance to Bank -0.0265 0.0084
(0.0207) (0.0260)
Exist. Savings Account 0.0998** -0.0022
(0.0444) (0.0667)
Donates to Charity 0.0221 -0.0100
(0.0424) (0.0625)
#Emergencies last yr -0.0161 -0.0215
(0.0277) (0.0493)
Marketer FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Mean Dep. Variable 0.2687 0.2687 0.2687 0.4115 0.4115 0.4115
Observations 402 402 402 209 209 209
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Entries in the table represent the
marginal coefficients of the probit regressions.
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effective penalty is very high: Given a constant probability of ‘rational default’, in
which a shock (say, the loss of one’s business) makes it optimal for an individual to
discontinue their contract, agents with a higher default penalty have more to lose.
As a result, for a fully sophisticated agent with medium to high time-inconsistency,
a low penalty may not be effective, and a high penalty may be too risky in the face
of uncertainty.
Column (3) looks beyond ‘deep’ individual characteristics and investigates cor-
relations with other choices. While neither distance to the bank branch, attitude to-
wards charities (proxied by having donated any positive amount to charity in the
past 12 months) nor estimated shock frequency significantly affect take-up prob-
ability, individuals with an existing bank account (at any local bank) were more
likely to take up the product. Given a widespread scepticism towards banks in the
study area, this may be interpreted as a sign of trust in and familiarity with the
banking system.
Columns (4) to (6) present the same regressions applied to take-up for the with-
drawal-restriction product Gihandom, limiting the sample to group W (where Gi-
handom was offered). Most strikingly, there is no overlap in the factors predicting
ASA and Gihandom. If the products were perceived as close substitutes, and in-
dividuals in need of commitment merely took up whichever commitment product
was offered to them, then the empirical analysis should find that the same fac-
tors which predict ASA take-up also predict take-up of Gihandom. A look at the
data confirms that the sets of determinants for the two products are mutually ex-
clusive, suggesting that individuals perceived ASA and Gihandom rather differ-
ently. Specifically, Gihandom take-up is predicted by high education (measured
in years of schooling), high risk aversion (choosing a ‘safe’ lottery in Figure C.3),
high household bargaining power (measured using questions on who decides what
in a household), and strong claims from others on own liquid assets. Consider-
ing a 94 percent female sample population, this combination of factors is reminis-
cent of the evidence presented in Anderson and Baland (2002): In their study, the
authors argue that Kenyan women use commitment devices (ROSCAs) to protect
their savings against claims from their husbands. They propose an inverted U-
shaped relationship between women’s power in their household, and participation
in ROSCAs. While the Kenyan context studied by Anderson and Baland (2002)
is different from the Philippine context studied here, the evidence in Table 3.5 is
consistent with the explanation that women took up Gihandom to ‘safeguard’ their
savings from intra-household conflicts. The withdrawal restriction featured in the
Gihandom account is well-suited to preventing other household members from ac-
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cessing savings, but allows the woman to retain flexibility regarding when to make
deposits. The estimated linear relationship of commitment take-up with household
bargaining power is unable to capture the proposed inverted U-shape. However,
both household bargaining power and female education may be associated with an
increased autonomy of the woman in planning to build up savings of her own. Fi-
nally, the strong predictive power of risk aversion is consistent with a precautionary
savings motive: Those women who are particularly concerned about consumption
variance and the possibility of shocks will be more interested in putting savings
aside for future hard times.
No evidence currently suggests that demand for the withdrawal-restriction prod-
uct Gihandom is associated with intra-personal conflicts and time-inconsistency. A
reservation must be made with respect to statistical power: The sample of group
W is half the size of group R, reducing the precision of estimates. Summing up,
the evidence currently available suggests that demand for ASA is related to time-
inconsistency and partial sophistication, while demand for Gihandom appears to
be related to household bargaining and safekeeping motives.
3.5.3.2 Predicting Default and Repeat Take-Up
Table 3.6 presents marginal coefficients from probit regressions with ASA default
as well as the ASA pre-order decision as the dependent variable. A take-up regres-
sion (column (3) from Table 3.5) has been added for comparison. In addition to
the regressors from the take-up regressions, Table 3.6 also includes the number of
emergencies (illness or death of household members, unemployment, damage due
to natural disasters, and a range of other income and expenditure shocks) which
the household suffered since the baseline survey.
Column (2) predicts ASA default among those randomly assigned to the Regu-
lar Saver group (R). Individuals who do not commit cannot default. Thus, the coef-
ficients are best understood as predictors of who took up the commitment product
‘by mistake’, proxied by take-up and subsequent default. Note that this interpre-
tation abstracts from the possibility of rational default following a shock realiza-
tion. The results provide further support to the partial sophistication hypothesis:
Present-biased individuals are significantly more likely to take up the ASA product
and then default. This effect is particularly strong for agents who report low levels
of temptation, representing naive and partially sophisticated hyperbolics. In con-
trast, more sophisticated hyperbolics are less likely to default: Note that temptation
is in [0, 10] with a median of 2. Aggregating the coefficients for present bias (0.11*),
sophistication (-0.045**) and temptation (-0.02*) yields a lower likelihood of default
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TABLE 3.6: ASA DEFAULTS & REPEAT TAKE-UPS (PROBIT)
Dependent
Variable
(1) ASA
Take-Up
(2) Default
( R-Sample)
(3) Default
(takeup-Sample)
(4) Pre-Order
(takeup-Sample)
Age -0.0003 -0.0024 -0.0057 -0.0080*
(0.0020) (0.0016) (0.0041) (0.0043)
Female 0.0536 0.1189 0.3663* 0.0745
(0.0868) (0.0911) (0.1871) (0.1942)
Married 0.0165 0.0064 0.0363 -0.2433
(0.0630) (0.0536) (0.1369) (0.1490)
HH Income -0.0028 0.0034 0.0206 0.0124
(0.0079) (0.0057) (0.0159) (0.0177)
Assets -0.0084 -0.0093 -0.0384 0.0007
(0.0143) (0.0115) (0.0238) (0.0298)
HH Members 0.0130 0.0123 0.0159 0.0015
(0.0095) (0.0077) (0.0143) (0.0179)
Education (yrs) -0.0094 -0.0030 0.0016 -0.0133
(0.0064) (0.0053) (0.0121) (0.0142)
Present Bias 0.0827 0.1119* 0.4837* -0.4860**
(0.0864) (0.0654) (0.2550) (0.2353)
Soph. Present Bias -0.0631** -0.0453** -0.1718 0.2375**
(Pres.Bias*Temptation) (0.0292) (0.0230) (0.1299) (0.1170)
Perceived Temptation -0.0046 -0.0202* -0.0655*** 0.0109
(0.0125) (0.0105) (0.0244) (0.0301)
Impatience -0.0008 -0.0030 0.0293 0.0319
(0.0464) (0.0372) (0.0882) (0.1001)
Financial Claims -0.0038 -0.0113 0.0095 0.0097
(0.0414) (0.0330) (0.0848) (0.0905)
Risk Aversion -0.0059 -0.0181** -0.0673*** 0.0199
(0.0105) (0.0084) (0.0192) (0.0240)
Cognitive Ability 0.0363* 0.0365** 0.0658* -0.0385
(0.0187) (0.0143) (0.0384) (0.0428)
Financial Literacy 0.0328 -0.0168 -0.1403*** 0.0582
(0.0250) (0.0204) (0.0401) (0.0465)
HH Bargaining Power 0.0053 -0.0116 -0.0778*** 0.0792***
(0.0113) (0.0090) (0.0236) (0.0257)
Distance to Bank -0.0265 -0.0115 -0.0365 0.0643
(0.0207) (0.0165) (0.0536) (0.0615)
Exist. Savings Account 0.0998** 0.0296 -0.0641 0.1694*
(0.0444) (0.0363) (0.0860) (0.0890)
Donates to Charity 0.0221 0.0422 0.0802 0.2122**
(0.0424) (0.0332) (0.0888) (0.0896)
#Emergencies last yr -0.0161 0.0005 0.0558 -0.0855
(0.0277) (0.0213) (0.0601) (0.0677)
#Emergencies -0.0033 0.1156* -0.0414
since baseline (0.0182) (0.0687) (0.0658)
Marketer FE YES YES YES YES
Mean Dep. Variable 0.2687 0.1468 0.5463 0.4630
Observations 402 402 108 108
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Entries in the table
represent the marginal coefficients of the probit regressions.
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for all time-inconsistent agents with perceived temptation values higher than the
median. This is in line with the proposed explanation: Sophisticated hyperbolic
discounters either do not select into the product (if an effective penalty would be
prohibitively high), or they choose a contract which is incentive-compatible for
their preferences (adjusted through the size of the weekly instalment, or the size
of the penalty).
Columns (3) and (4) restrict the analysis to the sample of clients who took up
the ASA product, and should be interpreted as correlational evidence only: The
regressions condition on an endogenous variable, and are likely subject to sample
selection bias. In predicting default occurence (column (3)), the marginal coeffi-
cient on present bias has quadrupled, and kept its significance. Interestingly, the
link between present bias (as proxied by observed time-inconsistency) and default
seems to be much stronger than the link between present bias and take-up. This
is consistent with the theoretical intuition that an agent’s take-up decision should
be driven by perceived time-inconsistency, as proxied by the sophistication measure.
In contrast, once the agent has adopted the contract, actual time-inconsistency will
determine the success of the contract (in addition to a sophistication effect). The
temptation measure now has strong predictive power on its own, even when not
interacted with present bias. Expanding on the discussion from Section 3.3, individ-
uals who report being positively tempted but do not exhibit hyperbolic preference
reversals in MPLs could be either one of two things: a) they are time-inconsistent,
but incorrectly classified as time-consistent in MPL questions, or b) they are sub-
jectively feeling tempted but behaving time-consistently, possibly due to the ex-
ercise of costly self-control. In both cases, higher awareness of temptation will
prompt individuals to choose more manageable (incentive-compatible) contracts
– either through higher penalties or through lower weekly deposits (conditional on
income). The data confirm that ASA clients with higher perceived temptation are
indeed more likely to choose a penalty strictly above the minimum. However, due
to lack of variation in penalties, this relationship is not significant.
Moving on to the pre-order (repeat take-up) decision, the coefficients on present
bias (-0.49**) and sophistication (0.24**) are large and significant. The aggregate co-
efficient for a present-biased individual with the median value of perceived temp-
tation is approximately zero. This has a convenient interpretation: Relatively naive
hyperbolic discounters (those with below-median reported temptation) are unlikely
to take up the ASA product again. From the previous analysis, there is a high
chance that these individuals defaulted on their contract, and at the same time had
not anticipated the default risk. These clients have ‘burnt their fingers’. The result
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that such individuals do not take up the product again is encouraging, insofar as it
suggests learning about their preferences. The reverse holds true for present-biased
individuals with above-median reported temptation (sophisticated hyperbolics):
The aggregate coefficient on their time preferences is positive, suggesting a higher
likelihood to pre-order ASA for a second round. This is consistent with the conjec-
ture that sophisticated hyperbolic discounters choose the ‘right’ contract, which is
incentive-compatible with their true preferences, and optimal in expectation. How-
ever, it does not imply a one-to-one mapping from successful ASA completion to
the decision to pre-order: A sophisticated client who chose a contract that was op-
timal in expectation, but then rationally defaulted following a shock, might well
decide to take up the product again. This is supported by an imperfect mapping
from account status to pre-order decision in the data (see Table 3.4).
A number of other factors can help in explaining the observed default rates.
The most obvious candidate - the occurrence of shocks during the savings period
- finds some support in the take-up sample (‘emergencies since baseline’, column
(3)). Shock occurrence was estimated by asking for common income or consump-
tion emergencies during the endline survey.30 The positive correlation of defaults
with shocks, in combination with the fact that 45 percent of clients completed their
ASA contract successfully, suggests that a significant portion of the take-up sample
likely did choose a contract which was optimal for them in expectation. Clients
without shocks could complete their plan successfully, while those with shocks ra-
tionally defaulted. The theoretical prediction that shock realisation should be irrel-
evant to the pre-order decision (as it does not affect contract optimality in expecta-
tion) is supported by the data (see column (4) of Table 3.6). Other factors predicting
default include financial literacy (-), household bargaining power (-), risk aversion
(-) and cognitive ability (+). Financial literacy is perhaps the least surprising: Indi-
viduals with poor numeracy skills tend to do worse at managing their household
finances, and may fail to allocate a portion of the household budget to regular ASA
deposits. The positive significance of cognitive ability may be partially explained
by the predictive power that cognitive ability has for take-up of the ASA product,
as those who struggle to understand the product’s rules don’t select in. Within the
take-up sample, cognitive ability may reflect predictability and rationalisability of
behaviour: An individual with high cognitive skills is more likely to realise when
30There is a risk that clients who defaulted had a stronger incentive to report shocks, in order to
preserve their self-image or reputation. However, the endline survey was framed as coming from a
research organisation, with no direct link to the bank. The survey was identical across the sample, and
made no reference to ASA or Gihandom. Note that attrition in the endline survey was compensated
by imputing the median shock value for those who did not participate.
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a contract is no longer optimal (even for time-inconsistent reasons), and default on
it, rather than display noisy or unsystematic behaviour.
A similar puzzle arises from the negative correlation of risk aversion with de-
fault (but not with take-up). An explanation requires a closer look at how the mea-
sure was obtained: The risk aversion measure is a score in [1, 6], indicating which
lottery individuals chose from a set of lottery options with increasing expected
value and increasing variance (see Figure C.3). If preferences are characterised
by reference dependence (with the no-risk lottery A as a reference point) and loss
aversion, then the choice of a safe lottery would measure loss aversion rather than
risk aversion. A high degree of loss aversion can be associated with a lower like-
lihood to default on the ASA product (to avoid loss of the penalty). Finally, it is
interesting to note that household bargaining power is unrelated to take-up of the
regular-instalment product ASA, but strongly related to defaulting on it (within the
take-up sample). A possible explanation is that intra-household conflicts played no
role in individual’s motives to take up the product – but that, much like a shock,
individuals soon learnt that it caused household conflicts to try and put aside a
portion of the household budget every week, beyond the reach of other household
members. This can be interpreted as a learning process in adopting a new savings
technology (loan repayment is similar in structure, but may be easier to agree on in
a household because of the higher penalties involved). Consequently, clients with
low bargaining power may have yielded to these disagreements, and defaulted on
their contracts. The large positive association of household bargaining power with
the pre-order decision provides further support for a learning explanation: Once
individuals had learnt about the difficulties of regularly diverting a share of the
household budget, only those with sufficient autonomy in their household chose
to take up the product again.
3.5.3.3 Heterogeneous Treatment Effects
Table 3.7 examines treatment effect heterogeneity across a number of dimensions
of interest. The regression set-up is identical to that in column (1) of Table 3.2: The
change in savings held at the partner bank is regressed on indicators for assign-
ment to the treatment groups. In addition, the treatment indicator for the Regular
Saver group is interacted with variables which have been shown to predict take-
up or default, or which are of interest in themselves. Interaction variables include
present-biased preferences, the self-reported sophistication measure, having an ex-
isting savings account, household bargaining power, and household income.
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TABLE 3.7: HETEROGENEOUS TREATMENT EFFECTS: CHANGE IN BANK SAVINGS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Regular Saver (R) 707.1748*** 481.4925*** 287.4050*** 455.4759*** 351.9444***
(257.1454) (134.9550) (63.6388) (133.2911) (114.1216)
Withdrawal Rest. (W) 129.4941*** 146.3426*** 147.2989*** 154.5030*** 148.8766***
(40.6258) (39.6980) (40.7323) (42.6279) (41.4302)
R * Present bias -58.8396
(543.3738)
Present bias 57.6709
(83.9149)
R*Soph. Present Bias 20.7603
(R*Pres.Bias*Temptation) (81.9725)
Soph. Present Bias -6.0420
(18.1875)
R * Temptation -48.8363
(62.2914)
Temptation -4.9396
(9.2861)
R*High Cognitive Ability 261.2952
(291.0735)
High Cognitive Ability -30.7091
(36.4527)
R * Existing SA 621.5350**
(269.7281)
Existing SA 74.9955*
(41.3577)
R * Income 44.6249
(56.0615)
Income 7.6109
(5.4829)
R * HH power 88.1604*
(50.5904)
HH power 6.9664
(10.3868)
Constant 34.9483 41.1479** -7.0002 2.7796 8.8140
(26.7103) (17.9218) (18.9202) (17.7092) (29.9048)
R² 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.03
Observations 720 748 748 745 748
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Heterogeneity in treatment effects is most pronounced for existing savings ac-
count holders. Existing savings account holders increased their savings balances by
622 pesos more than those without an existing account after being offered the Reg-
ular Saver product. Put differently, the intent-to-treat effect of the Regular Saver
88
3.5. RESULTS
product was 909 pesos for existing savings account holders, and only 287 pesos for
those without existing accounts. This seems particularly surprising in light of the
fact that, in absence of the Regular Saver treatment, existing account holders saved
only 75 pesos more than those without existing accounts. The evidence suggests
that existing account holders were not necessarily active savers before the inter-
vention, but felt strongly motivated by the Regular Saver treatment. A possible
explanation relates to mistrust and negative preconceptions towards banks, which
were common in the population.31 Existing account holders were more likely to be
familiar with basic bank transactions, and more trusting of the banking system as
a whole.
It is worth noting that treatment effects appear to be relatively uniform across
measures of present bias and sophistication. Theory predicts that a present-biased
agent with a low degree of sophistication is likely to select into a commitment con-
tract that is too weak to be effective given his preferences, resulting in default soon
after take-up. After taking into account the default penalty, savings with the com-
mitment product should be weakly smaller than savings without the commitment
product. The positive association between (naive) present bias and default is sup-
ported empirically by the regressions in Table 3.6. The negative effect of present-
biased preferences on savings should be mitigated or even reversed with increasing
levels of sophistication: The agent is more likely to choose an incentive-compatible
contract, increasing the chances of successfully reaching his savings goal. The sign
of the aggregate coefficient on sophisticated present-biased preferences relative to
time-consistent behaviour is theoretically ambiguous, as illustrated by O’Donoghue
and Rabin (1999). Column (1) of Table 3.7 shows that all estimates of treatment
effects with respect to measures of present bias and sophistication are small and
insignificant. A likely reason are the composition effects inherent in ITT estimates:
Individuals with sophisticated time-inconsistent preferences were much less likely
to select into the product (see Table 3.5). Thus, a lower percentage of sophisticated
agents were ‘treated’. Theoretical arguments in Chapter 2 confirm that a sophis-
ticated agent may choose to stay away from commitment, if the effective default
penalty is prohibitively high in the presence of shocks. If his preferences are such
that he cannot achieve his savings goal in autarky, he will choose not to save.
Columns (3) and (4) show that the estimated treatment effect is relatively uni-
form across household income level, as well as an above-median indicator for cog-
31It was a common belief that banks were “not for poor people”. In addition, some individuals
believed that savings deposited at a bank would likely be lost if the bank became insolvent. Deposit
insurance does exist in the Philippines, but may be associated with years of waiting time. See e.g.,
Dupas et al. (2012) on trust-related challenges in banking the poor.
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nitive ability. Column (6) suggests that successfully maintaining the Regular Saver
product ASA was facilitated by having a certain degree of household bargaining
power: Individuals who report to be the primary decisionmaker in many aspects
of household budgeting respond to the Regular Saver treatment with larger sav-
ings increases than those with low bargaining power. Using a score [0, 5], each
one-point increase in bargaining power corresponds to an increase of 88 pesos in
savings after being offered the Regular Saver product. This effect is consistent with
the incidence of household conflicts caused by the weekly ASA instalments (see
Section 3.5.3.2). Note that individuals with high bargaining power did not save
more absent treatment – it is the interaction of sufficient bargaining power and the
Regular Saver treatment which helped individuals to save. This explanation dif-
fers markedly from a ’safekeeping’ motive: If individuals took up ASA to mitigate
household bargaining issues, we would expect the interaction coefficient to be neg-
ative (as those with low power would benefit more from treatment).
3.6 Alternative Explanations for Default
Previous sections have focused on partially sophisticated hyperbolic preferences in
explaining why a majority of individuals who choose to adopt a regular-instalment
commitment product will default soon after opening their accounts. This section
will consider alternative explanations: Income optimism, aggregate shocks, and
limited attention.
3.6.1 Income Optimism
As suggested by Browning and Tobacman (2007), the consumption behaviour of
someone who is overoptimistic about his future income distribution cannot be dis-
tinguished from someone who is impatient – both will overconsume in the present.
Overoptimistic beliefs about future income could explain the observed measure
of time-inconsistency (from MPL questions): If individuals expect their future in-
come to be higher than their current income, they may select the smaller, sooner
reward when presented with the ’now vs. 1 month’ frame, but choose the larger,
later reward when presented with the ’1 month vs. 2 months’ frame. As a result,
they would be falsely classified as present-biased. Income optimism could further
explain default incidence: If people were overoptimistic about their income when
they adopted the Regular Saver product, and realised this upon starting their sav-
ings plan, default may have become an optimal response.
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TABLE 3.8: INCOME OPTIMISM
Not Present-
Biased
Present-
Biased All
T-stat
P-value
Prediction Gap (growth) 3.2904 3.6777 3.3570 0.81
(0.6976) (1.2298) (0.6146)
Prediction Gap (level) 1.2698 -2.2231 0.6686 0.22
(1.1704) (2.6292) (1.0698)
Observations 582 121 703
No Take-Up Take-Up All
T-stat
P-value
Prediction Gap (growth) 1.738007 5.043011 2.582418 0.08
(0.9255) (1.8137) (0.8325)
Prediction Gap (level) 1.140221 -2.569892 0.1923077 0.30
(1.8676) (2.6941) (1.552)
Observations 271 93 364
Successful Default All
T-stat
P-value
Prediction Gap (growth) 4.227273 5.77551 5.043011 0.67
(2.6477) (2.5106) (1.8137)
Prediction Gap (level) -5.318182 -0.1020408 -2.569892 0.34
(3.7117) (3.8799) (2.6941)
Observations 44 49 93
Standard deviations in parentheses. All numbers are group averages.
Using data on predicted and realised incomes, I construct a measure which
plausibly captures income optimism for groups. It is impossible to identify opti-
mism on an individual level – an individual who reports to have lower income
than predicted may either experience a bad draw from a correct income distri-
bution (the ’bad luck’ explanation), or he may have systematically biased beliefs
about his income distribution (’optimism’). However, the law of large numbers im-
plies that individuals should correctly predict their income on average if their beliefs
about income are unbiased. On the other hand, if the present bias measure cap-
tures income optimism rather than time-inconsistency, then individuals classified
as present-biased should have higher predicted-minus-realised income gaps than
those classified as not present-biased. Further, if defaults were caused by individ-
uals systematically misjudging their future income, then defaulting clients should
have higher prediction gaps than those who successfully completed their contract.
Table 3.8 presents group averages of prediction gaps across three dimensions:
The observed measure of present bias, take-up of the Regular Saver product ASA,
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and default on ASA. Prediction gaps are measured as follows: During the baseline
survey in September and October 2012, individuals were asked to predict their av-
erage weekly household income for each month from October 2012 to March 2013.
To make this task easier, individuals chose one of 31 income brackets, numbered
from 1 for ’0-50 pesos per week’ to 31 for ’more than 10,000 pesos per week’. Six
months later, in late March and April 2013, this exercise was repeated during the
endline survey, except that individuals now stated their realised weekly income
for the same time period. Two measures of optimism (or bad luck) are obtained:
Prediction Gap (growth)i is the difference between predicted income growth and re-
alised income growth, where growth is measured as Growthi =
Mar
∑
m=Nov
(bracketm −
bracketOctober). In other words, income growth is proxied by the sum of deviations
from October income, in units of income brackets. This approach is conservative,
in the sense that it is robust to individuals using different income benchmarks
for their October income in baseline and endline survey.32 An alternative mea-
sure of optimism is Prediction Gap (level)i, obtained by the simple difference be-
tween predicted and realised income levels (summed), Prediction Gap (level)i =
Mar
∑
m=Oct
(bracketpredm − bracketrealm ). Consistent with noise in benchmark income levels,
Prediction Gap (level)i exhibits more variation than Prediction Gap (growth)i. Note
that these measures cannot be included as covariates in take-up or default regres-
sions – both because they are not meaningful on an individual level, and because
they use data from the endline survey, and may thus not be orthogonal to treat-
ment.
The sample for Table 3.8 are those individuals who participated in both the
baseline and endline survey. The average prediction gap for income growth across
the sample was 3.36 brackets, suggesting that moderate income optimism may be
common. However, the average prediction gap is not higher for individuals classi-
fied as present-biased – if anything, the level measure suggests they may have been
more pessimistic. In contrast, the average prediction gap is significantly higher for
individuals who adopted the ASA product compared to those who did not, sug-
gesting that those entering commitment contracts may have been more optimistic
about their future income. Finally, individuals who defaulted on ASA did not re-
port significantly higher prediction gaps for income growth than did clients who
32For instance, individuals might have referred to the household income of their core household
in the baseline survey, and their extended household in the endline survey, or vice versa. Clear
definitions of what constitutes a household were provided, but some grey areas were unavoidable
(e.g., where families lived with uncles or cousins, and shared a common budget for food, but not for
other household expenses).
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successfully completed their contract. However, it is worth noting that the level
measure points to a possible pessimism of successful clients.
Summing up, there is mixed evidence that those who adopted ASA were op-
timistic about the growth of their income, relative to those who rejected the offer.
The evidence does not suggest a connection between optimism and the observed
measure of present bias. In addition, income optimism alone cannot explain why
individuals demand commitment. Further, it does not provide a rationale for the
observed link with the sophistication measure (which is based on self-reported
temptation).
Similar arguments apply for optimism regarding the shock frequency λ (as de-
fined in Chapter 2): For instance, individuals could have heterogeneous shock fre-
quencies λi, where shocks may refer to income shocks, consumption emergencies,
and more generally the risk that saving may no longer be optimal. With rational
expectations about λi, individuals with high shock frequencies are ceteris paribus
less likely to select into commitment. However, if individuals have biased beliefs
about λi (such as the belief that one’s shock frequency rate corresponds to the av-
erage shock frequency in the population), then the consequence of a commitment
contract may be a bulk of defaults soon after opening (as those individuals with the
highest λi are likely to drop out first). Therefore, biased beliefs about the shock fre-
quency provide another potential explanation for default occurrence. Its limitation
is similar to that of income optimism: Biased beliefs about λ alone do not predict a
demand for commitment. Neither do they explain a correlation with measures of
present-bias or sophistication.
Less parsimonious explanations may involve a combination of different factors,
such as fully sophisticated hyperbolic preferences in combination with income op-
timism. This combination may predict both a demand for commitment and sub-
sequent default. However, it fails to explain why measures of sophistication are
negatively associated with take-up and default. In this sense, partial sophistication
provides a parsimonious explanation that is consistent with the evidence.
3.6.2 Aggregate Shocks
Idiosyncratic and independent shocks are unlikely to cause the default timing pat-
tern apparent in Figure 3.1. However, if an aggregate shock hit the sample popu-
lation around the time of account opening, this may help to explain why 55 per-
cent of clients defaulted shortly after adopting the product. The Philippines is a
well-known area for earthquakes and tropical storms, and had recently been hit
by tropical storm Washi (Philippine name ‘Sendong’) in December 2011, causing
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1,268 casualties (more than half of them in Cagayan de Oro, a city 126km west of
the study location).33 The risk of such shocks was thus well-known at the time
of marketing in September 2012, possibly affecting take-up rates. Indeed, tropical
storm Bopha (Philippine name ‘Pablo’) hit the Mindanao region between Decem-
ber 2 and December 9, 2012. As opposed to storm Washi, storm Bopha did not
cause flash flooding, and the main effect on the study location was a six-day power
outage. While this may have affected on large businesses, power outages of several
hours each day were common in the study area even before the storm, and pro-
visions against power outages were widespread. Because of its limited effect on
the area, storm Bopha was not locally classified as a natural disaster (which would
have invoked both ASA’s and Gihandom’s emergency provisions). In the endline
survey, 20.5 percent of the sample population reported some damage to their house
or crops, with a median damage value of 1400 pesos (U.S. $33, conditional on non-
zero damage). Within the sample of defaulting ASA clients, the percentage affected
by the storm was 20.4. Asked whether they suffered reductions in income because
of the power outages, only 3 out of 732 endline survey respondents answered in
the affirmative.
While some negative effects of the storm cannot be ruled out, the timing of the
storm does not match the timing of the defaults: The ASA accounts were opened
between 20 September and 28 October. Out of 63 defaults, 35 made no further
deposit after their opening balance, resulting in contract default upon the third
missed deposit, three weeks after opening.34 An additional 15 clients made one or
two deposits after opening (see Figure 3.1 for the distribution of transactions). By
the time of the storm in early December, most of the contract defaults had already
occurred.
3.6.3 Limited Attention
An intuitive explanation for default suggests that clients may have simply forgot-
ten to make their weekly deposits. Limited attention models such as that of Baner-
jee and Mullainathan (2008) suggest that attention is a scarce resource, which needs
to be divided between home and work in order to catch emerging problems before
they cause damage. In their model, the amount of damage an individual suffers
from problems occurring at home or at work (such as a child’s sickness, or running
out of stock for one’s business) is a function of the attention which the individual
33Statistics from the Philippine National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council (NDR-
RMC).
3485 percent of ASA clients opted for weekly deposits, 15 percent opted for bi-weekly deposits.
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invests into home life and workplace. Given the relatively low stakes of the Regu-
lar Saver account (with default penalties roughly equivalent to a day’s household
income), it would be understandable if individuals prioritised their attention on
their home and work lives, rather than on their bank accounts. However, this ex-
planation predicts that individuals would not take up the Regular Saver product in
the first place: During the marketing stage, ASA was clearly presented as attention-
intensive: Clients were presented with an explicit savings plan including due dates
for each week, and given the instruction to physically deposit their instalments at
the bank. Most respondents received their income in cash, and bank transfers were
uncommon. In the Banerjee and Mullainathan (2008) model, not investing attention
in one aspect of one’s life incurred a risk that a costly problem would go unnoticed.
In contrast, not investing attention in the ASA product (by adhering to the weekly
schedule) resulted in certain default. As a result, if the returns to investing attention
at work or at home exceeded the returns to investing attention in the ASA sched-
ule, then individuals should not have adopted the product. The data suggests that
this indeed reduced take-up: Among the clients who were assigned to the Regular
Saver treatment but chose not to adopt the product, being “too busy to go to the
bank” was a common reason for rejecting. Among those clients who accepted the
offer, “distance to the bank branch” does not predict default (as measured by GPS
coordinates, see Table 3.6).
3.7 Conclusion
Commitment devices are receiving increasing attention both in the academic lit-
erature and in the public eye, and are generally portrayed as a promising way to
overcome intrapersonal conflict. The SafeSave case study presented in Chapter 1 of
this dissertation illustrates the positive effect of a newly introduced commitment
savings product in Bangladesh on individuals’ average savings contributions.
Using the example of a commitment savings product in the Philippines, I present
evidence that people may fail at choosing commitment contracts which are suit-
able for their preferences. I argue that an individual’s ability to correctly choose a
welfare-improving commitment contract depends on his degree of sophistication,
i.e., on the individual’s awareness of the nature of his time-inconsistency. I observe
that a majority of individuals who take up a commitment product choose very low
stakes for this commitment, and then default on it. Both take-up and default deci-
sions are systematically linked to low measures of sophisticated time-inconsistency,
suggesting that imperfect (or partial) levels of sophistication are widespread. By
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the nature of commitment, a tendency to choose unsuitable contracts is costly. Im-
plications reach beyond commitment savings, and may extend to rich country ap-
plications such as gym contracts (as shown by DellaVigna and Malmendier (2006)),
diet clubs, and long-term pension savings plans.
From a policy perspective, the presented comparison between a (harder) regular-
instalment commitment and a (softer) withdrawal-restriction commitment may sug-
gest a possible trade-off between efficacy and risk of offering commitment prod-
ucts: Offering stronger commitments with more pressure may provide greater ben-
efits on average – as observed by a fourfold effect of the ASA product on average
bank savings, and an increased likelihood of purchasing one’s savings goal us-
ing own funds. However, offering stronger commitments may also involve an in-
creased risk of adverse effects on welfare for partially sophisticated agents. In the
present study, a ‘softer’ commitment contract is exemplified by the date-based Gi-
handom account: At the end of the savings period, individuals simply received
their savings back, and ‘undesirable’ behaviour went unpenalized. While the ab-
sence of penalties may keep welfare risks to a minimum, beneficial effects of the
product may be similarly limited: Offering the account had a comparatively small
effect on average savings, and an even smaller effect on the median.
The welfare risks suggested in this study are not singular – a closer look at
heterogeneity behind average treatment effects in the literature may reveal that ad-
verse effects of commitment products are widespread. As a consequence, research
on new commitment products should carefully consider possible risks to welfare,
with particular view to partially sophisticated time-inconsistent agents.
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Appendix A
Appendix to Chapter 1: Explaining
Adoption Timing
Section 1.3.2 has pointed out that area of residence strongly influenced when clients
took up the product. However, early adoption areas do not seem richer than others
and are not closer to the bank branch. One possible factor at work may be a herding
behaviour story in the style of Banerjee (1992): Consider homogeneous individuals
who decide in a sequential fashion whether or not to adopt LTS. The sequential
decision process could be due to reasons exogenous to savings, e.g. because fam-
ilies need to find time to sit down at the kitchen table and solve the optimization
problem whether or not they want to commit to a 5 year contract.1 Assume there
is a network structure within each block or area (but not between areas): Commu-
nication between neighbours is good enough that agents know whether someone
in their block has chosen to i) adopt, ii) not adopt, iii) is yet undecided. Every-
one has a private signal whether the LTS product is good or bad for them: “Good”
means it will be manageable with their budget, and will improve their situation.
“Bad” means it will prove to be unmanageable, taking away slack from their bud-
get, causing transaction cost and withdrawal fees, and constrain them until they
decide to cancel it without reaping any returns. Assume further that the true re-
turn to the product is the same for everyone and positive, and that a large majority
of individuals (say, 90 percent) receive a good signal. Finally, add a tie-breaking
rule that someone who is indifferent will not bother to go to the bank to adopt the
product.
1See also the work on limited attention spans by Banerjee and Mullainathan (2008), which ad-
vocates the view that the poor may miss or delay investment opportunities because of time and
attention they spend on domestic problems.
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Suppose the first two individuals who decide receive a good signal. The first
individual will see only his signal and adopt. The second individual will observe
the first’s choice, conclude that his signal must have been positive, and adopt as
well. If someone with a bad signal follows, he will see the first two’s choice, discard
his own signal, and adopt. In a similar fashion, the entire block will adopt the
product regardless of their signals.
Suppose now the first individual has a bad signal, and will not adopt. The
second individual will observe this, conclude that the first had a bad signal and
weigh this against his own signal. Even if he had a good signal himself, he will be
indifferent, and will therefore not adopt. The third person sees that the first two
did not adopt, and will do the same. Likewise, no one in the block adopts.
The consequence is that even with completely homogeneous individuals, a prof-
itable innovation may spread very quickly in one area, and not at all or with con-
siderable delay in another area, depending on the signals of the first one or two
individuals who find the time to optimise. What would this explanation imply for
our results on the treatment effect? If random factors determine who chooses first,
then early adopter areas need not be different at all from late adopter areas in their
savings behaviour, and what we are observing is an actual treatment effect. This
explanation is supported empirically by the fact that early adopters did not choose
higher monthly contributions than late adopters did, as can be seen from the lack
of correlation between entry month and monthly deposit in Table 1.5.
Of course, one may question that the adoption decision is a sequential process
in a random order. Instead, we may believe that the order in which individuals
optimise may result from heterogeneous savings preferences. This leads us to a
technology adoption scenario as presented in Besley and Case (1994): Information
(about manageability) is a public good, and those with higher stakes in the public
good have bigger incentives to adopt the product first to learn about it. For ex-
ample, those who have a higher income may have higher potential gains from the
product, and may thus adopt early. Areas who have more of such “pioneers” will
then adopt the product faster, even if the area is not richer on average. Note that
we do not need to assume different degrees of risk-aversion for this explanation.
What are the implications for savings? The group of pioneers that causes an area
to adopt earlier than another area may be small, so that early adoption areas do
not necessarily differ much on average from late adoption areas, keeping the se-
lection bias small. If, however, the group of pioneers is large, and pioneers follow
different savings trends (for instance, because their income grows faster) than the
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average client, then there is a positive selection bias, and we are overestimating the
treatment effect.
Furthermore, area does not predict early adoption perfectly. If it is generally the
case that richer, or more educated clients in all areas tend to adopt early, and these
groups follow a higher savings trend, then there will be a positive selection bias.
Another classic issue in the technology adoption literature is risk aversion: With
higher risk aversion, the value of learning is higher. Intuitively, people who are
more risk averse will adopt later, waiting deliberately for the information revealed
by the actions and experience of others. Regarding LTS savings, risk averse clients
are likely to commit to higher amounts and longer contracts the later they enter.
Hence, if risk aversion is what drives adoption timing, we may expect monthly
contributions and contract length to be negatively correlated with early adoption
(which the data confirms for contract length but not for monthly deposits). How-
ever, we cannot make any statement about the sign of the selection bias: If the most
risk averse clients are in the control group (i.e. they are late adopters), then what
matters are their savings contributions before adopting LTS. Without LTS, we may
expect risk averse clients to save more in levels than other clients, e.g. as an insur-
ance to income uncertainty. But we cannot conclude anything on the change in their
savings during the treatment period.
Finally, what insights can be derived from the model outlined in Section 2? As
mentioned in the technology adoption scenario, agents who adopt early may be
those who have the highest potential gains from LTS, and consequently the largest
interest in learning whether or not it is manageable. The model identifies these
agents as those with β ∈ [βˆB, βˆ), respectively p ∈ (pmax, pBmax]. In other words, the-
ory suggests that early adopters may be those who can reach their desired savings
goal p with LTS but not without it. Late adopters could have reached their p in au-
tarky, but at less smooth savings contributions – thus their potential return to LTS
is positive, but their stake in learning about its manageability is lower. The main
implication of the model are heterogeneous treatment effects: If the variation of β
in the population is low and that of p is high, then early adopters are the clients
who aim for higher p’s, and who need LTS to achieve them. If p does not vary
in the population, but β varies, then everyone aims for the same savings goal, but
those with lower β need LTS to achieve it. In both cases, the treatment effect is
higher for early adopters than it would be for late adopters. Finally, β and p could
be constant across the population, with variation consisting only in the degree of
relatives’ claims, µ. Since pmax increases in µ (for given β), clients with demanding
relatives (low µ) may need LTS to achieve a p that clients with higher µ can achieve
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without LTS. So clients with low µ adopt early, and again the treatment effect is
bigger for early adopters.
What about the selection bias, E[SNTit − SNTi, t−1 | T]− E[SNTit − SNTi, t−1 | NT]? Ab-
sent treatment, early adopters would have saved zero as they could not achieve
their desirable p, hence the change in their savings is zero. Late adopters may
have been saving for p at home during the treatment period. Whether or not this
contribution increased or decreased from t to t + 1 depends on their allocation of
the savings burden p− 1 across periods. In the language of the model, if LTS was
introduced in a period 1, and β, p, u(ct) were such that s1 > s¯ in autarky, then
their savings would decrease from period 1 to 2, causing a positive selection bias.
If s1 < s¯, the selection bias would be negative. Finally, one may argue that late
adopters anticipated saving with LTS in the following period, and thus did not
save at home, resulting in a selection bias of zero.
This subsection has discussed a small number of factors that may have deter-
mined adoption timing – many others remain in the dark. The herding model is
consistent with adoption in some areas but not in others, and is further supported
by the lack of correlation between monthly contribution and entry timing as well as
the non-existence of pre-existing time trends. Classical technology adoption mech-
anisms are supported by the fact that late adopters choose longer contracts. Finally,
timing may be explained by different degrees of hyperbolic discounting or stronger
claims from relatives. While this preliminary analysis does not have survey data
on client’s time preferences, studies like Ashraf et al. (2006b) show that individuals
with a lower β and a higher degree of sophistication will be most interested in a
commitment savings product.
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Appendix B
Appendix to Chapter 2:
Mathematical Proofs
Lemma 1. (a) The period 2 agent is willing to save for the nondivisible and transfer
s2 = p − 1 if s1 is bigger than some threshold value, s1 ≥ smin. (b) smin is strictly de-
creasing in the time-inconsistency parameterβ. (c) The effect of the shock frequency λ on
smin is ambiguous.
Proof. (a) The period 2 agent is willing to save s2 = p− 1 if s1 is such that
u(1+ s1− (p− 1))+ β[(1−λ)u(b)+λu(p− 1)] ≥ u(1+ s1− sNo2 )+ βE[u(y3+ sNo2 )]
It is sufficient to prove that once s1 is high enough to satisfy the inequality above
(i.e., buying the good is optimal), the inequality will also be satisfied for all higher
values of s1. Consider a value s′1 such that buying the good is optimal, then
u(2+ s′1 − p) + β[(1− λ)u(b) + λu(p− 1)] ≥ u(1+ s′1 − s2) + βE[u(y2 + s2)].
The inequality holds for all s2 < p− 1, thus it also holds for sNo2 (s′′1 ), the s2 that is
optimal at a higher level s′′1 > s
′
1, conditional on the nondivisible not being bought.
Due to strict concavity of u(ct),
u(1+ s′1− sNo2 (s′′1 ))−u(1+ s′1− (p− 1)) ≥ u(1+ s′′1 − sNo2 (s′′1 ))−u(1+ s′′1 − (p− 1)),
i.e., the consumption gain (p− 1)− sNo2 from deciding not to save for the good in
period 2 gives a higher utility gain when starting from the lower consumption level
1+ s′1 than when starting from consumption level 1+ s
′′
1 . Since
β[(1−λ)u(b)+λu(p− 1)]− βE[u(y2+ sNo2 (s′′1 )] ≥ u(1+ s′1− sNo2 (s′′1 ))−u(2+ s′1− p)
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holds by the optimality of buying the good at s′1, substitution and rearranging
yields
u(2+ s′′1 − p) + β[(1− λ)u(b) + λu(p− 1)] ≥ u(1+ s′′1 − sNo2 ) + βE[u(y2 + sNo2 )]
for all s′′1 > s
′
1. Therefore, when s1 has reached some threshold smin, saving for the
nondivisible is optimal for all s1 ≥ smin.
(b) For a given β, evaluate inequality 2.2 at s1 = smin. If β is increased to β′ > β,
the inequality still holds: u(b) > u(1 + s2) and u(p− 1) > u(s2) for all s2 < p− 1
given b > p. Intuitively, the weight of the reward of saving increases relative to the
cost. Since u′(c) > 0, the inequality becomes more slack, and will still be satisfied
for s′1 = smin − e. Therefore, smin decreases in β.
(c) Investigating the sign of δsmin/δλ, note that an increase in λ makes it less at-
tractive to save for the nondivisible (which will not be obtained in case of a shock),
increasing smin. However, a stronger motive for precautionary savings on the right-
hand side decreases the savings difference (p − 1) − sNo2 , which decreases smin.
Which effect dominates is a function of (b − p) and u′′(c). Formally, both sides
of the inequality decrease in λ. As the shock hits, the right-hand side loses 1, at a
consumption level 1+ sNo2 < p. The left-hand side loses (b− p) + 1 > 1, at a higher
consumption level b > 1+ sNo2 .
Lemma 2. (a) The maximum that period 1 would be willing to save, denoted smax, is
strictly increasing in the time-inconsistency parameter β. (b) smax weakly decreases in the
amount of naiveté, β˜− β.
Proof. (a) Evaluate inequality 2.3 at s1 = smax. For each side separately, take the
derivative w.r.t. β. By the envelope condition, dUdβ =
δU
δβ +
δU
δsNo1
δsNo1
δβ =
δU
δβ . For a
time-inconsistent period 1 agent with β˜ < 1, only s1 is a choice variable – s˜No2 is
inferred by backward induction, and depends on his belief β˜ (rather than on β).
The resulting derivative of the left-hand side is bigger than the derivative of the
right-hand side:
(1− λ)²(u(2+ s1 − p) + u(b))
+ (1− λ)λ(u(2+ s1 − p) + u(p− 1))
+ λ(u(s1 − s˜No2 ) + E[u(y3 + s˜No2 )])
> E[u(y2 + sNo1 − s˜No2 ) + u(y3 + s˜No2 )]
This inequality follows from inequality 2.3, noting that u(1− smax) < u(1− sNo1 )
holds by definition of smax. As a result, when s1 is held constant at smax, and β is
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increased, the left-hand side increases more than the right-hand side does, so the
original inequality is maintained and becomes more slack. The inequality will still
hold for s1 = smax + e. Thus, smax is strictly increasing in β.
(b) For a given β, an increase in β˜ > β is associated with a less sophisticated
agent. The parameter β˜ enters the smax- function through period 1’s expectation of
period 2’s precautionary savings, s˜No2 (s1) = argmax(u(y2 + s1 − s2) + β˜E[u(y3 +
s2)]. An increase in β˜ causes expected precautionary savings s˜No2 to increase. This
brings savings closer to period 1’s ideal: Since period 1 discounts period 2 and 3 at
the same rate, he would like his future self to save more than he actually does. As β˜
increases, period 1 is more optimistic that period 2 will follow his preferences. As a
result, both sides of inequality 2.3 increase in β˜. However, the agent is more depen-
dent on precautionary savings if he does not save for the nondivisible good, since
savings for the nondivisible act as an insurance against shocks. Thus, the left-hand
side of the inequality increases less than the right-hand side, and the inequality
may no longer hold at the original smax. Hence, smax weakly decreases in β˜.
Lemma 3. (a) The optimal allocation of savings from period 1’s perspective, denoted
s1 = sopt, is characterized by
u′(1− sopt) = β[(1− λ)u′(2+ sopt − p) + λu′(sopt − s˜No2 )(1+ δs˜
No
2
δs1
· 1−β˜
β˜
)].
(b) sopt is strictly increasing in β, and always smaller than smax.
Proof. (a) Maximising expected lifetime utility from period 1 perspective, condi-
tional on purchase of the nondivisible (i.e., on s2 = p − 1), yields the following
first-order condition for s1 = sopt:
u′(1− sopt) = β[(1− λ)u′(2+ sopt − p) + λu′(sopt − s˜No2 )]
+ βλ
δs˜No2
δs1
[−u′(sopt − s˜No2 ) + Eu′(y3 + s˜No2 )]
Note that δU1/δs˜No2 6= 0 given β˜ < 1: Period 1 self does not expect his future self
to share his preferences, thus the envelope condition does not apply for s˜No2 . The
first-order condition for sopt can be simplified using the first-order condition from
s˜No2 : βEu
′(y3 + s˜No2 ) = u
′(s1− s˜No2 ). Substituting this into the above and simplifying
yields Lemma 3.
(b) sopt is determined by the equation in part (a). Increasing β unambiguously
increases the right-hand side of the equation (note δs˜No2 /δs1 > 0). To clear, the
marginal utility of period 1 consumption must increase, implying an increase in
sopt. Thus, sopt increases in β. Further, sopt ≤ smax, follows by the definition of
smax.
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Proposition 1. For small shock frequencies λ, and in the region where savings are skewed
towards period 1, s1 ≥ s¯ ≡ p−12 , adopting a regular-instalment product increases the
maximum the agent is willing to save, i.e., sBmax > smax. A sufficient constraint on the
shock frequency is λ < u
′(1)
u′(0.5) . In the region s1 < s¯, adopting the regular-instalment
product unambiguously decreases smax.
Proof. In the region s1 ≥ s¯: From inequality 2.5, the introduction of a penalty D will
increase smax whenever βλ[u(s1− s˜No2 )−u(s1−D− s˜No2 )] < u(1− sNo1 )−u(1−D−
sNo1 ). To a first-order approximation, this is equivalent to βλu
′(s1) · D < u′(1) · D,
which holds whenever λ < u′(1)/u′(s1). Given s1 ≥ s¯ > 0.5, it is sufficient that λ <
u′(1)/u′(0.5). Therefore, inequality 2.5 always holds using the original smax(β),
and it still holds for smax(β) + e. For the special case where D > s1, limited liability
applies: The left-hand side stays constant as D increases, while the right-hand side
decreases in D. The positive effect of D on smax is reinforced. The resulting sBmax(β)
will be strictly higher than smax(β) for s1 ≥ s¯.
In the region s1 < s¯: The agent compares
u(1− s1 − D) + β(1− λ)²(u(2+ s1 − p) + u(b))
+ β(1− λ)λ(u(2+ s1 − p) + u(p− 1))
+ βλ(u(s1 − s˜No2 ) + E[u(y3 + s˜No2 )])
≥ u(1− D− sNo1 ) + βE[u(y2 + sNo1 − s˜No2 ) + u(y3 + s˜No2 )]
With a strictly concave utility function, the utility loss from D when starting at
consumption level 1− s1 is bigger than the utility loss from D when starting at con-
sumption level 1: u(1− s1)− u(1− s1 − D) > u(1)− u(1− D) for s1 > 0. In other
words, the penalty D hurts the agent more when he is saving for the nondivisible
than when he is not. With the left-hand side decreasing more than the right-hand
side, willingness to save will decrease, shifting the sBmax(β)-curve below the original
smax(β)-curve for s1 < s¯. Further note s˜No2 is affected by D, but only through s
No
1 .
For sNo1 , the envelope condition applies.
Lemma 4. The threshold sˆ(β) weakly decreases in β. Equivalently, as β increases, a larger
range s1 ∈ (sˆ(β), s¯) is strictly dominated by s¯.
Proof. The threshold sˆ(β) is the lowest value of s1 which satisfies
u(1− sˆ− D) + β(1− λ)(u(2+ sˆ− p)) + βλ(u(sˆ− s˜No2 (sˆ)) + E[u(y3 + s˜No2 (sˆ))])
≤ u(1− s¯) + β(1− λ)(u(2+ s¯− p)) + βλ(u(s¯− D− s˜No2 (s¯)) + E[u(y3 + s˜No2 (s¯))]).
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By construction, sˆ(β) < s¯− D for all β > 0. Given u(1− sˆ− D) > u(1− s¯), it must
be that
β(1− λ)(u(2+ sˆ− p)) + βλ(u(sˆ− s˜No2 (sˆ)) + E[u(y3 + s˜No2 (sˆ))])
<β(1− λ)(u(2+ s¯− p)) + βλ(u(s¯− D− s˜No2 (s¯)) + E[u(y3 + s˜No2 (s¯))]).
This inequality will still hold for β′ > β, and become more slack. All values of s1
which were strictly dominated at β are also strictly dominated at β′. The dominated
region (sˆ(β), s¯) becomes weakly larger.
Proposition 2. For a given shock frequency λ, the minimum effective penalty De f f that
will enforce saving weakly decreases in the time-inconsistency parameter β.
Proof. For a given β, De f f (β) is defined as the minimum penalty such that sBmin(β) ≤
sBmax(β). Holding the penalty D fixed, and increasing β to β′ > β, Lemma 1 and 2
assert that sBmin(β
′) < sBmin(β) ≤ sBmax(β) < sBmax(β′). Thus, penalty De f f (β) is
effective for all β′ ≥ β.
Proposition 3. The optimal Regular Saver contract for a fully sophisticated agent with
β < βˆ depends on the effect of the minimum effective penalty, D = De f f : Where De f f
results in sBmin(β) ≤ sBmax(β) ≤ s¯ (illustrated in Figure 2.3), equilibrium savings contri-
butions are perfectly smooth, i.e., s1 = s¯ ≡ p−12 and s2 = 2s¯ = p− 1. Consequently, the
optimal contract is to choose De f f . Where De f f results in sBmax(β) ≥ sBmin(β) > s¯ (illus-
trated in Figure 2.2), the optimal contract involves D ≥ De f f , with equilibrium savings
weakly skewed towards period 1 (s1 ≥ s¯).
Proof. First, note that a fully sophisticated agent will never adopt a contract with
D < De f f : This results in sBmax(β) < sBmin(β), and thus in certain default in period 1,
which is dominated by not adopting the product. It then trivially follows that when
De f f results in sBmax(β) ≥ sBmin(β) > s¯, the optimal contract involves D ≥ De f f , and
achieves equilibrium savings s1 ≥ s¯.
Second, when De f f results in sBmin(β) ≤ sBmax(β) ≤ s¯, choosing De f f necessarily
results in equilibrium savings s¯. To see this, recall that sBmin(β) = smin(β) in the
region s1 < s¯: Period 1 has already defaulted on the contract, implying the contract
is no longer active in period 2. Further, by Proposition 1, sBmax(β) < smax(β) in
the region s1 < s¯. Therefore, starting from β < βˆ and thus smax(β) < smin(β),
introducing a penalty will never lead to an intersection sBmax = sBmin in the region
s1 < s¯. The only possibility for sBmin(β) ≤ sBmax(β) ≤ s¯ to occur is an intersection
of the curves on the vertical (dominated) part of the sBmax- curve, where sBmin ∈
[sˆ(β), s¯), and sBmax = s¯. This happens when the penalty is sufficiently high to make
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the agent willing to jump to s¯. From the equilibrium savings schedule, s1 = s¯ if
max(sBmin, s
B
opt) ∈ [sˆ, s¯).
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C.1. SUPPLEMENTARY FIGURES AND TABLES
C.1 Supplementary Figures and Tables
TABLE C.1: PERSONAL SAVINGS GOALS
All All (%) ASA
clients
Gihandom
clients
Education 163 21.79 18 21
General Savings/Not specified 148 19.79 37 21
House/Lot purchase/construction/repair 106 14.17 20 12
Christmas/Birthday/Fiesta/Baptism 91 12.17 12 16
Capital for Business 69 9.22 9 5
Household Item (Appliance/Furniture) 41 5.48 5 4
TV/DVD Player/Laptop/Cellphone 33 4.41 3 2
Emergency Buffer 31 4.14 1 0
Health/Medical 26 3.48 3 2
Agricultural/Livestock 19 2.54 2 6
Motorbike/Car/Boat 17 2.27 4 2
Travel/Vacation 4 0.53 0 1
Total 748 100 114 92
Median Goal Amount (pesos) 2400 2400 2400
Median Time until Goal Date (days) 137 138 133
Median Termination Fee (pesos, if ASA) – 150 –
Date-Based Goal (if Gihandom) – – 53
Amount-Based Goal (if Gihandom) – – 39
TABLE C.2: TAKE-UP RATES
Assigned Reached Take-Up Take-Up
(% assigned)
Take-Up
(% reached)
Regular Saver
(ASA)
457 423 114 25% 27%
Withdrawal
Restriction
(Gihandom)
228 219 92 40% 42%
Standard
Account (OSA)
with P100
913 852 788 86% 92%
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TABLE C.3: QUANTILE REGRESSIONS
(1) Change in
Bank Savings
(2) Change in
Other Savings
(3) Change in
Outstanding
Loans
10th Regular Saver 0.00 252.00 -4,000.00*
Percentile (ASA) (0.00) (2,353.66) (2,282.56)
Withdrawal Restr. 0.00 -148.00 -345.00
(Gihandom) (0.00) (2,670.35) (2,598.30)
20th Regular Saver 0.00 -271.00 -2,000.00*
Percentile (ASA) (0.00) (630.63) (1,021.07)
Withdrawal Restr. 0.00 -1,071.00 -1,000.00
(Gihandom) (0.00) (715.48) (1,162.30)
30th Regular Saver 0.00 -150.00 -800.01**
Percentile (ASA) (0.00) (261.67) (394.72)
Withdrawal Restr. 0.00 -240.00 -700.00
(Gihandom) (0.00) (296.88) (449.32)
40th Regular Saver 0.00 0.00 0.00
Percentile (ASA) (5.45) (53.89) (129.39)
Withdrawal Restr. 0.00 0.00 0.00
(Gihandom) (6.29) (61.15) (147.28)
50th Regular Saver 0.00 0.00 0.00
Percentile (ASA) (5.23) (97.89) (41.80)
Withdrawal Restr. 100.00*** 56.67 0.00
(Gihandom) (6.03) (111.06) (47.58)
60th Regular Saver 0.00 85.00 50.00
Percentile (ASA) (0.00) (229.72) (261.24)
Withdrawal Restr. 100.00*** -135.00 -100.00
(Gihandom) (0.00) (260.62) (297.38)
70th Regular Saver 0.00 110.00 -234.00
Percentile (ASA) (17.91) (389.19) (711.40)
Withdrawal Restr. 100.00*** -343.44 -800.00
(Gihandom) (20.64) (441.56) (809.80)
80th Regular Saver 200.00 -208.00 840.00
Percentile (ASA) (181.42) (587.84) (1,226.00)
Withdrawal Restr. 150.00 -865.96 340.00
(Gihandom) (209.10) (666.93) (1,395.59)
90th Regular Saver 2,051.87*** -635.00 925.00
Percentile (ASA) (329.68) (1,290.76) (3,737.72)
Withdrawal Restr. 280.00 -1,050.00 -489.00
(Gihandom) (379.97) (1,464.43) (4,254.74)
Observations 748 603 720
Estimated standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Survey-based data
(columns (2) and (3)) is truncated at 1 percent. All reported coefficients are Intent-to-Treat
effects.
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Notes for Table C.3: The effect of offering the Regular Saver (ASA) product on
total bank savings (ordinary plus commitment savings accounts) is not apparent
until the 90th percentile. This is consistent with a large effect on the 51 ASA clients
who successfully completed their contract, and a limited effect on non-adopters.
The ASA product was offered to 423 individuals, of whom 114 adopted the prod-
uct. The 63 ASA clients who defaulted largely achieved a zero change in savings
- a majority of defaulters stopped depositing soon after opening their account (see
Figure 3.1), and their opening balance was consumed by the default penalty.
The effect of offering the Withdrawal Restriction (Gihandom) product on bank
savings is 100 pesos at the median - this is likely the mechanical result of a 42
percent take-up rate and a 100 pesos minimum opening balance. In contrast to
ASA clients, those Gihandom clients who stopped depositing after their opening
balance (79 percent) did not lose their savings to a default penalty, but their savings
remain frozen in their account (up to a goal date or amount, see Section 3.5.2).
The regressions in columns (2) and (3) are based on survey responses on in-
dividuals’ outstanding loan balance, as well as on savings at home and at other
banks. While there is a large amount of noise in the survey data, there is no sys-
tematic evidence of a substitution from other sources of savings into savings at the
partner bank. However, offering the Regular Saver product may have facilitated
the biggest reductions in loan demand (at 10th, 20th, and 30th percentile).
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Figure C.1: Distributional Effect of Treatment on Savings, Loans and Expenditures
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C.2 Robustness Checks
This section tests robustness along several dimensions. Table C.4 verifies that the
estimation of average treatment effects is robust to the inclusion of unbalanced co-
variates (see Table 3.1). Table C.5 tests robustness of the take-up and default re-
gressions of Section 3.5.3 with respect to the measurement of sophistication. As
outlined in Section 3.3, sophistication is measured by interacting observed time-
inconsistency (in MPLs) with a measure of perceived time-inconsistency. Instead of
the previously used “Perceived Temptation” variable, Columns (4) and (8) of Ta-
ble C.5 use “Perceived Self-Control” to capture perception of time-inconsistency
(both measures are discussed in Section 3.3). Note that 316 out of 402 (79%) indi-
viduals in the R-sample report zero (or in 13 cases, negative) values of Perceived
Self-Control. Interacted with the observed measure of present bias, this implies that
only 21 out of 402 values of Pres.Bias*Self-Control are non-zero. While the relation-
ship with take-up is not significant (likely due to a lack of variation), the coefficient
on Pres.Bias*Self-Control is roughly comparable in magnitude and sign to the coef-
ficient on Pres.Bias*Temptation.
Table C.6 looks at the effect of using real incentives instead of hypothetical ques-
tions in the measurement of time-inconsistency. Section 3.3 outlines the multiple
price list method which was used to elicit individuals’ time preferences. The elic-
itation was first conducted with the entire sample using hypothetical questions.
Towards the end of the survey (approximately 30min later), the elicitation was re-
peated for a randomly chosen half of the sample with real monetary rewards (Ap-
pendix C.3 describes the randomisation). During the hypothetical round, individ-
uals were not informed about the existence of the real-rewards round.
The regressions in the main text use the incentivised measures where obtained
(468 of 913 individuals, equivalent to 230 of 457 in group R), and rely on measures
from the hypothetical round otherwise. Columns (2) and (5) of Table C.6 exploit the
fact that ‘hypothetical measures’ are available for the whole sample, and re-run the
ASA take-up and default estimations (treatment group R) from Section 3.5.3 using
only unincentivised measures of present bias and impatience. In contrast, Columns
(3) and (6) restrict the sample to those who received real rewards, and rely only on
incentivised measures.
Table C.6 indicates that the main results of this paper (sophistication negatively
predicts commitment take-up, (naive) present bias predicts default) appear to be
driven by the incentivised measures of time-inconsistency: The estimated effects
in the real-rewards sample are highly significant despite the much smaller sample
size, while the coefficients for unincentivised measures of present bias (Columns
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TABLE C.7: REAL VS. HYPOTHETICAL INCENTIVES
A. BETWEEN-INDIVIDUAL COMPARISON (CROSS SECTION)
Dependent
Variable
Present Bias Future Bias Impatience
Real Incentives -0.0264 -0.0117 0.0253
(0.0250) (0.0264) (0.0323)
Mean Dep.
Variable
0.166 0.189 0.357
Observations 882 882 882
B. WITHIN-INDIVIDUAL COMPARISON (PANEL DATA)
Dependent
Variable
Present Bias Future Bias Impatience
Real Incentives -0.0825 -0.3049*** 0.5086***
(0.1127) (0.1064) (0.1452)
Mean Dep.
Variable
0.161 0.219 0.337
Individuals 462 462 462
Observations 903 903 903
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Entries in the tables represent the
marginal coefficients of probit regressions. Table B restricts the sample to those individuals who
received real incentives, and uses a panel structure with ‘real vs. hypothetical incentives’ as the
time dimension (thus, T = 2).
(2) and (5)) are close to zero. This result raises a series of new questions, most no-
tably: What is the effect of real monetary incentives in the measurement of time
preferences? Clearly a research topic of great interest in its own right, this ques-
tion is beyond the scope of this dissertation, and will be the subject of a separate
working paper.
Table C.7 provides some preliminary evidence on the effect of real rewards: The
between-individual analysis is a simple cross-section regression of time-preference
outcomes (incentivised where obtained, otherwise hypothetical) on whether or not
the individual received monetary incentives. The within-individual analysis is re-
stricted to the real-rewards sample, and uses two observations per individual: One
to capture her time preferences using hypothetical questions, and one under mone-
tary rewards. To illustrate, the estimated equation for present bias is presentbiasit =
α + β ∗ realit + µi + eit, where µi is assumed to be random. The results suggest
that monetary incentives may decrease the occurrence of time-inconsistency: In-
dividuals were less likely to exhibit either present bias or future bias (although
only the latter effect is significant), but developed more general impatience. The
between-individual analysis confirms the sign of this effect (less time-inconsistency,
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more impatience), but remains statistically insignificant. In combination with the
strong predictive power for commitment take-up and default observed in Table
C.6, these results are consistent with the idea that incentivising survey questions
reduces noise and improves the quality of the answers.
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C.3 Survey Measurement and Marketing Material
The ad-hoc randomization to determine who would receive real rewards for the
time-preference questions was implemented as follows: At the start of the survey,
enumerators verified respondents’ ID as a part of the screening process. Enumer-
ators then performed a calculation based on an individual’s birth day, month and
year. If the calculated number was odd, the respondent received a survey contain-
ing questions with real rewards. If the calculated number was even, the survey was
administered with hypothetical questions.1 Individuals were not informed about
this randomisation when starting the survey, but the nature of rewards was trans-
parent at the time of asking the questions. Serious consideration was given to the
possibility of an uncertainty bias: In the presence of uncertainty about whether they
would receive a promised future payment, even time-consistent agents would have
an incentive to always pick the immediate reward. Choices in the future time frame
would be unaffected, resulting in an upward bias on the present bias measure. To
assure individuals that all payments were guaranteed, both cash and official post-
dated bank cheques were presented during the game.
In addition to the measures for present bias and sophistication, the baseline sur-
vey obtained measures of other covariates of interest: A measure of the strength
of financial claims from others is obtained using a methodology similar to that in
Johnson et al. (2002): Individuals were presented with a hypothetical scenario in
which they keep 3000 pesos in their house, set aside for a particular expenditure
that is due in one month. If the people around them knew about this money, how
many would ask for assistance, and how much would they ask? This hypotheti-
cal framing avoids the endogeneity inherent in asking respondents directly about
actual transfers made to others (actual transfers were also observed, but not used
in the analysis). The ’Financial Claims’ variable used in this paper is an indicator
for individuals who reported to face above-median claims from others (the median
was 500 pesos, which was also the mode). Risk aversion is a score in [1, 6], and
represents the individual’s choice when faced with a set of lottery options with
increasing expected value and increasing variance (see Figure C.3). Choosing the
‘no-risk’ lottery A yielded a score of 6, for extreme risk aversion (this option was
chosen by 48 percent of the sample). Cognitive ability is proxied by the number of
correct answers (out of five possible) from a culture-free intelligence test (see Fig-
1The calculation was designed to give an odd number if the individual’s birth year was odd, and
even otherwise. The survey team was unaware of this connection. Given the availability of verified
IDs which included birthdays, it was possible to check ex-post that the correct type of survey had
been administered.
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Figure C.3: Test of Risk Aversion (Methodology: Binswanger (1980))
Figure C.4: Illustration: Test of Cognitive Ability
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Figure C.5: Personal Savings Plan (All Treatment Groups)
126
C.3. SURVEY MEASUREMENT AND MARKETING MATERIAL
ure C.4 for a sample question). A financial literacy score is given by the number of
correct answers (again, out of five possible) to basic numeracy questions. House-
hold bargaining power is measured as follows: Individuals were asked who was
the main decisionmaker for five types of household expenses (market purchases,
durable goods, transfers to others, personal recreation, and schooling of children).
For each type of expense at their discretion, their bargaining score increased by one,
resulting in a measure with a range [0, 5]. 95 percent of respondents were female;
thus the variable measures predominantly female bargaining power. Distance to
the bank branch is measured as the linear geographic distance to the partner bank,
obtained using GPS coordinates. An existing savings account indicates that the
individual reported to have an existing savings or checking account at any bank
(not necessarily the partner bank) at the time of the baseline survey. ‘Donates to
charity’ is a dummy that switches on if the individual reported to have given any
positive amount of money to charity in the past 12 months. It is a proxy for the
individual’s attitude towards charitable giving, motivated by the fact that the ASA
default penalty was framed as a charitable contribution. ‘Charity buckets’ are com-
mon even in low-income areas of the Philippines, especially for disaster relief and
the Red Cross. While charitable giving is unsurprisingly related to income, 40 per-
cent of the population reported positive contributions, many as small as five pesos
(the median was 100 pesos, conditional on giving). Finally, the shock arrival rate
is proxied by the number of unexpected emergencies (such as death or illness of
a household member, redundancy, natural disasters, damage to house and crops,
theft, and a range of others) that a household suffered in the last 12 months before
the start of the treatment (’Emergencies last yr’).
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